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PLATO’S ATTITUDE TO POETRY
AND THE FINE ARTS




Plato has much to say about poetry and about arts which can
be called fine (or beautiful) such as music and painting, and deals
with them in a variety of contexts.These contributions of his have
attracted the attention of scholars, giving rise to a vast, and ever
increasing,production of books and articles.Much of this production
assumes that it is legitimate to talk of a Platonic philosophy (or
philosophical theory) of art, often even adopting this as the title
(or subtitle) of the scholar’s presentation.1 It is also admitted,though
sometimes with reservations, that his contributions belong in some
* I started to deal with the issues treated in this, very long, article when I submit-
ted a paper,entitled «The quarrel between philosophy and poetry», to the colloque in
honour of Stanley Rosen,entitled «Métaphysique,Herméneutique,Platonisme» which
was organized by Monique Dixsaut and Rémi Brague and took place in Paris in novem-
ber 2001. I was then encouraged to come back to these issues by Jean-François Pra-
deau,and the result is (for the moment) this first instalment.[La seconde partie de cette
étude paraîtra dans la prochaine livraison des Études platoniciennes (Volume II,2005)].
1. E.g. Collingwood, «Plato’s Philosophy of Art», Mind 34, 1925, pp. 154-72; R.C.
Lodge, Plato’s Theory of Art, London 1953;W.J. Oates, Plato’s View of Art, New York
1972; ch. 8 in C. Janaway’s Images of Excellence. Plato’s Critique of the Arts, Oxford
1995,is entitled Plato and the Philosophy of Art,on the assumption,made explicit in
his article on Plato in the Encyclopaedia of Aesthetics, vol. III,p.518, that «it is appro-
priate to speak of his philosophy of art»; titles like the quoted one can also be found
in general books on Plato or in the history of philosophy.
way to the history of aesthetics.Yet, when these reservations come
to the fore, it becomes evident that they are not so small, but make
it difficult to talk of a Platonic philosophy of art.
It is often admitted (following, in the main, P.O. Kristeller’s
influential article on «The Modern System of the Arts»2) that only
in modern times there has arisen the recognition that between the
«fine arts» (beaux arts), which are represented, at least primarily,
by painting, sculpture, architecture, music and poetry, there is an
affinity such that they can be said to constitute a «system» and that
this fact has to do with their being a source of aesthetic pleasure
through the beauty realized in the works they produce.Ancient
authors like Plato himself did not recognize this affinity, because
they were not able or willing to talk of beauty in a recognizedly
distinct aesthetic sense of the word and did not establish a privileged
link between beauty (thus understood) and the arts.The way in
which he classified the «arts» (technai), including under this heading
artisanal crafts or skills and even mathematical disciplines,precluded
in any case the identification of a sufficiently homogeneous group
corresponding to the modern system of «fine arts». Beyond this
one would have to register that, in Kristeller’s words, «such
dominating concepts of modern aesthetics as taste,sentiment,genius,
originality, and creative imagination did not assume their definite
modern meaning before the eighteenth century» (Origins of
Aesthetics, cit., p. 416). In brief, aesthetics is to be regarded as a
modern discipline to which Plato could not give a proper contri-
bution.
Yet at this point it becomes rather paradoxical to admit that Plato
had a particular interest in this field and gave significant and
influential contributions to it while excluding,at least implicitly, that
he could have recognized it as a distinct field. On the basis in fact
of the assertions that have just been expounded one would have
to claim not just that he looked at the object of aesthetics from a
point of view which was different from that of modern aesthetics
but that the very object of aesthetics did not exist for him.
This paradox comes less, but not all difficulties, if one adopts the
alternative view that it makes sense to talk of an ancient aesthetics
but that Plato had a negative attitude to it. Even if one attributes to
Plato a conscious decision in this matter, as does Stephen Halliwell in
his recent The Aesthetics of Mimesis (Princeton 2002), by talking of
Plato’s «anti-aestheticism», that is to say, of his tendency «to reject the
idea of autonomous artistic criteria of value and,with it,the acceptability
of appraising artistic styles or techniques from within a purely artistic
WALTER G. LESZL114
Études platoniciennes I
2.Appeared in Journal of the History
of Ideas 12, 1951, pp. 496-527, and 13,
1952, pp. 17-46; see also his Origins of
Aesthetics: Historical and Conceptual
Overview, in the Encyclopaedia of Aes-
thetics, vol. III, pp. 416-428.
perspective rather than from a wider angle of ethicocultural judgement»
(op.cit.,p.140), there is the risk of going against what looks like a big
stumbling-block to the inclusion of Plato in a history of aesthetics.
Unless in fact one admits that Plato was (at least tacitly) presupposing
the applicability of aesthetic criteria,without making recourse to them
it is hard to circumscribe the fine arts as a distinct domain of life. If
for instance one considers them as a way to pass leisure time,how can
they be distinguished from games? If one considers the influence they
have in shaping our beliefs, how can they constitute a field distinct
from that of rhetoric? Halliwell attempts to do so on the basis of the
description that is given of them as mimetic arts.Yet, though this
suggestion (as I shall try to show below) has some justification, as it
stands it is open to the same objection, for there are other disciplines
or arts that can be regarded as mimetic and are so regarded by Plato
(e.g. sophistic in the Sophist).
Some scholars try to avoid this difficulty by concentrating on some
specific discipline: there are articles or books concerning Plato’s
contributions to poetry or to the study of painting or to some other
discipline3. Sometimes it is even explicitly claimed that, given the
heterogeneity, in Plato’s eyes, of the arts with which he occupies
himself, there is only space for distinct consideration of the
contributions he gives to those disciplines (cfr.e.g.J.Moravcsik,Plato:
Plato and Modern Aesthetics, in Encyclopaedia of Aesthetics,cit.,pp.
529-531).Now,there is no doubt that these disciplines received some
recognition by Plato before Aristotle (notice, on poetry, that in
Symposium 205b-c poiesis in the narrow sense of production which
concerns music and verses is kept distinct from poiesis in the large
sense of production from what is not to what is;Plato is clearly using
it in the narrow sense when connecting it to mimetiké in Republic
X, 603b8; similarly poietai are sometimes denominated by him
specifically our «poets», e.g. in Lysis 214a1 and in Ion, 532c7-8, and
poetiké is sometimes used in the specific sense of our «poetic», e.g.
in Gorgias 502d1, in Ion 532c8, and in Republic X, 607b6, c4, and
608b7).Yet the approach that Plato adopts to them raises problems.
Starting with the simpler case,that of painting,in most cases in which
Plato deals with it does so with the purpose of illustrating something
else (the typical case, which will attract our attention, is that of the
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3. On Plato on poetry e.g. Plato on
Poetry ed. by P. Murray, Cambridge
1996; G. F. Else, Plato and Aristotle on
poetry, Chapel Hill and London 1986;
G. Colin, «Platon et la poésie», Rev. Et.
Grecques 31, 1928, pp. 1-72; W.C.
Greene, «Plato’s View of Poetry», Har-
vard Studies in Classical Philology, 29,
1918,pp.1-75; G.R. F.Ferrari, «Plato and
poetry» in G. Kennedy, ed., The Cam-
bridge History of Literary Criticism.
Vol. I,Cambridge 1989;on Plato on pain-
ting: M. Sartorius, «Plato und die Male-
rei», Arch. Gesch. Philos. IX, 1896, pp.
123-48; N. Demand, «Plato and the pain-
ters», Phoenix 29, 1975, pp. 1-20; E.
Keuls, Plato and Greek Painting, Lei-
den 1978; further P.-M.Schuhl,Platon et
l’art des son temps (arts plastiques),
Paris 1952, 2nd ed.
use of painting in Republic X to illustrate poetry). So it is difficult to
treat this as a circumscribed field of inquiry.The other ‘plastic arts’
(or ‘figurative arts’) are not usually quoted to this purpose, but Plato
says a good deal less about them than about painting. In the case of
poetry it should be recalled that for Plato it concerns both music
(mousiké) and verses (metra),for this is how poiesis is defined in the
mentioned passage of the Symposium.This is probably in conformity
with the normal use of these words in Plato’s times, for it was usual,
for a long time at least, that the poet would not just write down a
poem but compose the music that accompanies its recitation,and this
was true even of the tragedians.Aristotle,in his Poetics,tacitly excludes
music from the field of poetry (he mentions the melos or the melopoiia
as a ‘part’of tragedy at the end of ch.6,but, though recognizing there
and in 26, 1462a15-17, that it is a great source of pleasure, makes
nothing of it in the rest of the work, and admits that tragedy can be
of interest - or exercise its effect - even when read,presumably aloud,
but not represented,cfr.26,1462a10-18).Most scholars,when dealing
with poetry in Plato, take for granted Aristotle’s implicit redefinition
of it,without wondering whether this reflects a substantially changed
attitude to poetic experience. It is true that, as we shall see, Plato is
sometimes willing to talk of stories or discourses (logoi) in both metre
and prose, and does so especially in some passages of books II and
III of the Republic.Yet the treatment of them in this part of the work
is said to belong to an explanation of education in music (mousiké)
in the large sense (not just our music) and is followed by a consideration
of music (mousiké) in the narrow sense (roughly corresponding to
our music). So probably in his eyes their treatment is not complete
without consideration of music.Just as poems usually were not recited
(or even sung) without the accompaniment of music, the practice of
a purely instrumental music, which is habitual for us, was unusual.
When talking about music (mousiké) what was often understood was
the combination of words recited or sung, of sounds emitted by
instruments and,often,of the movements of dance and/or of acting4.
Further, some scholars are not satisfied with the restriction, still
present in Aristotle,to poetry,and prefer to talk of literature in general
or of literary criticism5.Yet, literature for us certainly includes the
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4. On Plato’s own understanding of
what is mousiké see Laws II,654e,where
figure (schema),tune (melos),song (odé)
and dance (orchesis) are clearly regarded
as constitutive of music (see further 672e
ff. and VIII, 835a-b); in 653d ff., esp. 655a
(also 669d), it is said that figures (sche-
mata) and tunes (mele) are present in
music, since this is concerned with
rhythm (rhythmos) and harmony (har-
monia) (figure, one can see, is not a
wholly indipendent category,for it can be
found in dance but also in other forms of
music and also in acting).
5. Cfr. e.g. J.Annas, «Plato on the Tri-
viality of literature», in Moravcsik and
Temko, 1982, pp. 1-28; P.Vicaire, Platon:
critique littéraire, Paris 1960; chapters
on Plato are included in J.W.H. Atkins,
Literary Criticism in Antiquity, Cam-
bridge 1934, and in D. Russell, Criticism
in Antiquity, London 1981.
works in prose by historians like Herodotus and Thucydides, while
there is no sign that Plato was interested in them,and even Aristotle
shows a dismissive attitude towards them (in some well-known
passages of his Poetics in which history is said to be less universal
than poetry and is said to be episodic, cfr. ch. 9 and 23). It should
also include more technical works like those of the Hippocratic
physicians, but this would lead us very far from poetry, and in fact
they do not receive attention in this connection by either Plato or
Aristotle. On the other hand there are points of contact between
poetry and rhetoric that could attract the attention of the ancient
authors (e.g. for Aristotle they have a common interest in elocution,
even if this is not treated in exactly the same way).As to «literary
criticism»,one cannot say that Plato contributed to it, if this etiquette
is understood in the sense which is current for us, for he is not
interested in discussing e.g. the comparative merits between Homer
and Hesiod or between Aeschilus and Euripides from a literary point
of view.
One can see, then, that the notion of poetry, if this is detached
from music, and that of literature are of difficult application in trying
to identify a Platonic philosophy of art that is restricted to this field.
But its restriction to this field seems to be not quite appropriate also
because Plato himself is not inclined to respect it.We have already seen
that he admits some affinity between painting and poetry and a close
association between poetry and music as both belonging to music
(mousiké) in the large sense of the word. He has, as we shall see, a
great interest in drama,and in tragedy in particular,but one reason for
this is probably that he must have considered it as a sort of
Gesamtkunstwerk,i.e.as the total or complete work of art,embracing
in itself not only a plurality of genres of poetry (epic, lyric, in addition
to drama in the narrow sense) but also a plurality of genres of art (in
addition to poetry in the narrow sense recitation, music - including
dance - and painting through the scenography).This attitude must have
been not only his,for it seems that certain forms of poetry,such as lyric
poetry, towards the end of the fifth century had lost in popularity in
favour of drama (cfr.G.Nagy, «Early Greek views of poets and poetry»,
in Kennedy,The Cambridge History of Literary Criticism,vol.I,[pp.1-
77] pp.69 ff.).Homeric Epos on the other hand preserved its importance
to a large extent because of its role in education.
2. On the  i s sue  whether  there  was  an aes the t ic s  in
antiqui ty : the  beauti ful  ar ts
It is important to make it clear whether Plato was reacting in a
negative way to an approach to the fine arts which can be classified
as aesthetic or he had no such approach in mind. In the former
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case it is conceivable that he took for granted that aesthetic criteria
of evaluation were circulating in the culture of his times but could
not accept them: so this becomes a further point that would have
to be ascertained. In the latter case the conclusion is simple: he did
not contribute to aesthetics because he could not do so.
As anticipated above,it is often claimed,by scholars,that aesthetics
as a discipline is a modern invention.This is supposedly to be shown
by the fact that the ancient authors, and particularly the ancient
philosophers, did not possess the terminology, thus the conceptual
apparatus, that is constitutive of this discipline. It is said that they
were not able to identify, inside the ample field of arts and crafts
(technai) recognized by them, a class or group of arts which
corresponds to what for us are the fine arts (beaux arts); it is equally
said that, when they talked of beauty, they were not able to keep
distinct a sense of aesthetic beauty from the senses which reflect
other forms of appreciation, and, primarily, moral appreciation. It is
said that they missed such indispensable concepts as that of taste
or that of imagination.
One clear negative statement (in addition to the one quoted above)
is due to Kristeller,who, in his article entitled «The Modern System of
the Arts», comes to the following negative conclusion about ancient
aesthetics:«Thus classical antiquity left no systems or elaborate concepts
of an aestetic nature, but merely a number of scattered notions and
suggestions that exercised a lasting influence down to modern times
but had to be carefully selected,taken out of their context,rearranged,
reemphasized and reinterpreted or misinterpreted before they could
be utilized as building materials for aesthetic systems.We have to admit
the conclusion,distastful to many historians of aesthetics but grudgingly
admitted by most of them, that ancient writers and thinkers, though
confronted with excellent works of art and quite susceptible to their
charm, were neither able nor eager to detach the aesthetic quality of
these works of art from their intellectual,moral,religious and practical
function or content, or to use such an aesthetic quality as a standard
for grouping the fine arts together or for making them the subject of
a comprehensive philosophical interpretation.» (art. cit., p. 506) 
I concentrate for the moment on one aspect of this issue,namely
the recognition of a class or group of arts which corresponds to
what for us are the fine arts (beaux arts). Kristeller does not deny
that there is some correspondence between these arts and what for
the ancient were the «imitative arts», but thinks that this
correspondence is not such as to justify the positive conclusion that
they recognized the fine arts because (a) they did not conceive them
as a system, and (b) the arts involved are not quite the same and
present different interrelations (on this second point cfr. art. cit., p.
504).An example of the discrepancy concerning (b) is given by
the fact that architecture is not included in the lists given by the
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ancients. Kristeller’s starting-point is clearly that the position of the
‘moderns’ is quite different on these two points6. But should one
concede to Kristeller this starting-point?
The impressive erudition that Kristeller displays in his article
seems to have prevented other scholars from noticing certain serious
weakness in his argument concerning precisely the claims he makes.
(I) He expressly talks of the modern system of the arts, meaning by
them,as he explains towards the beginning of the article (at p.497),
the five arts of painting, sculpture, architecture, music and poetry,
which constitute its «irreducible nucleus» to which some other
arts are sometimes added.Yet most of the authors he quotes do not
recognize such a system,for either (as Kristeller himself admits) they
show to be interested only in some of the arts (for instance in painting
and poetry and their relationship) or they adopt a larger list of arts,
and this happens,at least in some cases,on the basis of criteria which
exclude the adoption of such a system (cfr. e.g., in addition to the
lists by Batteux, by Mendelssohn and by Kant quoted below, that
by Montesquieu in his Essai sur le goût, quoted in n. 191, which
includes dance and «les différentes sortes de jeux»).The main author
who recognizes those five arts and asserts that they constitute a
system is Hegel, in his Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik, section on
Einteilung at the end of the introductory part (pp. 100 ff. in the
Theorie Werksausgabe, vol. 13), but the reasons he gives for
considering them that way can only convince Hegelians (e.g. that
architecture is based on the temple as the house of God, this being
the condition of exteriority with respect to which sculpture and
painting are steps to interiority).Kristeller avoids discussing Hegel’s
position (he stops with Kant),but this must be somehow in the back
of his mind.
(II) He quotes certain authors like Batteux for his «famous and
influential treatise, Les beaux arts réduits à un même principle
(1746)» and D’Alembert in his Discours préliminaire to the
Encyclopédie as if they propounded some significant innovation,
not realizing that their conception of the fine arts is that which is
already to be found in the ancient authors, evidently better known
to them than to Kristeller.Batteux in fact adopts a subdivision of the
arts into three types, viz. (1) those which just aim at utility, which
include the ‘mechanical arts’, (2) those which he says are called
«les beaux arts par excellence» and which aim at pleasure (on this
point I reproduce the quotation given by Kristeller,n.190:«Les autres
ont pour object le plaisir …on le appelle les beaux arts par
excellence.Tels sont la musique, la poésie, la peinture, la sculpture
PLATO’S ATTITUDE TO POETRY 119
Études platoniciennes I
6.A position close to that adopted by
Kristeller is to be found in W.Tatarkie-
wicz, «Classification of Arts in Antiquity»,
Journal of the History of Ideas, XXIV,
1963,pp.231-240;cfr.also his History of
Aesthetics. I: Ancient Aesthetics, Wars-
zawa, 1970.
et l’art du geste ou la danse»), (3) those which aim at both utility and
pleasure,which include architecture and eloquence.It can be noticed
that his five fine arts include dance and exclude architecture, and
(it should be added) that he takes the theatre as a combination of
all the other arts.What, in addition to pleasure, keeps the fine arts
together for Batteux is … imitation!.As to the position of D’Alembert,
it has to be admitted that he talks of the (standard) five arts, called
by him ‘liberal arts’, but his account of them remains on the same
lines. (I reproduce the quotation given by Kristeller, n. 196: «Parmi
les arts libéraux qu’on réduit à des principes,ceux qui se proposent
l’imitation de la nature on été appelés beaux-arts, parce qu’ils on
principalement l’agrément pour object» [my italics].) 
(III) In the case at least of one author, Mendelssohn, he converts
the expression of a wish («that the fine arts (painting, sculpture,
music, the dance, and architecture) and belles lettres (poetry and
eloquence) should be reduced to some common principle better
than imitation») into a fact («thus was the first among the Germans
to formulate a system of the fine arts») (art. cit., II, pp. 36-37).
(IV) One can see that Mendelssohn has not a system of the five
arts,but recognizes a distinction between fine arts and belles lettres,
including eloquence. Similarly Kant does not have a system of the
five arts, for in § 51 of his Kritik der Urteilskraft he admits three
types of beautiful arts: those connected with word (die redende),
the figurative arts (die bildende) and the art of the play of sensations
(die Kunst des Spiels der Empfindungen).The first group includes
eloquence and poetry; the second group ‘plastic’ (die Plastik) and
painting,with a subdivision of plastic into sculpture and architecture,
while gardening is associated to painting; the third group includes
music and colouring (Farbenkunst).
(V) Kristeller is obliged to leave out of consideration or to play down
the positions of those authors,like Lessing,who expressed reservations
about the possibility of detecting a system among the fine arts.The
reservations expressed by Lessing in particular (in his Laocoön) are
focussed on the traditional parallel between painting and poetry, but
have more general consequences,whereas this is denied by Kristeller
(cfr.art.cit.,p.36).He asserts the existence of a basic difference between
the two arts,in that painting has to do with objects which are regarded
as collocated in space and poetry with objects which are regarded as
collocated in time, i.e. with actions, with the consequence that only
poetry can represent what is in development,i.e.a succession of events,
while a picture is restricted to a single event. In this way he makes
obvious among other things that poetry,at least in certain forms (those
which interest most Plato and Aristotle),offers a narrative (what is told
is a muthos),while this cannot happen in the case of a (single) painting.
(This sort of distinction, as we shall see Part II, in ch. 28, finds some
anticipations in the ancient authors.) 
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One is not, then, in the position to oppose the moderns to the
ancients because they had a system of the arts which was not
recognized by the latter. In fact, in spite of the title given by Batteux
to his treatise, it is not easy to conceive how such different activities
as music, architecture, painting and poetry can be reduced to one
principle. It would have to be asked how much credit this sort of
view really enjoys, and if it is not happening that, on Kristeller’s
authority, a conclusion is accepted (‘the ancient had no aesthetics’)
that is obtained by an argument (‘they did not have it because they
did not recognize a system of the arts’) that is based on an assumption
(‘a system of the arts exists’) which very few would accept. Anyhow,
in so far as some unity can be found among the various fine arts, it
can be said that it was recognized by the ancients in treating them
as imitative arts,and that the moderns did not make much significant
progress on this point (see above under (II)). But there is an
unavoidable tension between the point of view of imitation, which
makes sense of the work of art by putting it into some relationship
to what it is supposed to reproduce, however freely, and the point
of view of beauty in the formal sense, which makes sense of the
work of art by setting requirements that it must satisfy independently
of any such relationship.This tension emerges with clarity when it
is recognized that there are works of arts,especially those belonging
to architecture, which are susceptible to be judged only from the
second point of view. Its existence, as I shall illustrate below
(particularly in Part II,ch.29),was not ignored by the ancient authors.
In what follows more immediately I shall first develop the point
of view of imitation (starting with ch. 6), considering what unity
among the various arts can be established adopting it.For the moment
there are two provisos to be made.The first is that it is of importance
to realize that ‘imitative art’ is not a purely classificatory concept or
description.There are arts or genres inside the arts which are more
imitative than others.For instance drama is regarded as more imitative
than other forms of poetry. Certain forms are regarded as imitative
in a paradigmatic way (this is true of painting, and, inside painting,
of portraiture). Certain arts or certain genres can be rather little
imitative, but are associated to others, that are fully imitative, by
affinity, and thus included in the classification. Music is treated as
imitative on its own grounds, which are questionable but accepted
by important authors like Plato and Aristotle (see Part II,ch.28).The
only doubtful case seems to be constituted by architecture, for there
are no clear grounds for treating it as imitative. It should be noticed
however that the ‘moderns’are not agreed in admitting it among the
beautiful arts,and that Plato does seem to want to associate it to arts
like painting in Republic IV 401b.The fact in any case that ‘being
imitative’ does not apply to all the arts in the same way has the
implication that the concept is used in a rather flexible manner,
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and that in some contexts it can be more inclusive than in others.
(We shall see for instance that Plato in Republic X talks of poetry
‘in that it is imitative’, and that this raises problems as to how much
poetry he wants to include.) 
The second proviso is that one cannot talk simply of ‘imitative
arts’, but of imitative arts which produce pleasure in the viewers
and/or hearers (it being understood that it is a pleasure of a certain
type). Only in this way other arts that can be said to be imitative,
such as sophistic, can be excluded.This is a point that is remarked,
as we have seen, by some modern authors like D’Alembert, but
that has received little recognition in recent scholarship.This leads
of course to the issue whether the concept of pleasure (hedoné)
adopted by the ancients has a distinct aesthetic meaning. In other
words,one has to ascertain whether the ancient thinkers recognized
that there are pleasures that can be regarded as properly aesthetic.
Surprisingly there is little discussion of this concept on the
part of the scholars who have attempted to clarify what ancient
aesthetics is. For instance the article dedicated to this topic in the
Encyclopaedia of Aesthetics concerns exclusively modern authors.
In the same work, in connection with the topic of the “origins of
aesthetics”, an article is dedicated to the “history of Aisthesis” (op.
cit.,vol. III,pp.428-432,by D.Summers),but, though notice is given
to the fact that the feeling of pleasure could be regarded as belonging
to the field of aisthesis, this receives no development,but the main
purpose is to explain Baumgarten’s decision to refer to aisthesis
when inventing “aesthetics”. In the index to Halliwell’s Aesthetic of
mimesis there is no separate heading for “pleasure” (or hedoné),
but this is mentioned exclusively in connection with mimesis.The
same author gives attention to the topic of pleasure in ch. II of his
Aristotle’s Poetics (London,1986),but he tends to minimize its role
and limits his attention to this Aristotelian work.At least he does
not completely ignore this issue,but this is unusual.Yet the relevance
of this notion for aesthetics is not hard to grasp. For instance Kant
is very explicit in admitting that the judgment of taste involves
pleasure and displeasure (cfr. e.g. §§ 36 and 37 of his Kritik der
Urteilskraft).
3. On the  i s sue  whether  there was  an aes the t ic s  in
antiqui ty : the  concepts
Scholars like Kristeller maintain equally,as we have seen,that the
ancient authors missed certain concepts that are indispensable for
aesthetics.What is usually not made clear,by these scholars, is what
precisely they suppose to be absent in the Greek culture. Is it just
a certain type of philosophical theorization concerning the arts and
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our reactions to them? Or is the very aesthetic experience which
underlies this theorization supposed to be absent as well? Their
intention is probably to claim that only the first object is missing.
However the implication of what they assert seems to go in the
sense of excluding the presence of an aesthetic experience in the
Greek world. For if this experience were available, it would have
found its expression in an appropriate terminology (not necessarily
very technical, but sufficiently distinctive), but it is precisely this
terminology which is said to be not available.
This point can be made more clear by drawing a parallel with
ethics. It is out of question that ethics as a philosophical discipline
was an innovation by the Greek philosophers.It can also be admitted
that this innovation made some difference to the terminology used
in the field of morals, for there were progresses not only in the
consciousness and consistency with which it was used but also in
its richness and sophistication. But it is equally out of question that
certain moral criteria and rules were operating before the invention
of ethics as a philosophical discipline, and that their existence was
signalled by such words as «good and bad», «just and unjust», «right
and wrong».(They were not purely moral words from the beginning,
but without a basic moral meaning to be enucleated the task of
philosophical ethics would have been impossible.) These words or
some equivalents are probably to be found in any human language.
It is hard to imagine what sense of what is good and bad and so forth
may have been operating at a prelinguistic stage.
If we now consider the case of aesthetics, it is manifest that the
parallel can only be partial, for not only does no question arise about
the sense that could be had by men of what is beautiful and what
is ugly at a prelinguistic stage,but clearly any community needs some
moral criteria and rules to be a community at all.However the Greek
belonged to a stage at which,as they themselves recognized,a number
of objects, of activities and of skills had been introduced that were
not in view of the ‘necessities of life’.What is supposed is that they,
though finding themselves in this condition and having at their
disposal words like kalós and aischrós which could have served to
convey aesthetic judgements, did not use them for this purpose. If
this is so, what capacity could have they had to make those
judgements?
One only has to reflect on this point, to realise that something
must have gone wrong with the prevailing thesis of an absence of
aesthetics in Greek culture. It cannot be doubted that an attitude
that can only be classified as aesthetic played an important part in
the life of the Greeks, for many of the products of their civilization,
especially those belonging to the field of the fine arts, just as many
of the practices pursued by them, such as the symposia, cannot be
explained in other ways, for instance as expressing the wish to
PLATO’S ATTITUDE TO POETRY 123
Études platoniciennes I
celebrate the gods, however important these other aims may have
been.And one cannot believe that this aesthetic attitude was not
cultivated in a self-conscious way. It is hard to suppose, for instance,
that they organized competitions for the best drama or the best song,
without realizing that this judgment involved an aesthetic
appreciation.
It is likely that the scholars who deny the existence of an aesthetics
in the Greek world are impressed by the fact that,while there existed,
at least starting with Plato and Aristotle, works which defined the
main concepts of ethics and discussed the main issues involved in
their use, there is no comparable work in the field of aesthetics.
There is no work in fact in which the tasks and objectives of
aesthetics receive some definition, in contradistinction (at least
implicitly) with other disciplines such as ethics, psychology and
criticism of art. A work of this sort should include (saying
schematically and selectively): (1) a discussion of what is beautiful
by determining, at the least, its definition and its main criteria, in
general and with application to artworks;(2) a discussion of notions
that are related to that of beauty, including those of the ugly, of the
sublime,of the marvellous …;(3) a classification of those arts which
can be called «beautiful» or which, in any case, give rise to an
experience involving aesthetic pleasure, accompanied by some
treatment of their nature, by distinguishing them from other types
of arts or skills, in addition to explaining their interrelations; (4) a
similar classification of types of artwork, e.g. of genera of poetry
(epos, drama, lyric, etc.), accompanied by a definition of the nature
of each type; (5) a clarification of the reaction (of pleasure and of
emotional involvement, including participation or identification,but
possibly also of acquisition of knowledge) which we have in
observing (or hearing) the products of these arts and, at the same
time, of the capacity of judgement or of taste which is exercised in
doing so; (6) an analogous treatment of the capacity (imagination,
inspiration,etc.,but also skill) which is at the basis of artistic creativity.
The closest thing we possess to a treatise of aesthetics, for a long
period at least, is Aristotle’s Poetics,but this, though containing some
general reflections (especially on the notion of mimesis), on the
whole does not satisfy the requirements now laid down. However,
before coming to the conclusion that no general work on aesthetics
was written by Aristotle or by any other author who would have
had the capacity of writing one because no field that could somehow
be circumscribed as aesthetics and no relative conceptual apparatus
was available, we should look for an alternative explanation.
The first observation to be made is that Aristotle’s Poetics is not
a general work on aesthetics because it was written with different
purposes. It can be conjectured that the Stagirite’s original intention
was to write an ars poetica, that is to say a handbook which was
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meant to give instructions to poets, and especially to tragedians, on
how to best compose poems (or tragedies).The prescriptive tone
which is noticeable in various parts of the work (especially in chs.
13-15 and 17,where there are formulae of the type: «one must [dei]
do so and so») and its evident purpose of propounding rules for
writing a good tragedy suggests this. From this point of view the
work is to be seen in parallel with Aristotle’s Rhetoric,as a handbook
of rhetoric, and with his Topics, as a handbook of dialectic.The fact
that his approach is not very practical and concrete is not a disproof
of this conclusion, for this is true of those other books as well.
However, somewhat paradoxically,Aristotle believes that tragedy at
its best belongs to the past, and to a past that is not very close to
the present: it is the tragedy of Sophocles. He cannot have held a
very strong faith that a new Sophocles would appear and write his
tragedies following the directions given in the Poetics.So the original
intention with which the work was written is to some extent
supplanted by other intentions,so that his discourse in part becomes
historical and in part becomes a sort of contribution to literary
criticism (e.g. by giving general definitions of the literary genres
studied by him).
A work like the Poetics that was written with the purposes now
described manifestly cannot constitute a general work on aesthetics.
But is it imaginable that a work like this could have been written,
if there had not been a larger background of reflection about
aesthetics? The same question can be raised about Plato’s own
contributions to questions which have to do with the sphere of
aesthetics.And there are lost works, starting with Aristotle’s lost
dialogue On poets, which would render the picture we have more
rich and complex. (I cannot agree with those scholars who assume
that everything of significance that was written by Aristotle is
preserved in the ‘acroamatic’ works which are preserved. In that
dialogue he could have given that detailed account of katharsis
which is promised in Politics VIII and which is not to be found in
the Poetics,and he could made more explicit his reservations towards
Plato’s approach.) There are testimonies that an author like
Democritus occupied himself of poetry in general and of Homer in
particular, and one cannot presume that his contributions, just as
those of other authors that are lost, would make no difference for
the idea we have of ancient aesthetics.The existence of a reflection
and discussion presenting a certain sophistication is made probable
by the fact that both Plato and Aristotle seem to rely on some existing
(relatively) technical terminology (for illustrations see Part II,ch.19).
Plato, in his Phaedrus (cfr. 266c ff.), testifies to the existence of a
literature on rhetoric which made some use of technical language,
and this language reappears, with developments, in Aristotle’s
Rhetoric.The same must have been true (at least to some extent in
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writing, but to some extent orally) for the field of music and of the
fine arts,and in the case of poetry there are some overlappings with
rhetoric (especially for their common interest in lexis).
It is important to realise that both Plato and Aristotle have in
mind the fact that tragedies, comedies, and other artworks were
usually submitted to public competitions in cities like Athens.The
citizens who went to the theatre, even when they could not vote
themselves, were involved in the competition among the dramas
represented, and certainly there were hot disputes about their
merits.One can suspect that even the judgement of the appointed
judges was not based on purely aesthetic criteria.Yet the existence
of a popular public that is interested in the discussion of the
relative merits of dramas,of poems and other artworks constitutes
the natural background for a smaller public of connoisseurs who
would take up the discussion at a higher level, by expressing
judgement with greater consciousness of the aesthetic criteria
to be applied.There must have been some awareness of the fact
that divergence of judgement could reflect divergence in the
criteria applied, and this must have led to some discussion about
those criteria and about the general notions (starting with that
of beauty) to which they are associated. The existence of this
smaller public of connoisseurs who express their judgements and
who dispute and discuss constitutes itself the background for the
reflection and theorization done by philosophers like Plato and
Aristotle and also for their more practical contributions.What they
wrote was not meant to give a full picture of the reality (social,
political, intellectual) which was before their eyes, but consisted
largely in interventions that were intended to modify it and that
are fully intelligible to a reader who is familiar with it in an
independent way.This is not our position, or it is to a very limited
extent, for not many sources of information are available to us
beyond what Plato and Aristotle tell us.
Still, if it is plausible to maintain that there was, at the time of
Plato and of Aristotle, an educated public which discussed matters
concerning aesthetics at a certain level of sophistication,by making
use of an appropriate terminology, why is it that we miss not only
any general work on aesthetics but even work or works that give
us a sufficiently complete idea of the range of the terms used, of
the definitions proposed for them, and of the issues discussed by
using them? If we want to refer to a work which offers a full treatment
of the questions concerning ethics we are obliged to refer to
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, but already through a survey of
Plato’s Socratic dialogues we get a rather comprehensive idea of
how those questions were discussed or could be discussed in




Any reply that one tries to give to this question is inevitably
conjectural. I attempt to give two such replies.The first is that the
issues concerning ethics and also concerning politics were felt to
be much more important and urgent than those concerning
aesthetics.To discuss about what is right or wrong, good or bad,
just or unjust,seemed to have precedence,in order to take a decision
about the main question that a man has to raise for himself: how to
live.(We shall see that this question is very evident in certain Platonic
dialogues.) These questions seemed to involve not only ethics but
also politics because man,according to the well-known Aristotelian
dictum, must be considered a political animal. If man is also an
aesthetic animal (we shall see that some assertions by Aristotle go
in this sense), he is so in his leisure time, by occupying it with a
sophisticated pastime, and it may seem not so important to decide
in what pastimes the leisure time is employed,for this does not make
a great difference in how one lives,while being just or unjust makes
all the difference. Further, it seemed to both Plato and Aristotle
that, in so far as a good use of leisure time is of importance, it should
be dedicated to philosophical contemplation.For them it is the great
significance of this aim that has to be asserted against the preference
given by the well-born to political life.
The second reply is that the need of giving a full account of the
concepts which belong to the sphere of aesthetics, both from
the point of view of the public and from the point of view of the
artist or creator, was felt in modern times because the sphere of
aesthetics was seen as the expression of the freedom and of the
creativity of the individual.What happened is not an introduction
of notions, such as those of taste and of creativity, that were wholly
absent in antiquity, but that existing notions were considered in a
changed perspective.Divergences in taste and in aesthetic judgment
were not seen any more as a sign of imperfection and of
contradiction in human nature but as an expression of the
personalities of the different persons involved.Thus if the modern
notion of taste finds an equivalent or a substitute (as I shall suggest
below) in the ancient notion of a feeling of pleasure qualified in
a certain way, the underlying perspective is different, for the ancient
philosophers would not be interested in exploring it as an
expression of the individual freedom of judgement and of choice.
They assumed, rather, that what makes taste different from one
person to another is an idiosyncratic defect that would have to
be corrected.Similarly,creativity is recognized in postulating a form
of divine inspiration,but this is not very much the creativity of the
individual, since he is in some way an instrument of a divine entity
(we shall find this point asserted explicitly in Plato’s Ion). (Further,
divine inspiration seems to have been admitted only in the case
of poetry, not in the case of painting or of other arts.The idea
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that the painter is inspired comes after Plato. And this helps to
explain the failure to mention inspiration in Republic X) Creativity
was not meant to exclude some recourse to skill, but skill was
not supposed to give expression to the personality of its possessor
or even of the inventor of new techniques.Thus there was little
interest in discovering, in the works of art, the original creative
touch of the singular artist.
One observation that is relevant in this connection is that,when
ancient authors like Plinius talk of the development of certain arts,
they are concerned with certain achievements of a relatively technical
nature like the invention of illusory representation7.Similarly Aristotle,
in his Poetics,offers certain characterizations of the works of poets,
e.g. that some of them imitated men as they are and some of them
imitated them as better than they are,which leave out the originality
and uniqueness of the mentioned poet.Another relevant comment
that can be quoted is one by Halliwell (The Aesthetics of Mimesis,
cit., pp. 247-48), on the issue of expression as self-expression on
the part of the composer: of this there is «very little trace at all in
most ancient conceptions of mimesis, which are not for the most
part preoccupied with a personal point of view, let alone the inner
life, of the artist, but much more with the status of artistic works or
performances and the kinds of experience they generate in their
audiences».
It can be said,a bit schematically,that the issue is as follows.According
to certain modern conceptions of aesthetics it is admitted either that
a properly aesthetic experience concerns items or objects which are
the products of human creativity or at least that there is a significant
difference between the aesthetic experience which concerns these
items or objects and the, still aesthetic, experience which concerns
items or objects existing in nature. Of course, further differentiations
may be admitted inside each field, for instance by giving a privileged
place to theatrical experience, but these are less basic than this one.
Human creativity as the origin of those items or objects seems to be
only one reason for admitting that difference. Another reason is
constituted by the conviction that not only what belongs to the realm
of language in the proper sense but also what belongs to the realm of
music and of the visual arts has the nature of a language, is charged
with symbolic significance.This is a point of view that, at least in the
realm of the visual arts,is absent in authors like Plato and Aristotle,with
an exception to be mentioned below. However this limitation is not
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7. In commenting on this fact L.
Eldestein, in his The Idea of Progress in
Classical Antiquity, Baltimore 1967,
remarks that «a technological theory of
art being still predominant, art was jud-
ged in technological terms.The day had
not yet come for assuming that different
art-forms represent different ways of
seeing the world and that the genius of
the artist is decisive for the greatness of
his accomplishment,which itself is time-
less» (p. 78).
an obstacle for them to admitting that the contemplation of paintings,
statues,etc.,is a source of a pleasure that is of an aesthetic nature,when
they satisfy certain criteria of beauty.
The perspective of the ancient authors (with limitation to those
considered here) is different from the modern perspective, because
they admit that there is a type of aesthetic experience which is
fundamentally the same in the case of the items or objects which are
human products and the items or objects which are the products of
nature or of some divinity, there being the inclination to admit that
there is an affinity between human art and the more comprehensive
art which operates at a cosmic level,so that also the products of nature
will satisfy the same criteria of beauty. For them the main difference
is not to be found in the experience which concerns these two fields,
but between this experience as a whole and the experience which
concerns those items or objects which not only are human products
but which have to do with man in the sense that they are in some
way ‘imitative’ of the human thoughts and emotions.These items or
objects belong to the field of music and of poetry, especially drama,
which for this reason have a privileged place in aesthetic experience,
though they are not treated in the same way.
The exception to be mentioned is that it is admitted there are
paintings or statues which portray persons in such a way as to let
transpire the emotions and thoughts of the person portrayed.As
we shall see (cfr. Part II, ch. 26),Aristotle talks in this connection of
the fact that figures and colours (of the painting or statue) are signs
(semeia) of the character of the person portrayed.As signs they
clearly require some intellectual operation of conjecturing to be
correctly interpreted by the onlooker. It would seem that, if a much
later author, Dio Chrysostom, claims that the statue of Zeus made
by Phidias reveals, through a tacit language, the main qualities and
traits of character of the divinity such as his majesty,his severity and
his benevolence, he develops the same approach (cfr. Oratio XII,
§§ 74-77).The meaning that is to be found in the products of the
visual arts depends not so much on the intention of their authors
as on the objects they reproduce, there being no meaning if the
object is not a human or divine being.8
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8. It should be noticed that the view
stated by Kristeller that there is no aes-
thetics in antiquity is not new with him,
but is to be found in previous authors,
for instance in certain publications by
Bernhard Schweitzer.Precisely the claim
that there cannot be an aesthetics in the
absence of a «Vorstellung vom dem
schöpferischen Anteil des Menschen an
der Art and der Wirkung des Kunstwerk,
das er hervorbringt» is formulated by this
author in Platon und die bildende
Kunst der Griechen,Tübingen 1953, p.
12. He thus associates what he regards
as the modern invention of aesthetics
with the recognition of a human creati-
vity distinct from the creativity that God
exercises towards the whole world.This
sort of view about the history of aesthe-
tics is to be found in various works on
the topic, e.g. in the book by Marc Jime-
nez quoted below.
In ancient times the sphere of ethics started to be explored by
philosophers,at least from Socrates,as an expression of the freedom
of choice of the individual, for it depends on him whether to live
as a good or as bad man, even if the choice he makes can be
influenced by the education received,the environment in which he
lives, and so forth. But only in modern times could the sphere of
aesthetics be explored by philosophers with a similar attitude, and
this is the reason why so much attention was given to it.An account
of the capacities of an individual man, such as that given by Kant
in his works, would not be complete if it did not consider his
creativity as an artist (when he is one) and (as part of the public)
his reaction to the sight (or the hearing) of beautiful things.The
attitude by Plato and by Aristotle is profoundly different, because
they took for granted that the sphere of aesthetics was something
that concerned the community, the city (the polis), rather than the
single individual.Hence part at least of their contributions are made
from the point of view of the city and belong to works that are, to
some extent at least, political.
4. Some peculiar i t ies  of  ancient  aesthet ic  experience
The sphere of aesthetics concerned the city in two ways: (I) the
education (paideia) to be given to the individual from childhood
was supposed to consist, to a large extent, in music (mousiké),
with inclusion (we have seen) of literature, but what sort of music
(or literature) should be imparted, in which way it should be
imparted, and to what extent, is something that had to be decided
by the authorities of the city having in mind the principle that
‘each citizen belongs not to himself but to the city’ (cfr.Aristotle,
Politics VIII 1, 1337a27-29; a somewhat similar assertion by Plato is
to be found in Laws VII 804d:the children «belong more to the polis
than to their parents»). (II) The administration of the leisure-time of
the citizens was left only to a limited extent to their personal choices,
for the city assumed on itself the task of organizing their cultural
activities, often by organizing festivals in which dramatic and other
representations and competitions would take place. Of course the
single citizen,at least in a democratic city like Athens,was not obliged
to take part to these activities, but this meant not so much that he
would pursue cultural activities in a private place as that he would
cut himself out from cultural activities,for these belonged prevalently
to the communal sphere.
It is also not to be overlooked that these activities had often a
religious dimension.Plato asserts, in Laws II 653c9-d5,that «the gods
took pity on the human race, born to suffer as it was, and gave it
relief in the form of religious festivals to serve as periods of rest from
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its labours.At the same time they gave us the Muses, with Apollo
their leader, and Dionysus, to share these festivals with us and keep
them right, with all the spiritual sustenance these gods bring to
the feast.» Probably, in saying this,he expresses a widely shared view;
certainly he expresses his own conviction that these activities should
be prevalently communal and religious. We tend to see cultural
activities, and especially those which have an aesthetic dimension,
as either belonging to a purely private sphere or, when they have a
communal character, as being organized, by the community or by
privates, in order to satisfy a request by the individuals (if a sufficient
number of people are interested in visiting a museum, this should
be set up in a town which can afford it; idem if they want to go to
a theatre,to a cinema,and so forth).When,on the other hand,cultural
activities are associated to religious celebrations, the request by
the individuals becomes less important, for the celebrations are to
be kept in honour of the gods whether there are many people who
attend them or not. (In fact the request by the individuals was
acquiring importance under democracy, but this is precisely one of
the developments that are condemned by Plato.) Their organization
belonged to the polis, for anything that had to do with religion
belonged to the polis.
The importance attributed to education,in the aspect of formation
of character, goes beyond what the most optimistic of us moderns
would be inclined to admit.Plato, in the Laws, insists on the fact that
care should be given to the education of children from the beginning,
indeed, in a way, from the time in which the child is not yet born
(the mother should give attention to her behaviour, which must be
such as to be favourable to the good growth of the embryo, cfr.VII
788c ff.).What sort of education a child receives from his earliest
years, if not already from the womb,is supposed to make a very great
difference, if not all the difference,to what sort of person he is likely
to become. It is as with animals (tame and wild) and plants: what
kind of environment they find themselves to live in the first stages
of their growth makes the difference between a good and healthy
growth in which they realize their excellence (their areté) and
one that is the opposite of this (cfr.VI 765e, further Republic III
401b-d). In the case of man it can be said that he is to be classified
as a tame animal,and if he has a good natural disposition and benefits
from the right education,he is likely to become a most heavenly and
gentle (ad litteram: tamest) creature; if, on the other hand, he is
not educated in an adequate and proper way, he will become the
wildest animal on the face of earth (cfr.VI 765e-766a). (A partly
similar assertion is to be found in Aristotle, Politics I 2, 1253a29 ff.,
where he says that man left to himself is the wildest of animals while
if he partakes of a community submitting himself to its laws becomes
the best of animals.) The consequence that is drawn in the passage
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of the Laws is that the legislator «should not treat the education of
children cursorily or as a secondary matter».Another aspect concerns
the sort of education that should be given, once the child become
susceptible to literate instruction.As we shall see in some detail Part
II (ch. 16), this consists to a very large extent in becoming familiar
with music,in the large sense by which it includes poetry or literature.
This central role of music in the formation of character is attributed
to it both by Plato and Aristotle.Hence the main discussions of music
given by them in their works belong to contexts in which the issue
is education (cfr.below,ch.15,for Plato’s contributions,with allusions
also to Aristotle’s contributions, which notoriously are to be found
in the main in book VIII of his Politics, especially chs. 3 and 5-7).9
It should also be realized that between the education (paideia)
directed to young people, thus taken in the narrow sense, and the
influence exercised on the citizens by the other cultural activities,
such as those associated to religious celebrations, there was a
continuity.Certainly there was a continuity if one admitted,as Plato
no doubt admitted, that the influence was educative (either in the
positive or in the negative sense), for they were not mere
entertainment. Probably this conviction was widespread, for it is
manifest for instance in some plays by Aristophanes.How strong the
continuity should be supposed to be could certainly be a matter of
controversy, and in fact we shall find there is some divergence on
this point between Plato and Aristotle (cfr. below, ch. 16).Where
the two philosophers are in agreement is in believing that there was
a contradiction between leaving education in the narrow sense to
the initiative of the privates (of the parents of the children and so
forth), as it happened in cities like Athens, and admitting that the
city had a responsibility in all other cultural activities,and propounded
its elimination by extending public responsibility also to the formation
of the young people.
Both philosophers took for granted that the responsibility of
organizing such activities as the competitions in occasion of the
festivals would still belong to the city.Thus Plato, at the beginning
of book VIII of the Laws, expressly talks of the organization of the
festivals,suggesting,among other things,that there should be a festival
every month in honour of a certain god and thus that every month
the citizens should sacrifice to each of these gods and arrange chorus
performances and ‘musical’ and gymnastic contests (agonas) (cfr.
828c). Reference to these contests or competitions is also made in
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9.As we shall see, music is supposed
to form the character in at least two
ways: through the emotive patterns (as
one may call them) which music, in its
more properly musical aspect (but inclu-
ding poetic metre and song), impresses
on the soul of the hearers; through the
contents of literature, which offers
models to be imitated and convictions
or attitudes towards values to be acqui-
red.
book VI,when making a distinction between two classes of officials,
those who are concerned with education and those who are
concerned with competitions (cfr. 764c ff.)10.The second group is
itself distinct in two groups: those who are in charge of ‘musical’
competitions and those who are in charge of gymnastic competitions.
One of their functions is that of being the judges in these
competitions.In his turn Aristotle takes for granted, in some passages
of the Poetics and of the Politics, that dramas will be submitted to
some competition, as was usual in Greek cities like Athens (cfr. e.g.
Poetics 6, 1450b19-20, 7, 1451a6 ff., 13, 1453a23 ff.; 18, 1456a18;
Politics VIII 7, 1342a21-22; it is true that in some of these passages
he admits this can have a corrupting influence;but this is to suggest
that the poet should not be influenced by the preoccupation of
winning a competition in composing a tragedy, not that he should
keep out of competitions).
Aristotle also admits, as Plato does, that art is not just a private
affair of the single persons belonging to a certain community. It
seems that in his view the politician (in the sense of the possessor
of the art of politics) should be able to decide what place the
fine arts should have in a well-ordered polis.This sort of decision
is in fact implicitly attributed to him at the beginning of the
Nicomachean Ethics, where politics is put at the head of the
hierarchy of the arts and is said to decide of which of them there
is use in the towns, and which of them must be learnt and up to
what point by each group of citizens (‘learning’ probably is to be
taken in a large sense, so as to include any sort of acquaintance)11.
This presumably means deciding (a) what place they should have
in the education of young people, (b) what place they should have
in the life of adult citizens, in the sense of establishing how much
time they can dedicate to activities such as going to the theatre
etc. with respect to other activities which are of importance for
the city. It is likely, further, that, as the references to competitions
quoted above suggest, Aristotle takes for granted that the
organization of certain spectacles belongs to the city (as happened
in Athens), so that there is some political responsibility from this
point of view.Also on this ground it is not surprising that his most
extended treatment of music is to be found in book VIII of the
Politics, where the topic is that of the education of young people,
just as large part of Plato’s contributions to the treatment of music
and of the fine arts belong to the same context of discussion of
the education that should be given to young people.
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10. In this passage there is also a dis-
tinction between ‘monodic’ and ‘choral’
musical performance, for which see
Nagy, art. cit., p. 39, who remarks: «Still,
the essential fact remains that the
medium of both monodic and choral
composition is public performance.»
11.The hierarchy of the arts admitted
by him goes back to Plato, cfr. Part II, ch.
27.
Some scholars have rightly pointed out that we cannot reach
an understanding of Plato’s attitude to poetry if we do not «bear
in mind how poetry would typically reach the public in Plato’s
day».Ferrari,whom I have been quoting,makes a statement on this
point which deserves to be quoted in full. «In a modern culture
our most frequent direct contact with literature deemed important
in our society (and in the West this would of course include the
very poets on whom Plato targets his attack) comes either through
private and (at least potentially) reflective reading,or in the context
of the classroom;and is supplemented in the case of drama by visits
to the theatre, to see actual performance. In Plato’s culture, live
performance was the norm. Private reading and study of literary
texts, to the extent that it was practised at all, seems to have been
confined to a tiny minority of enthusiasts and intellectuals. Most
citizens experienced poetry - not drama merely, but also the
Homeric epic and lyric poetry - as members of an audience (or,
indeed, as performers themselves) in various well-defined social
settings: seeing tragedy and comedy at the annual dramatic festivals,
hearing their Homer performed by professional rhapsodes, taking
their turn with a song or two at drinking-parties. And all would
have felt these (rather than reading or study) to be the proper
contexts for poetry - oral memorisation and recital dominating
even the schoolchild’s poetic training. So that in order to gauge
Plato’s critique we must first banish any image of the serious reader
curled quietly in armchair with the Iliad, and think rather of the
audience at a performance by the rhapsode (Ion 535b-e).For Plato,
the typical experience of poetry is never anything like private
contemplation; and our most appropriate context for comparison
is the experience of the theatre-going or, it may be, film-going
public.» (Plato and Poetry, cit., pp. 92-93) 
There may be some exaggeration in giving so little importance to
the interpretation of literary texts,for this is illustrated by Plato himself
in some dialogues (in the Protagoras there is a dispute between
Protagoras and Socrates on the interpretation of a lyric composition
of Simonides, cfr. 339b ff.; and some sort of interpretation is implied
in the dispute between Socrates and Hippias, in the Hippias minor,
concerning the qualities of Achilles and Odysseus), but on the whole
the picture seems to be right. However the importance given to
performance is only in part to be associated (as done by Ferrari, who
is influenced by Havelock) to the persistence of a prevalently oral
culture, for this dimension must prevail also if cultural activities are
organized by the city and are seen as a means for socialization or for
reinforcing the unity of the community and,at the same time,as a means
of religious celebration.I also think it is unilateral to suppose that Plato’s
attack on poetry concerns rather exclusively this aspect, for there is
the ideological aspect that is of great importance and performance
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itself tends to be seen as objectionable if it is meant to please the
moltitude (but this is to anticipate on what follows)12.
One point to be stressed is that, in trying to ascertain whether a
domain of aesthetics, of which aesthetic experience constitutes
the subjective side, received some recognition in the time of Plato
and of Aristotle,we should not expect it to coincide completely with
what we would regard as such a domain.The constitution of this
domain is an eminently cultural affair, so that (a) it is not likely to
take place in exactly the same way in different cultures,(b) it is likely
to undergo changes or show a certain development inside a given
culture.A work of art is charged with symbolic meaning, but what
meaning it can be regarded to have depends both on the (more or
less conscious) intentions of the author and on the way in which
the viewer looks at it or the hearer or reader interprets it. But both
what the author wants to transmit with his work and the viewer or
hearer or reader draws from it depends on the cultural experiences
they have.It has to be added that this all is true not only of the single
work but also of the type or genera of work, e.g. of the genera of
literature.
In the last connection both points (a) and (b) can be illustrated
by the case of drama.Borges dedicates a story (La busca de Averroes,
included in his collection El Aleph) to the difficulties which Averroes
met in his attempt to understand what Aristotle’s Poetics was all
about, since the Arabs had no experience of tragedy and of comedy,
and to the mistaken way in which he overcome them (that they had
no experience of them should not mean they had no aesthetic
experience,but that the type of aesthetic experience which concerns
drama was extraneous to them). But even in Greece drama was not
available from the beginning, but was something new and still
undergoing some development in fifth century Athens. It is well-
known that there was an increase in the number of actors and a
change in the part played by the chorus.The first process is connected
with the increasing autonomy of actors with respect to the dramatist,
for initially it was the dramatist who himself played some parts or
even all the parts in the drama composed by him.Drama was initially
an extension of epos,with the poet who both composed and recited
his work,rather than a wholly distinct literary genre. It is not usually
recognized that these developments were accompanied by changes
in the way of seeing or understanding drama.As we shall see, Plato
goes back to a somewhat archaic attitude to drama, which takes it
precisely as an extension of epos in which the poet both composes
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12. Ferrari’s article, and other recent
literature on the argument,cannot ignore
of course that much of the discussion of
poetry is conducted by Plato in connec-
tion with the topic of education,but does
not sufficiently recognize that this influen-
ces his approach to poetry.The ideological
aspect,and especially the fact that the tras-
mission of religious beliefs is involved,
rarely receives much attention.
the work and plays the parts in the drama.Aristotle abandons this
attitude,clearly because it was too far from contemporary experience
of drama.There are also other important differences in their ways
at looking at drama, which require other explanations.
More on the objective side, it has to be remarked that, if there
was a group of arts that were regarded as constituting what we
would call the fine arts, they have not to be quite the same as those
that have been recognized in modern times, for what this group is
supposed to include (or to exclude) depends on cultural interests
that can change with time.For instance modern authors would often
add other disciplines to the five major arts, such as decorative arts,
the dance, the drama and the opera; in ancient times the drama,
and tragedy in particular,had a particular importance,and,given the
role played by music in it, corresponded to some extent to modern
opera.(Only to some extent,as pointed out by R.Rehm,Greek Tragic
Theatre, London 1992, p. 52, in the first place because «the power
of speech is absent or extremely attenuated in opera».) This example
also shows that the arts themselves could be conceived rather
differently, and the same can be said of their interrelations.We have
already seen that a close association was admitted between poetry
and music. Music itself, when understood in the wide sense, so as
to include poetry, did not only constitute the unity of all the arts
accessible by the ear, but had a certain priority among all the arts.
Among the figurative or plastic arts a priority tended to be attributed
to painting (cfr. e.g. the passage of the Epinomis quoted below, ch.
6). Probably this priority was attributed to it in virtue of drawing
(it should be noticed that in Greek graphiké can mean both painting
and drawing), for a picture was first drawn and then coloured (it
cannot be conceived,as a modern picture often can be,as the result
of a combination of colour-patches)13.One could regard the products
of sculpture and of architecture as being the result of a sort of three-
dimensional drawing,colours being added (as in the case of pictures)
in a second time.
Similarly, on the subjective side, we cannot expect aesthetic
experience, being an eminently cultural affair, to be quite the same
for the Greeks and for us, though there must be some common
ground for it to be called aesthetic experience in either case.While
we tend to regard as a typical occasion for having an aesthetic
experience the visit to a museum, this is extraneous to the Greeks,
who gave importance to experiences that had a convivial character,
such as those that can be had in taking part to a symposium, or at
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13.The distinction between the two processes, that of drawing the figure of e.g.
an animal in outline and that of filling it with colours, is assumed for instance by Aris-
totle in the case of painting (cfr. De generatione animalium II 6, 743b18-25). For
more technical details one may refer to H. Blümner, Technologie und Terminologie
der Gewerbe und Künste bei Griechen und Römern,bd.IV,Leipzig 1887,pp.414 ff.
least to experiences that had a collective character,such as attending
to the performance of a drama in a theatre.This is a general point
of difference which has already been remarked above.
For the sake of exemplification I mention three more specific
points on which it is likely that there is some difference between
their experience and ours: (a) there is an inclination by the Greeks
to admit that the culmination of this experience lies in eroticism,
or in the erotic attraction which is exercised by what is beautiful;
and this is connected with the fact that certain typical occasions for
having that experience, such as the symposia, were also occasions
for eroticism (it may be significant that Plato, in Republic IV 402d-
403c,sees the culmination of the appreciation of harmony in music
in an erotic love of the beautiful; and it may also be significant that
both he and Xenophon are willing to associate contemplation of
what is beautiful in a manifestly aesthetic sense,but with limitation
to human beings, to erotic love14); (b) there is also an inclination
by them to give a place of some importance to the products of
rhetoric in the domain of what gives rise to pleasure from an aesthetic
point of view, while this is rare with us (in any case the sphere of
lexis tends to be taken as common to poetic and to rhetoric, as is
evident in Aristotle, though of course he does not think that the style
to be used in an oration is wholly the same as that to be used in a
poem);(c) Greek art,at least till the time of Plato, is interested in the
representation of the human world,thus of men and of those entities
which can make a difference to human life (especially gods and
animals) and of the environment in which men live,while the interest
in nature as such is scarce (it is not usual that pictures of landscapes
were given and it is rare that the adjective ‘beautiful’ be applied to
landscapes); in conformity with this attitude the philosophers most
usually talk of imitation (mimesis) about the representation of men
(and this is one reason why it is problematic to include architecture
among the ‘mimetic arts’).
5. The hypothes is  of  an «aes thet ics  of  mimesis»  
Among the few scholars who reject the prevailing account of an
absence of aesthetics in the Greek world there is Halliwell who, in
his Aesthetics of Mimesis,cit.,propounds as an alternative the suggestion
that philosophers like Plato and Aristotle had an aesthetics that was
concentrated on the idea of mimesis.He maintains that they were able
to identify,among the arts,a class or group that had the characterization
of being ‘mimetic’and that their philosophy of art consisted to a large
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14.Eroticism must not be confounded with sexual attraction, that was to be kept
in check,see what Aristotle observes on this point in the passages of the Ethics quoted
below, ch. 7
extent on a reflection on the idea of mimesis. This means that their
aesthetics presents certain characteristics which make it different from
that which is based on taking the earlier sections of Kant’s third critique
as paradigmatic,with the idea there expressed of a pure,disinterested
judgment of beauty. He thinks that modern thinkers did not really
succeed in disengaging the category of the aesthetic «from its previously
accepted intersections with ethics,emotion and truth», for «this could
only be done at the cost of making any resulting theory too narrow,
too psychologically etiolated, to encompass and deal with the
representational and expressive impulses that remained central to
various forms of «fine art»» (op. cit., p. 10).
On the first point he says what follows:“By the fourth century
B.C. it was already a widely shared judgment, as both Plato and
Aristotle explicitly attest, that a certain range of artistic practices and
their products - above all, poetry, painting, sculpture, dance, music,
but also certain other activities too (including vocal mimicry and
theatrical acting) - could be considered to share a representational-
cum-expressive character that made it legitimate to regard them as
a coherent group of mimetic arts.”(op.cit.,p.7).(Some of the passages
he refers to there, in n. 18, and in n. 19 to p. 44, will be examined
below, ch. 6.) Yet, though this suggestion, as we shall see, is not
without a justification, it cannot be said that Halliwell has succeeded
in showing that the idea of mimesis has a definite aesthetic
significance. He himself has to admit that the word mimesis has a
much wider application than the field of aesthetic experience (e.g.
in op.cit.,p.65,with reference to the treatment found in the Sophist,
he says that this dialogue “does not offer a blanket condemnation
of mimesis but something more like a philosophical “grid”on which
many different kinds of human representation, including mimetic
art,can be mapped”;see also his survey of the main uses of mimesis
and cognate words in the Platonic dialogues given in his Aristotle’s
Poetics, London 1986, p. 121, which includes what are called
“linguistic”,“philosophical”and “cosmic”uses).A restriction is certainly
obtained by talking of mimetic arts, but this, as the already quoted
example of sophistic shows, remains too comprehensive.
In another way it is not sufficiently comprehensive, for it can be
remarked that no mention is made of architecture among what
according to Halliwell is to be regarded «as a coherent group of
mimetic arts». In fact in his book no attention is given to this art, as
against painting and, to a less extent, sculpture. It cannot be claimed
that there was no realization of the fact that the works belonging to
this field can be beautiful and that they realize certain criteria of
formal perfection, for Vitruvius’ De architectura testifies to the
existence of an important theorization about those criteria (see below,
ch.29).Not to discuss this work constitutes a serious lacuna in a book
dedicated to the main contributions to aesthetics in ancient thought.
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Also the concept of mimesis which is adopted by Halliwell is
very comprehensive, as shown by the formula he adopts (in the
above quoted passage) of the «representational-cum-expressive
character» which is shared by the mimetic arts. It is comprehensive
on two counts: because he regards the traditional rendering of
mimesis with «imitation» as too restrictive; and because he thinks
that the term does not serve merely to identify a certain relationship
between the object of aesthetic experience (a poem, a picture…)
and some other object but concerns also the response which the
first object obtains on his viewer or hearer. Concerning the first
point,Halliwell says that the term is used «in relation to at least five
categories of phenomena: first, visual resemblance (including
figurative works of art); second, behavioral emulation/imitation;
third, impersonation, including dramatic enactment; fourth, vocal
or musical production of significant or expressive structures of
sound; fifth, metaphysical conformity…» (p. 15).According to him
there is a «common thread running through these otherwise various
uses»,namely «an idea of correspondence or equivalence», and this
is explained as follows: «correspondence between mimetic works,
activities and performances and their putative real-world
equivalents,whether the latter are taken to be externally given and
independent or only hypothetically projectable from the mimetic
works themselves» (p. 15). One has however to ask whether those
uses are so various, at least in the eyes’ of authors like Plato and
Aristotle, and whether we have to look for a conceptual minimum
that is common to them all rather than for a notion suggested by
the adoption of some paradigm.The idea of correspondence or
equivalence in any case seems to be rather lax, leaving place to
that of «representation»,while I think that the rendering of mimesis
with «imitation» is not improper (see discussion below, ch. 25).As
to the suggestions that among the «putative real-world equivalents»
there may be the «only hypothetically projectable from the mimetic
works themselves», that is to say, there may be objects which do
not belong at all to the real world but are fictions,Halliwell, though
attempting to find some basis for this in Plato, depends in effect
rather exclusively on Aristotle’s Poetics, chs. 9 and 25. One can
express the suspicion that, when Aristotle propounds an imitation
(mimesis) which concerns not what is real but what is possible,
he is streching this notion beyond its normal limits, for reasons
connected with his perspective (see discussion below, chs. 19
and 25).Why talk of an imitation (in whatever wide sense one may
take this term) of something possible, that is of something only
imaginary, rather than simply admit that what is narrated etc. is to
be said quite immediately the product of imagination, a fiction? It
is of some significance that Philostrathus, in a often quoted passage
of his Life of Apollonius of Tyana, stresses the limitation of mimesis
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to what can be seen with the eyes, and opposes to it phantasia
as being able to represent that which cannot (cfr.VI 19). Halliwell,
in discussing this passage (in op. cit., pp. 308-310), warns us from
giving too much importance to this (rather isolated) passage, for
one must take into account the context to which it belongs (the
representation of gods) and not generalize it into an aesthetics
alternative to that of mimesis.This may be right,but it remains true
that the passage points out a limitation of mimesis which on
Halliwell’s account does not exist and expresses dissatisfaction
with it.
Concerning the second point,Halliwell maintains that an aesthetic
of mimesis is one that gives particular attention to reception,because
what is involved is “the use of an artistic medium (words, sounds,
physical images) to signify and communicate certain hypothesized
realities” (he offers this as a definition of representation). But, he
says,“because hypothesized realities are imagined possibilities of
experience,the Greek tradition,both before and after Plato, is greatly
interested in the effects of mimetic artworks on their viewers or
hearers, and repeatedly attempts to characterize the kinds of
recognition,understanding,emotional response,and evalutation that
such artworks can or should elicit in their audiences.”(op.cit.,p.16;
something to the same effect is said by him at pp. 21-22) This
observation is certainly true about “the Greek tradition”of thinking
about art. But the question is whether those authors were induced
to give that attention to reception because they made recourse to
the notion of mimesis or for some other reason.Halliwell makes this
consequence descend on his talk of “signifying and communicating”
and on having “imagined possibilities of experience”, but this is to
attribute “communicative”characteristics to the art-works which do
not depend on their being mimetic.The discussion given below of
pleasure as the typical response to an artwork which satisfies the
requirement of being beautiful will render my objection more clear.
On the whole Halliwell is inclined to treat as an aesthetics of
mimesis whatever aesthetics avoids to detach and isolate aesthetic
experience “from engagement with the rest of experience” (op.
cit.,p.12),and thus is induced to talk (in the passage quoted above)
of the «representational-cum-expressive character» shared by certain
artistic practices and their products because of their being mimetic.
But this is to adopt a too comprehensive conception of what is
mimetic,which is not justified by what the Greeks meant by mimesis,
and runs the risk of leaving unclear what is proper to aesthetic
experience: before saying what aesthetic experience should not be
detached from we should say what it is, otherwise there is no
specifically aesthetic experience left any more.No Greek philosopher
could imagine, as Kierkegaard did, a purely aesthetic mode of
existence for a man,but Plato did not just imagine there are people
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who are passionate lovers of spectacles. Halliwell tends to oppose
the aesthetics of mimesis thus understood to any position like that
of Kant which asserts the autonomy of aesthetics.His position seems
in fact to be an attempt to give a positive contents to the widely
circulating view that ancient aesthetics was heteronomous,because
depending on notions which are not properly aesthetic because
ethical, political, educational, metaphysical, and so forth. However
there is the risk of some serious equivocation,for an aesthetics which
had no notions of its own but depended exclusively on notions
coming from other fields would be no aesthetics any more. On the
other hand asserting the autonomy of aesthetics needs not have
the negative consequence of isolating the aesthetic experience
(intending by this both the experience of the creator of an art-
work and the experience of its viewer or hearer) from all other
experience,for it can be a matter of recognizing both what is peculiar
to it and how it is related to other types of experience. Excluding
this autonomy altogether involves discognizing its peculiarity.
(Another question,to which attention will be given later, is whether
art itself is supposed to be autonomous.) 
A decision can be reached in this matter,I think,by giving attention
not only to the concept of mimesis, which applies to the object of
aesthetic experience,but to the concept of pleasure (hedoné),which
applies directly to the aesthetic experience, to ascertain whether
the ancient thinkers recognized that there are pleasures that can
be regarded as properly aesthetic.
6. Imitat ive  ar ts  as  a  dis t inct  c lass  of  ar ts
In the following discussion our starting point is then the
recognition that, if there is a class of arts (technai), recognized by
Plato as a distinct class, under which what we call the fine arts can
be brought, it is that of the arts that are said to be mimetic.This class
is treated by him as a distinct species, inside the genus of productive
arts, in Sophist 235d-e and 265a ff.These passages contain Plato’s
main attempt at a classification of these arts inside a genus-species
division and will deserve some comments. For the moment they
must be left out of consideration because they do not sufficiently
clarify which are the arts that can be called mimetic and because
their main purpose is to show that sophistic is in some sense a
mimetic art. What should be noticed at once is that, when
propounding a classification of the imitative arts like that given in
the Sophist, Plato leaves open the question whether they are to be
regarded as genuine arts or they are just mere skills (in fact the
sophist’s art is for him a mere skill, not a genuine art).The criteria
that must be satisfied by a certain skill in order to be considered
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an art or craft (techne) are formulated in the clearest way in another
dialogue: the Gorgias. (For a brief account see Part II, ch.27.) There
however the question whether these criteria are satisfied or not by
the skills that are said to be mimetic is not raised,at least in a direct
and an explicit way.There are various indications to be found in
the dialogues that suggest that these skills are not regarded as
satisfying those criteria. For the moment this question can be left
open,and art (techne) will be used,as done by Plato himself in various
contexts (including the passages of the Sophist just mentioned), in
the conventional and wide sense by which it covers all skills.
In this discussion, it is convenient to start with a passage of
Republic II where certain of the arts that are called mimetic receive
mention and where a criterion (beyond that of being mimetic) is
offered for distinguishing them from the others (cfr.372e ff.). In this
passage the main speaker, Socrates, on solicitation by Glaucon, in
describing the formation of the city, goes beyond the initial
consideration of what is necessary to life (ta anagkaia,373a5) saying
that «we must set painting (zographia) to work and embroidery…».
This implies admitting in the city certain classes of people such as
huntsmen and,he adds, «the imitators (hoi mimetai),many of them
occupied with figures and colours and many with music - the poets
(poietai) and their assistants, rhapsodists, actors, chorus-dancers,
contractors» (373b5-8). Leaving out for the moment the distinction
here made between the poets and their assistants I remark that here
too the activity of the poets is supposed to coincide with music
(taken as including reciting and dancing) and not to be restricted to
poetry in the narrow (or Aristotelian) sense. Beyond the poets as
one class of imitators there are those imitators who are «occupied
with figures and colours», and these clearly are represented by
painters, sculptors and so forth. It should also be noticed that, in
admitting not only a distinction but a temporal succession between
the skills that are concerned with the necessities of life and those
which aim at procuring us what is superfluous,Plato must be thinking
of different stages in the development of civilization.
It seems to be significant that also elsewhere in the Republic he
has in mind a distinction between two classes of people and of the
relative arts or non-necessary activities to which they dedicate
themselves.This happens in book III, where the question discussed
is what sort of people should be admitted and under which
supervision in the (by then) «purified» city. In this passage (from
401b onwards) these are treated as craftsmen who produce beautiful
things and not (at least explicitly) as imitators.These beautiful things
are said to exercise an influence on the young men who enter in
contact with them by impressing either their sight (pros opsin) or
their hearing (pros akoén) (cfr. 401c). In what follows particular
attention is given to music, which clearly gives rise to the beautiful
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things which are directed to hearing, but previously mention was
made of painting (graphiké), of weaving, of embroidery, of
architecture and so forth (cfr.401a).In this same context a distinction
is introduced between the poets, who presumably are concerned
with all music, and the other craftsmen (demiourgoi), including
those who produce pictures of living being (eikones zoon) and
buildings (cfr. 401b).
Similarly, in Republic, book X, in drawing the parallel between
painting (graphiké) and poetry (poiesis),some stress is made on the
fact the former is concerned with vision (is kata ten opsin) and
the latter is concerned with hearing (katà ten akoén) (cfr. 603b).
And,towards the end of book V, in talking of the lovers of spectacles
who are opposed to the philosophers (as the genuine lovers of
spectacles), it is remarked of them that they are lovers of sounds
(philekoi) and lovers of sights (philotheamones) who delight in
beautiful tones (kalas phonas) and in beautiful colours and shapes
(chroas kai schemata) (cfr.476b and also 480a). In this connection
it should be noticed that, when Plato talks, as in the passages now
quoted,of persons or of arts that are concerned with beautiful tones
and with beautiful colours and shapes,he is simplifying, for in 476b
he associates tones etc. to ‘all the artefacts that are produced out of
them’ (panta ta ek toiouton demiourgoumena, b6). (‘Artefacts’
must be understood in a wide sense, for what are composed of
beautiful tones may be songs.) The lovers of spectacles, who
manifestly cultivate an aesthetic attitude, do so in relation to the
products of the arts and of music (and poetry),and are not interested
in any sort of beautiful tones and beautiful colours and shapes.
Plato comes back to imitative art and to imitation in Laws, book
II, in discussing the role of music in education and the pleasure of
which it is the source. In that connection the remark is made that,
in the case of music, everybody would agree (pas an homologoi)
that all production which has to do with it is imitation and
representation (mimesis kai apeikasia); and it is specified that all
poets and hearers and actors would be agreed on this point (cfr.
668b-c). From this passage it is clear that taking music, including
poetry, as a mimetic art did not simply express the point of view of
some theoreticians but was something generally agreed upon. But,
then, it is likely that also taking painting and the other figurative arts
as imitative was something generally agreed upon, for their being
imitative is a more obvious fact.The way in which Plato himself
introduces certain categories of people as imitators in the passage
of Republic II mentioned above favours this impression, for there
calling them that way was not supposed to need any explanation.
This impression tends to be confirmed by Aristotle.In his Rhetoric,
as is well known, he gives accounts of what is regarded as valuable
adopting a point of view which has a general agreement.Thus in
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book I, ch.11, in considering what is pleasurable,he says that, since
to learn and to admire is pleasurable, anything of this sort must be
pleasurable, and of this sort is what is imitative (to mimoumenon),
such as painting (or drawing: graphiké), sculpture and poetry (cfr.
1371b4 ff.).These then were generally regarded as typically imitative
arts. If Aristotle himself, in the first chapters of his Poetics, can treat
painting and poetry as imitative arts without giving any particular
justification for this view of them it is because here (as elsewhere)
he takes as his starting point a generally agreed point of view.(Poetry
is associated by him to music in ch. 1, and music is regarded as
imitative in the Politics as well. Poetic genres which are mentioned
as imitative are: epic, tragedy and comedy, dithyrambe. He does not
mention figurative or plastic arts beyond painting.)
Another passage of some importance is to be found in the
Epinomis.This contains a survey of arts and disciplines the possession
of which cannot be regarded as constituting wisdom (sophia). In
addition to the arts or disciplines which are directed to the acquisition
of what is necessary there is the mention of those which are, for the
most part, imitative (mimetiké) and which are to regarded not as
something serious but as a sort of play (paidià). Some of these arts
are exercised by those who imitate by means of their bodies, some
other are concerned with discourses (or words: logous) and with
all music,further there are those which have their mother in painting
(graphikè), in the case of which many and varied adornaments
(poikilmata) are executed in many matters that are humid and dry
(cfr. 975d). Poikilmata means works in various colours and even
embroidery rather than ‘figures’ (as the word is usually translated);
that figures or drawings are involved comes from admitting that
the ‘mother-art’ is painting (thought of as involving drawing).The
passage is presumably to be taken as indicating not only what is
executed in but also what is executed with, thus including painting
itself and vase-painting, which require the use of some humid
substance, and sculpture, perhaps also architecture.The admission
of the priority of painting is significant, and, if it was widely held,
as is likely15, implies that in certain passages in which only painting
is explicitly mentioned the other plastic arts are involved (for instance
only painting is mentioned, together with music, as imitative arts in
Cratylus 423d).The judgment that these arts or disciplines are nothing
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15. I was not able to find any parallel
passage.The collections of texts edited
by J.J. Pollitt, entitled The Art of Ancient
Greece: Sources and Documents, Engle-
wood Cliffs,N.J.1965 [reprint Cambridge
1990],and by A.Reinach,entitled La pein-
ture ancienne.Textes grecs et latins (2nd
ed.with introd.and notes by A.Rouveret,
Paris 1985), do not include passages
concerning the relationship between dif-
ferent arts such as painting and the other
plastic or figurative arts:they even ignore
the passage from the Epinomis; the same
can be said of Pollitt’s book entitled The
ancient view of Greek Art.Criticism, His-
tory, and Terminology,New Haven 1974
(useful mainly on terminology).
17. This passage of the Politicus is
but a sort of play reflects (as we shall see) Plato’s attitude to the
matter,but could not have application if they were regarded as useful
arts; the classification of those that are in fact mentioned under the
heading «imitative arts» must have been current. In either way this
dismissive treatment of them involves a recognition of their
peculiarity.
The passage in the Epinomis contains a development of
something that is stated by Plato himself in Laws X, though it is
not clear how far he accepts it, for it belongs to an account of the
origin of civilization that is influenced by sophistic and naturalistic
thought. It is likely however that he sees here a point of contact
between his own position and that adopted by the sophists and
the (Presocratic) naturalists. In talking of the emergence of art
(techne) it is said that «it has produced,at a late stage,various amusing
trifles (plays: paidias) that are hardly real at all (not parteking in
truth = reality) - mere unsubstantial images (eidola) of the same
order as the arts themselves (I mean for instance the productions
of the arts of painting (graphiké) and music, and all their ancillary
skills).» (889c-d) It is not explicitly said that these arts are imitative,
but the fact that they are said to produce images goes in this sense,
and there is the same tendency to dismiss them as mere plays (since
their products are such).There is a simplificatory mention of music
and painting,but music will include poetry,and painting is mentioned
probably on the same assumption of the Epinomis that it is the
‘mother’ of all the figurative or plastic arts, thus as representative
of them all.
Of importance is also another passage by Plato, to be found in
the Politicus,where a list is offered of the arts (or of their products)
that are to be regarded as auxiliary to politics,which is the dominating
art.The fifth class or group of these are the arts which are said to
be ‘concerned with adornment (kosmos) and painting and all those
coloured objects and imitations (mimemata) which are brought
to end by means of this (= of painting) and of music’. It is added that
all these works are produced only in view of our pleasures (pros tas
hedonas) and that they may justly be named collectively play or
diversion (paignion), for they are produced not with a serious
purpose but for play (paidias heneka) (288c). In this passage we
find the same attitude towards the fine arts which is to be found in
the above quoted passages from the Epinomis and the Laws: they
are nothing serious, but just a sort of play. (This judgement implies,
of course, that they are not genuine arts, and goes back, as we shall
see, to Republic, book X. Notice that ‘mimetic’ in general is treated
as a form of play also in Sophist 234b.) However here it is made
clear that this status attributed to them involves their being a source
of pleasure. In this way it is recognized that it is not sufficient to
describe them as imitative arts, but that, to circumscribe them, one
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must also state their external aim:pleasure.It is to be presumed that,
if in other passages they are described only in the first way, this is
a simplification, just as it is a simplification (to be found in a passage
by Aristotle to be considered immediately) to regard them only as
having pleasure as their aim16. The passage also introduces a
distinction between two main types of art: painting, presumably is
to include the arts subordinated to it,and music.Adornment (kosmos)
is to be associated to music,for in Politicus 307a-b it is said that what
concerns the whole field of music is to be regarded as realizing
kosmiotes and not courage. In any case there is the adoption of
the usual division of the arts in visual arts and music.
The same perspective of an account of the origin of civilization
that we met in the passage of the Laws (and that probably constitutes
the background of the passage of Republic II) is to be found in the
final part of ch.1 of Aristotle’s Metaphysics (from 981b13 onwards).
He there alludes to an initial stage of invention of the arts (technai)
and to a second stage at which «more arts were invented», some of
which were in view of the necessities of life (presumably in the
initial stage they were all of this type) and some in view of recreation
(diagogé).He then introduces a third stage at which sciences or arts
(epistemai, but in some contexts episteme and techne are
interchangeable) were introduced in view of knowledge, starting
with the mathematical disciplines in Egypt,rendered possible by the
leisure enjoyed by the priestly caste in that country. Of these last
disciplines it is said that, being in view of knowledge, they were
neither in view of the necessities of life (anagkaia) nor in view of
giving pleasure (pros hedonen).It is clear that the formula ‘arts which
exist in view of giving pleasure’ is an alternative description of the
arts which were said to exist in view of recreation. (An allusion to
the same threepartition of disciplines, referring now to disciplines
which are in view of recreation and of comfort (rastone), is to be
found in ch.2,982b22-24.A similar distinction of activities in general,
again in the perspective of the development of civilization, is to be
found in Politics VII 10, 1329b27-29.) 
The sphere of recreation and comfort,evidently to be associated
to leisure (for this association cannot apply only to the theoretical
disciplines), is certainly wider than that of the fine arts, for it must
include other activities,such as plays,and of these it can be said that
they give pleasure.(On leisure and recreation cfr.Politics VIII 3.This
point is stressed by Halliwell, Aristotle’s Poetics, cit., pp. 50-51).
However Aristotle is talking of arts (technai) and it is not evident
that other activities such as forms of play would be included by him
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sometimes mentioned in the dialo-
gues, e.g. in Gorgias, 514b, in Charmi-
des, 170c, and in Republic I, 346d;
architektones are mentioned as the
directors of works in a relatively large
field, cfr. Gorgias, 455b and Politicus,
259e.
18. Cfr. SVF III 401, from Androni-
under this heading. (Plato is willing to regard a play of skill and
intelligence such as the petteia or petteutike as a techne,cfr.Gorgias
450d and, at least by implication,Republic II 374c,but this is rather
an exception and it is not sure that Aristotle would be willing to
follow on him on this point.The only passage in which he mentions
this play, together with other plays, is Rhetoric I 11, 1370b35 ff.,
and there is no sign there that he regards it as a techne; from this
passage,as from the passage of the Nicomachean Ethics to be quoted,
it is in any case clear that he regards plays as producing pleasure.)
Further, one notices that he tends to be rather dismissive of plays
as a way of passing time of leisure,regarding them as pure relaxation
(cfr.Politics VIII 3,1337b23 ff.;Eth.Nic.X 6,1178b9 ff.),and he keeps
music and certain fine arts at least distinct from plays because of
their role in education (this is clear from Politics VIII 3 and following
chapters) and at the same time because imitative arts are not just a
source of pleasure but also of instruction (they are kept distinct from
plays,apparently for this reason,in Rhetoric I 11,1371b4 ff.).Aristotle
does not seem to be willing,as Plato was,at least sometimes,to regard
the imitative arts on the whole as a sort of play.Thus, if it can be
shown that the fine or mimetic arts were regarded by Aristotle as
having pleasure as their aim, there is little doubt that he is referring
to them in the passage just discussed of the Metaphysics. It can be
added that this way of describing them must have been rather
current, for also Isocrates, in his fourth Oration (Panegyricus), §
40, mentions the arts that were invented in view of pleasure in
addition to those that were invented in view of the necessities of
life (pros tanagkaia tou biou).
The survey now offered has to be completed, in the first place,
by referring to what Alcidamas, in his polemical writing entitled
On those who write written speeches (or On sophists), perhaps to
be dated about 390 BC, has to say about statues (andriantes) and
pictures of animals (or simply pictures? gegrammena zoa) (cfr. §§
27-29). He does not explicitly talk of the arts which produce them,
but treats these objects as ‘imitations of the real bodies’(mimemata
tôn alethinôn sômatôn) in parallel to written discourses (logoi),
which are said to be imitations (mimemata, but also eidôla kai
schemata) of oral discourses.These objects are said to offer delight
(terpsis) to their contemplation (or view:theoria),but no use (chresis)
for human life. Real bodies, on the other hand, are said to be much
inferior to the beautiful imitations concerning their appearance (tas
eumorphias) but much superior to them in utility.One can see,then,
that the pleasure or delight procured by the vision of statues and
pictures is presented in alternative to usefulness, thus must be a
pleasure of aesthetic nature.
In the second place, something must be said about architecture.
This discipline is mentioned by Plato among the ‘fine arts’ only in
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the passage of Republic III referred to above (i.e. 401a), thus in a
context in which the point of view of imitation is not adopted, and
through a generic mention of ‘buildings’ (oikodemata)17. It is
mentioned in Sophist 266c, under the denomination oikodomiké,
where it is opposed to painting (graphiké) for the fact that it
produces the real house (the house itself, aute oikia) and not one
like a dream. In this way it is implicitly excluded that this could be
taken as an imitative techne. It is not included, either, in the list of
imitative arts given by Plotinus in Enneads V 9,11,which is limited
to the couples: painting and sculpture, dance and pantomime, but
it is still mentioned in that chapter among the arts which have to
do with beauty,namely as a productive art (together with carpentry).
In his De architectura Vitruvius never associates architecture to the
imitative arts (he talks of imitation only in connection with wall-
paintings, cfr. book VII, ch. 5). But he qualifies this discipline as
ensuring at the same time venustas, i.e.beauty or grace,and utilitas
(cfr. I 3, 2). Beauty, presented under that denomination and in
alternative to utility, can only have an aesthetic meaning. (It can be
seen that Batteux’s collocation of architecture in his classification
of the arts corresponds to this presentation by Vitruvius.)
In conclusion, the art of architecture has a peculiar collocation,
because, though aiming at beauty and thus at producing aesthetic
pleasure, is not an imitative art and differs from the other fine arts
also for the fact that it is originated by the need to satisfy the
necessities of life (houses serve as protections). If this exception is
left out of consideration, we find that the criteria to be satisfied for
a certain human activity to belong to the realm of the fine arts are
mainly three: (1) to be an art (techne), that is to say a form of
production according to certain rules, at the exclusion of games
(which in most cases involve performance without production) but
also at the exclusion of science (which does not involve any
production); (2) to be an art that is not originated by the need to
satisfy the necessities of life but aiming at pleasure (not however
any sort of pleasure,as will be explained in the following chapters);
(3) to be an art which is mimetic in its products and/or which aims
at producing artifacts that satisfy certain criteria of formal beauty or
perfection. (It will be seen, at some later stage of this treatment,
that between these two requirements there is no full compatibility,
and that this is one reason, not concerning just ancient aesthetics,
why it is difficult to talk of a «system of the fine arts».) It should be
remarked that this way of classifying the arts must be kept distinct
from their division in vulgar and liberal arts, for this concerns the
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ignored by Kristeller in his article; it is
also ignored by Halliwell, when quoting
passages on the mimetic arts, probably
because he is reluctant to consider pas-
sages which attest the admission of plea-
sure as a distinct criterion for qualifying
those arts.
16.A related oikodomikè techne is
issue whether or not the acquirement of a certain art should be part
of the education of the free man.The ancients had no difficulty in
admitting that the products of a certain art like sculpture possess
high value but that the art itself, requiring the use of hands and
instruments, is a dirty affair to be avoided by a free man (this double
evaluation of sculpture is evident for instance in Lucian’s Somnium
sive Vita Luciani).
7. The recogni t ion of  aes thet ic  p leasure  
In this way we are introduced to the second point to examine,
namely that the arts we are considering, whether called imitative
or identified in other ways, are supposed to give rise to feelings of
pleasure in those who contemplate or otherwise enjoy their objects.
Besides looking for confirmation of this point it will have to be
clarified whether they are supposed to give rise to feelings of pleasure
whatsoever or feelings of a certain type.That they give rise to feelings
of pleasure is stated with some frequency by Plato in the dialogues
(in addition to the already quoted passage of the Politicus, see e.g.
Gorgias 501e ff.; Republic X 606b, 607a and d). In most of these
passages he regards this pleasure in a negative way,as what is pursued
by the mass of men who are not able to pursue anything but pleasure
(on this point see below,ch.10). In some passages however he gives
a more differentiated account.
One of these passages is Philebus 51b ff. In what immediately
precedes it the speaker, Socrates, had been arguing that not all
pleasures involve some relationship with pain (since they are relieves
from distress) but there are pleasures which,from this point of view,
are pure, saying that it is to these that attention must be given.
After another brief exchange, on the request of his interlocutor,
Protarcos,to tell which pleasures are to be regarded as true,he replies
as follows: «Those related to colours we call beautiful or to shapes,
most pleasures of smell and those of hearing,and generally any where
the deprivation is imperceptible and which supply perceptible
replenishments which are pleasant and pure of pain.» (51b,Gosling’s
transl. modified) To Protarcos it is not clear how these cases can be
considered that way, so Socrates, in giving a clarification, is obliged
to introduce a restriction in saying that by beauty of shapes he
does not understand,as ‘the many’(hoi polloi) would do,the beauty
of living beings and of certain pictures, but that of certain simple
geometrical shapes,which are beautiful not in relation to somebody
but in themselves and always; the same, he adds, applies to colours
and to sounds,with the specification about the latter that they must
be smooth clear ones, i.e. those that produce a single pure tune.
The exact meaning of this passage is disputed by scholars, but it
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seems to me that the most plausible interpretation is that Plato wants
to introduce a restriction in the class of pure or non-mixed pleasures,
saying that ‘true’are only those which satisfy the further requirement
of non-relativity.In fact,Plato himself, in Republic IX 584b-c, is willing
to admit that there are some pleasures, those of smell among others
(which there are not explicitly mentioned), that are ‘pure’ precisely
in the sense that they are not accompanied by pain.
If this is right, the pleasures aroused by the contemplation of
beautiful pictures and so forth are considered by Plato as pure but
not as genuine (from some sort of metaphysical point of view),with
the concession that they are admitted, without that reservation, by
‘the many’.These ‘many’ need not be taken, in the present context,
as vulgar people, but probably include everybody who does not
share the Platonic view about what is really beautiful; in fact they
may correspond,at least to some extent, to the admirers of beautiful
colours, shapes and sounds which are kept distinct from the
philosophers at the end of Republic V.And if we leave out, for the
moment, the developments that are proper to the Platonic view of
reality, the passage constitutes a testimony of the fact that, in the
intellectual circles of a city like Athens, if not also among common
people,the pleasures by the contemplation of beautiful pictures and
so forth were kept distinct from other pleasures (e.g. those raised
by the assimilation of food). Plato himself, in the Philebus, thinks
that a higher standard of purity is desirable, but (as the passage of
Republic IX shows) he cannot deny that those pleasures are pure.
Some confirmation of this conclusion, as we shall see, is given by
Aristotle.
A differentiated treatment of pleasure is to be found also in the
Laws, where Plato treats education, in so far as it is education of
character, as being very much a form of training our feelings of
pleasure and of pain, so that one gets used to feel pleasure at what
is morally good and pain at what is morally bad. But our feelings of
pleasure can be trained or disciplined if they are not all directed,
from the beginning, in the direction of carnal pleasure,but there are
some of them which are different and which are open to
development or refinement.Thus Plato, in one connection in which
he talks about education, is induced to point out that, by the
intervention of the gods, men resulted to be different from animals
because they have a sense of order and disorder in movement, that
is to say, they have the capacity to recognize ‘rhythm’and ‘harmony’
and to enjoy them (this is there said to be a perception that is
accompanied by pleasure [aisthesis meth’hedones] regarding what
is provided with rhythm and with harmony, cfr. 653e-654a).This
human constitution is to be put in relation to the fact that the gods
wished that the human race, born to suffer as it was, should have a
relief from its labours in celebrating religious festivals (cfr. 653d).
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In another passage, in which he lays down the criteria by which
to judge certain activities, which are distinguished by the fact of
giving rise to a certain delight (or of encountering a certain favour:
charis), this itself is treated as a criterion besides a certain rectitude
(orthotes) and/or a certain usefulness (ophelia) (cfr. 667b ff.). For
instance learning gives rise to a certain delight, but its rectitude
and usefulness come from the truth it reaches. In the case of the
mimetic arts (hosai technai eikastikaì) there is a rectitude which
lies in exact correspondence with the object reproduced, but it is
conceivable that certain of them are pursued without regard to
this rectitude or to truth and without regard to usefulness, just in
view of that element which, when not accompanied by the others,
deserves the name of ‘pleasure’(hedoné).This is to be admitted only
when the pleasure in question can be regarded as harmless, it being
in fact the case of those activities which we call ‘play’ (paidiá) (cfr.
667d-e). From what follows one understands that they are not
considered any more as imitative arts, for if they were the criterion
of rectitude could not be abandoned.Anyhow the passage shows
that Plato is willing to admit that activities belonging to this field
give rise to nothing but pleasure and that this pleasure is not to be
condemned since it is harmless.Plato himself,as we shall see, insists
on the pleasure to which give rise such arts as that of the tragedian,
but regards it as mistaken to judge this pleasure as harmless because
tragedies and other poetic recitations are just plays (cfr.Republic IV,
424d). It is not unlikely that this judgement was expressed by other
people who extended the concept of play beyond what for him
are its legitimate limits.They were thus inclined to treat all imitative
art as giving rise to a pleasure which is harmless (some further
indications in this sense can be desumed from what Gorgias has to
say on this point). But what is this harmless pleasure for them if
not an aesthetic pleasure? 
Aristotle takes up the doctrine which,as we have seen,is attributed
to ‘the many’ in the Philebus. In Nicomachean Ethics, X 5, where
the topic discussed is pleasure, he suggests that pleasures differ
among themselves as the activities which they accompany. One
application of this view is to the activities of the senses: «Sight is
superior to touch, and hearing and smell to taste, in purity, so their
pleasures differ similarly.Also intellectual pleasures are superior to
sensuous ones, and both kinds differ among themselves.» (1176a1-
3) The superiority in purity of certain pleasures on others is made
depend on the superiority in purity of the activities of certain senses,
presumably due to the fact that they do not require contact with
the object,not on their being unmixed with pain,but one explanation
need not exclude the other. In any case the peculiarity of these
pleasures is underlined by Aristotle also in another connection,
that of the discussion of temperance (sophrosune) as a virtue (cfr.
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book III, ch. 13). He observes that temperance concerns bodily
pleasures,not however all of them,but those which have to do with
the senses of touch and of taste and which are shared by the other
animals (cfr. 1118a23 ff.). Different is the case of the pleasures that
come from the senses of sight, of hearing and of smell, for, though
it is possible to pursue them in an excessive way, it is not proper to
call intemperate or licentious (akolastous) those who fall into this
excess and temperate those who are free of it (cfr. 1118a1 ff.). In
exemplifying this point he talks of those who have enjoyment
(chairontes) through sight of objects such as colours, figures and
pictures (or designs), a list close to those given by Plato in the
mentioned passages of Republic V and of the Philebus.He also talks
of those who have enjoyment through hearing in listening to songs
or an actor’s voice.A similar treatment is given to the smell of roses
or incense, while it is admitted that the smell of savoury dishes
may have a different effect because of its association to food.That
he has in mind the attitude of cultivated people is confirmed by
the fact that in the case of taste he is willing to make an exception
to his general rule by admitting that wine-tasters and experts in
dishes cannot be regarded as intemperate (cfr. 1118a27 ff.).
It can be added that in this same work, book VII, ch. 7, the view
is expressed that being a lover of plays or of amusements (paidiodes),
clearly in the sense of pursuing them in an excessive way, is not an
instance of intemperance (akolasia),but one of softness (malakia)
(cfr.1150a16-19). Plato in his turn associates the excessive and
exclusive pursuit of music to malakia, though treating this more
as a consequence than as a cause,but of course malakia reinforces
itself (cfr.Republic III 411a-c).This is a recognition of the peculiarity
of this phenomenon, that cannot be put on the same plan as vice
or weakness of will (akrasia). One may recall that Pericles, as
Thucydides reports his speech, said in praise of the Athenians that
they loved and coltivated what is beautiful without softness
(philokaloumen … aneu malakias), thus regarding softness as a
danger inherent in pursuing aesthetic pleasures.
The parallel treatment of this topic in the Eudemian Ethics
confirms that Aristotle has in mind a properly aesthetic pleasure.He
there says in fact that a person would not be considered intemperate
if,‘when looking at a beautiful statue or horse or man, or listening
to someone singing, he did not wish for food or drink or sexual
indulgence but only wished to look at the beautiful objects or listen
to the music - any more than the persons held spell-bound in the
abode of the Sirens’ (III 2, 1230b31-35). In what follows he does
not simply point out,as in the Nicomachean Ethics, that temperance
and intemperance concern those feelings of pleasure and of pain
which have to do with the senses of taste and of touch and which
are shared by other animals, but suggests that the pleasures which
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comes from contemplating a beautiful object or from listening to
an harmonious sound are inaccessible to them. (What he says in
Nicomachean Ethics III 13, 1118a16-23 has the same implication:
animals do not get pleasure from the sensations as such, but only
by the association of certain of them to objects of their appetite,
for instance dogs are pleased at the smell of hares not because of
the quality of their smell but because hares are perceived by them
as something eatable, so their smell is a sign of this.The same point
reappears in Problemata 27, § 7. On the other hand in Politics VIII
6, 1341a13-17, he admits that some animals show a response to the
charm of beautiful music, but this concession is analogous to his
concession that some superior animals are provided with some
intelligence,thus does not exclude the general suggestions that these
pleasures, though arising from the senses, are of a high level.) We
can see that he generalizes the point made by Plato in the passage
above discussed of Laws II,by extending it to all aesthetic pleasure,
not just that arising from musical harmony. He also shows, in the
passage of the Nicomachean Ethics concerning wine-tasters and so
forth,not to have the reservations towards this attitude of cultivated
people that Plato shows to have (the latter’s hostility towards all
refinement in food-tasting is particularly evident in the Gorgias).
Both of them however recognize the existence of an attitude that
can only be classified as aesthetic, because it concerns objects that
are beautiful and is limited to human beings.
That the sort of definition of aesthetic pleasure that is adopted
by the two philosophers had a rather wide circulation in antiquity
is shown by the definition given of joy (terpsis) by the Stoics,namely,
that is the pleasure that one gets through either sight or hearing
(notice that terpsis is the word most frequently used by the poets
in describing the pleasure to which their poems gives rise)18. It is
also shown by the fact that the Cirenaics were supposed to have
denied that pleasure comes from the pure sensation of sight or
hearing, for also intelligence is required (cfr. Diogenes Laertius II
90 and Plutarchus, Quaestiones convivales V 1, 674A-B), thus
evidently rejecting what they regarded as a widespread view.
8. Beauty defined as  g iving r i se  to  (aes thet ic)  p lea -
sure
A further step to be taken concerns the issue whether there
was some recognition of the fact that beauty could be considered
from the point of view of its giving rise to aesthetic pleasure.There
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cus’ Perì pathôn; for more details on
their position cfr.M.-A.Zagdoun,La phi-
losophie stoicienne de l’art, Paris 2000,
pp. 206-207.
19. In antiquity this statue, together
is one dialogue by Plato in which various possible definitions that
can be given of beauty and of beautiful are introduced and submitted
to examination for their adequacy, viz. the Greater Hippias. One of
these definitions, which is put forward by Socrates, is that which
understands what is beautiful as that which gives us enjoyment
(chairein),with the specification that not all pleasures are involved,
«but only what gives us enjoyment through our senses of hearing
and sight» (297e). It cannot be a chance that there is an explicit
reference, and restriction, to the senses of hearing and of sight, for
we have seen that the usual way of distinguishing the main groups
of imitative arts is by the fact that their products or objects have to
do with one of these two senses.But that he has in mind the products
of these arts, even if not in an exclusive way, is shown by the
exemplification with which Socrates illustrates what he has in mind:
«surely beautiful human beings,and all decorative work,and pictures,
and plastic art [sculpture? Plasmata],delight us when we see them
if they are beautiful;and beautiful sounds,and music as a whole,and
discourses, and tales (muthologiai), have the same effect.» (298a,
Jowett’s transl.modified) In what follows in the dialogue difficulties
are raised against this definition,giving place to a tortuous discussion
on which I cannot while, for on the whole it does not concern the
topic which interests us.It should only be remarked that one difficulty
concerns the possibility of admitting some differentiation among
the various pleasures of which we have experience,beyond the mere
fact they come from certain senses rather than others (cfr. 298d-
299b), but that at some stage a positive (if not necessarily very
adequate) suggestion is given by saying that they are ‘the most
harmless and the best’ (cfr. 303e). Singularly this suggestion is then
taken as equivalent to saying that beauty is to be defined as ‘beneficial
pleasure’, and this other suggestion is shown to give rise to a new
difficulty.This transition can only be justified by the dialectical
purposes of the dialogue, and the specification that the pleasure is
harmless could be regarded as a useful integration of the original
definition (and one that,as we have seen,Plato himself, in the Laws,
could not regard as mistaken).
This definition of what is beautiful, though not the examples with
which it is illustrated, is often mentioned by scholars who discuss
the concept of beauty in Greek philosophy and literature,but almost
equally often the definition is put on the same plane as the other
definitions which are rejected in the course of the discussion between
Socrates and Hippias presented in the dialogue. However, before
raising the question whether Plato himself could have accepted it
one has to ask the question whether anybody else in his times would
have accepted it. Can one suppose that this definition was just
invented by Plato (or by Socrates as the interlocutor of the dialogue)
in order to dismiss it? It seems more likely that it was a current
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definition of what is beautiful that is propounded by Socrates for
criticism.This impression is confirmed by the fact that the same
definition (‘what is pleasant to the sight or to the hearing’) is
mentioned by Aristotle in a passage of his Topics, i.e. in a work which
contains much material that consisted in views that were commonly
accepted or that were propound by well-known philosophers (cfr.
VI 7, 146a21 ff.).
It can be added that the discussion in the previous part of the
Greater Hippias introduced examples and notions which opened
the way to a definition of beauty in an aesthetic sense.The first naive
reply by Hippias to Socrates’ question: «what is the beautiful (to
kalon)?» (understood by him as concerning something beautiful and
not beauty itself) is «a beautiful woman», intending manifestly a
handsome one.Another example, introduced this time by Socrates,
is that of the statue of Athena made by Phidias, which clearly was
regarded as particularly beautiful in an aesthetic sense (cfr. 290a-
b)19. In what follows the introduction of this example the discussion
gets concentrated on the notion of the appropriate or the convenient
(to prepon) as a definition of what is beautiful.This notion may not
be regarded as an adequate definition of what is beautiful,but plays
an important role in ancient aesthetics, for it tends to be regarded
as indicating one of the characteristics which an object must possess
in order to be beautiful (it is rendered in latin with decorum)20.
Another Platonic passage which should be considered in this
connection belongs to the Gorgias. In an exchange between him
and Polos Socrates offers an argument which goes against his
interlocutor’s attempt to draw a distinction between good (agathon)
and fine (kalon) taken as properties of actions (the main issue there
being whether doing just actions is in the interest of the agent). In
doing so he tries to clarify what is meant by fine (kalon), offering
a sort of definition of it (cfr. 474d ff.; that a sort of definition is in
question is suggested by Polos’ comment, in 475a, that Socrates has
made a good proposal in thus defining the fine (horizomenos to
kalon)).The definition given is in fact a disjunction, and is made
with reference to things normally regarded as fine (or beautiful):
bodies,colours, figures,sounds,and institutions (epitedeumata,e.g.
laws).Of these things we can say that they are fine either according
to some utility, because they are useful for something, or according
to some pleasure (kata hedonen tina), because of the enjoyment
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with that of Zeus by the same Phidias, ten-
ded to be regarded as the highest achieve-
ment in the field of the visual arts (cfr. the
quotations given byA.Rouveret,Histoire et
imaginaire de la peinture ancienne,
B.E.F.A.R.,Rome,1989,pp.405-411).
20.Aristotle for instance makes use
of this notion in his Poetics, cfr. 6,
1450b5; 15, 1454a22 and 30; 17,
1455a25; 18, 1456a14; 22, 1458b14 and
59a4, 9 and 12; 24, 1459b32 and 60a4.
Plato himself makes recourse to this
notion, without apparent reservations,
in Gorgias, 503e and in Phaedrus,
264c. See also Part II, ch. 29.
21. References to this passage are
(chairein) which they produce by contemplating them to those
who contemplate them, or for both reasons (cfr. 474d-e). In what
follows Socrates shows that the definition of the fine as what
produces pleasure is not relevant to actions that are to be judged
for their being just or unjust, and thus concludes that there is a
convergence between what is good and what is fine,with a refutation
of Polos’ position.
It should be noticed that the coincidence between what is good
and what is useful could itself be questioned (it is questioned for
instance in Alcibiades I 113d ff., even if talking of what is just
rather than of what is good), but that here it is taken for granted.
Socrates’purpose in this dialogue is simply to adduce some plausible
reason why his interlocutor is induced to resist the postulation
of an immediate coincidence between what is good and what is
fine, and this reason is that «fine» has application to what is called
so independently of any evaluation of moral goodness or of utility,
because it is called so as giving rise to pleasure in the observer
(or hearer). In this passage of the Gorgias there is no mention of
the specification to be found in the passage above discussed of the
Greater Hippias, namely that the pleasantness involved concerns
exclusively the senses of sight and of hearing. But it is sufficiently
clear that it is the same type of experience that is considered, for
it is said that the pleasure comes from the contemplation of bodies,
colours, figures and sounds (contemplation suggests sight, with a
simplificative omission of hearing).The reason why that speci-
fication is omitted is probably that the disjunction is meant to be
quite general, and to extend to the case of institutions, for which
it is not really possible to say that the pleasantness, if any, to which
they give rise is obtained either through sight or through hearing.
(That epitedeumata constitute a problematic case, because we
have awareness of them through sight or hearing, but do not give
rise to pleasure, is pointed out in Greater Hippias 298b-d.) The
passage, then, offers a confirmation of the fact that a definition of
the fine (or the beautiful) in terms of the aesthetic pleasure to
which what possesses it gives rise circulated in Socrates’and Plato’s
times, for mention of it in the course of a discussion of ethical
questions would not have been required if its omission had not
been particularly noticeable.But the passage is of importance also
because it shows that, contrary to what is assumed by most
interpreters who discussed this question, there was awareness of
the ambiguity of ‘the fine’ (to kalon) between its aesthetical and
its non-aesthetical (mainly, but not exclusively, ethical) meaning.21
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usually missing in articles concerning
the topic of beauty in ancient philoso-
phy, e.g. the articles Beauty: Concep-
tual and Historical Overview by S.D.
Ross and Classical Concepts by N. Pap-
pas, in Encyclopaedia of Aesthetics,
vol. I, pp. 237 ff. and pp. 244 ff. and
(das) Schöne: 1. Antike, by G. Most, in
That this ambiguity was felt, at least in intellectual circles, is
confirmed to some extent by the comic episode of the «beauty-
contest» between Socrates and the young Critobulos which is told
by Xenophon in his Symposium, ch. 5.There the only definition of
‘the fine’ which is expressly given is a Socratic one in terms of
usefulness or efficiency,thus corresponds to one of the members of
the disjunction propounded in the Gorgias, but the way in which
that beauty-contest ends, with all the votes in favour of Critobulos,
shows that the definition was not felt to be adequate, for, from the
point of view of efficiency, the superiority of Socrates on him (a
greater mouth to eat,a greater nose to inspire air,etc.) was irrefutably
demonstrated by Socrates himself. It was instead regarded as obvious
that Critobulos was a beautiful person and Socrates an ugly one,
for the same reason for which we would regard this as obvious:their
looks (in Greek: their schema or their morphé). Critobolus had in
fact already made clear that his being beautiful was different from
being strong or brave or wise and, he added, more convenient, for
he could obtain what he wanted without effort (of course by
inducing others to do things for him because exercising on them an
erotic attraction,cfr.4,13). It can be added that the reasons adduced
by the same Xenophon, in Cyropaedia V 1, 5 and 7, for regarding a
certain woman as beautiful are clearly aesthetic ones (there is talk
of the appearance of her face and of her hands and of her
euschemosune),though there is also mention of the danger of feeling
an erotic attraction.
Aristotle offers a definition of beauty in relation to the pleasure
to which it gives rise only in the passage of Topics VI 7 quoted above,
and without taking position with respect to it. In his account of
tragedy, of epos, and other genera of poetry he admits that each of
them is a source of a pleasure proper to that genus, and it seems
natural to admit that this pleasure depends on the beauty that is
realized by a particular tragedy and so forth (for this account cfr.
below, ch. 13). In Politics VIII 5, 1340a25-28, he talks of a
contemplation that is a source of pleasure when the contemplation
of the object, namely a person, is done for no other reason than its
form or shape (morphé), apparently intending to keep this distinct
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Hist.Wörterbuch der Philosophie, edd.
J. Ritter & K. Gründer, vol. 8, coll. 1343-
1351. C. Janaway, Images of Excellence,
cit., ch. 3 entitled The Fine and the
Beautiful, discusses this passage toge-
ther with those of the Greater Hippias,
recognizing that they are of impor-
tance from the point of view of the his-
tory of aesthetics, though leaving the
question open how far they reflect Pla-
to’s own position; in any case he can-
not find in them a sufficient basis for
talking of an ancient aeshetics. The
importance of the main passage of the
Greater Hippias was recognized
already by Bernard Bosanquet, A His-
tory of Aesthetics (London 1904;
reprinted as vol. 4 of The collected
Works of Bernard Bosanquet, vol. 4,
Thoemmes Press, Bristol 1999, from
which edition I quote), p. 52.
26.For the interpretation of this § cfr.
from the reasons considered elsewhere (i.e. in De partibus
animalium I 5, 645a10 ff., Poetics 4, 1448b9 ff. 22, and Rhet. I 11,
1371b6-10).There must be some complementarity between this
passage and a suggestion that is contained in the passage of Poetics
4, namely that one may appreciate a work of art such as a painting
independently from its being an imitation of something, e.g. for its
fine execution and colour (cfr. 1448b17-19, quoted below, ch. 10).
He talks of ‘the fine’(to kalón) as the end of action in various passages
of his Ethics, without making any attempt to clarify its difference
from what is beautiful in an aesthetic sense, but in a passage of the
Metaphysics, concerning however the beauty in mathematics, he
makes it clear that what qualifies the moral end must be kept distinct
from what satisfies requirements of perfection in an aesthetic sense23.
There is an obvious connection between this account of what
is beautiful because satistisfying certain formal requirements and
the account considered above of the pleasures coming from the
senses that are unmixed or pure, but there is also a difference, for
those pleasures were extended to the sense of smell and even (by
Aristotle and not without a severe restriction) to that of taste.The
difference however need not be of great importance, because the
restriction to the senses of sight and hearing is probably suggested
(as I have said) by a reference to the two main classes in which
imitative arts are subdivided,but the aesthetic attitude, though most
typically exemplified in their case, has a wider scope.We ourselves
would admit that it can be exercised in the case of beautiful bodies
of men and of women,when sexual attraction is excluded or at least
kept in check (we have seen that Aristotle points out this fact in
the passage quoted above of the Eudemian Ethics; see also Ps.-
Aristotle, Problemata 10, 896b10 ff.).We would also admit that it
can be exercised in the case of landscapes,but the Greeks of Plato’s
time showed little interest in this sort of beauty.
9. Pleasure  as  discr iminatory tas te  
One can see that, if the interpretation I am propounding is on the
right track, the feeling of pleasure which is said to be raised by cer-
tain objects which fall primarily under the senses of sight and of
hearing is the ancient equivalent of our idea of taste. It certainly pos-
sesses certain characteristics of taste, for it is admitted (by both Plato
and Aristotle) that it can be educated and it is also admitted that it
is capable of discrimination.This is admitted in a sufficiently clear
way by Aristotle in the passage of the Nicomachean Ethics in which
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22. For a discussion of these two
passages see part II, ch. 29
23. See part II, ch. 29
he considers the case of wine-tasters and other experts, for he there
says (recalling something admitted by him, but in a more general
form, in the De anima) that the sense of taste involves discrimina-
tion (krisis). (There are various passages in the De anima where it
is said that the senses discriminate (using krinein, kritikos, etc.),
cfr. e.g. II 6, 418a14-16; 11, 425a5-10; III 2, 426b8-14. But the discri-
mination there lies in the capacity e.g. to distinguish one colour
from another. Presumably in the Ethics he assumes that the senses
can be trained to become more discriminating.Further, it is also said,
in the De anima (cfr. II 2, 413b23; 3, 414b3; III 9, beginning), that
their exercise is accompanied by the feelings of pleasure and pain.
That these can be trained is a basic doctrine of his Ethics.) It may be
relevant to remark, in this connection, that sometimes the Greek
word for pleasure, hedoné, can also take the meaning of flavour or
(sort of) smell24 or even,more directly, the meaning of (good) taste,
in connection with the use of the tongue25 Our metaphorical use of
the word 'taste' is thus not wholly without a parallel in Greek in the
case of the very word hedoné.A different suggestion,somewhat clo-
ser to the expertise attributed to wine-tasters and other such experts
in the passage of the Nicomachean Ethics, is to be found in Politics
VIII 6.Here the general topic is education in music and the question
discussed is whether young people should be encouraged and
instructed to learn music by singing themselves and playing instru-
ments with their own hands,or not.Aristotle’s reply to this question
is positive, with the proviso that they should not pursue these acti-
vities so as to become professional specialists in one or more than
one of them, but only as part of a ‘liberal’ education.The reason for
pursuing these activities is that through some direct involvement
one can become a good judge (krités) in this field, this being a mat-
ter of being able to discriminate beautiful works (ta kalà krinein)
and to enjoy them in a correct way (chairein orthos) (cfr.1340b23-
25 and b35-39).That music is a source of pleasure had been said
already in ch. 5, 1340a14-18. Here it is a matter of becoming a good
judge of music, through a proper enjoyment acquired by education,
thus it is a matter of educated taste.
Plato makes a similar admission when he suggests, in the Laws,
that it would be legitimate to use pleasure as a criterion for deciding
which works of art are good and which are not (the formulation
used in 658e7 is dein ten mousiken hedonê krinesthai) if this power
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24. Cfr. Heraclitus, fr. 67 (cfr. discus-
sion by G.S. Kirk, Heraclitus: The Cos-
mic Fragments, Cambridge 1954, pp.
196-97,who also refers to the other pas-
sages),Anaxagoras, fr. 4 ("∑ seeds of all
things, with all kinds of shapes and
colours and hedonas"), Diogenes of
Apollonia, fr. 5).
25.This happens in the Hippocratic
treatise On Regimen, I 23,where tongue
is said to be of the good or pleasant taste
(hedoné) and of the bad or unpleasant
taste (aedie). (On all these passages see
also J.C.B.Gosling and C.C.W.Taylor,The
Greeks on Pleasure, Oxford 1982, §
1.2.3, p. 18.)
were exercised not by everybody but by the appropriate people,
who are provided with virtue and education (cfr. II 658e ff.).The
implication is precisely that pleasure can function as a criterion,
hence involves some form of discrimination, but that what makes
the difference is the kind of training this capacity has received.
Aristotle seems to be wanting to correct Plato in Politics III 11,when
he says that collective judgment may be superior to the judgment
of the single person,hence that ‘the many are better judges of works
of music and poetry’ (1281b7-8), but from the context it seems
sufficiently clear that even for him these ‘many’ must be educated
people (for his attitude on this matter cfr. below, ch. 13). Otherwise
the issue now touched upon has political implications that cannot
be discussed here.
It is significant that Plato feels obliged to make this sort of
concession,for it shows that pleasure in his eyes could not be rejected
altogether as a criterion, but that he tried to find some way of
regulating it. His attitude is not that of denying the existence of a
sphere of aesthetic experience,which has pleasure as both its main
criterion and its main aim, by assimilating it to other spheres of
human experience, such as the religious and the ethical ones.This
sphere corresponds to what for instance the poets would do if left
to themselves, but the poets cannot be left to themselves.Thus he
implictily admits in a passage of the Laws that the poets, left to
themselves,have their own way of dealing with their field and their
own judgements based on their taste, for, in suggesting that existing
works of poetry, when not satisfactory on the basis of the criteria
set up by the lawgiver, should be ‘revised and rearranged, taking as
advisors men who are both poets and musicians, thus exploiting
their powers in composing {poems}’, he adds:‘but not relying, with
a few exceptions, on their tastes (hedonais) and inclinations’ (cfr.
802b5-c2). However, as this very passage shows, he does not think
that the poets should be left to themselves,that their irresponsibility
should be tolerated.Their influence can be harmful and must be
kept in check.But it must be kept in check mainly from the outside,
by the intervention of the lawgiver. Little earlier he had said, in
fact, that the poets in general are not at all able to know what is good
and what is not good (cfr.801b10-c1),hence, it is implied, it belongs
to other people,namely the authorities of the city,to decide for them
what is good and what is not by imposing certain restrictions on
them and on their works. Regulations of this type are in fact laid
down in the context of this passage. (For some more details on this
position in the Laws see below.) Judgement of taste and ethico-
political judgement do not coincide, and may not be found in the
same persons.
Coming back to the main issue, it is important to realize that both
Plato and Aristotle have in mind the fact that tragedies, comedies,
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and other artworks were usually submitted to public competitions
in cities like Athens.The citizens who went to the theatre,even when
they could not vote themselves, were involved in the competition
among the dramas represented,and certainly there were hot disputes
about their merits. One can suspect that even the judgment of the
appointed judges was not based on purely aesthetic criteria.Yet
the existence of a popular public that is interested in the discussion
of the relative merits of dramas, of poems and other artworks
constitutes the natural background for a smaller public of
connoisseurs who would take up the discussion at a higher level,
by expressing judgment with greater consciousness of the aesthetic
criteria to be applied. The existence of this smaller public of
connoisseurs constitutes itself the background for the reflection and
theorization done by philosophers like Plato and Aristotle.To limit
the attention to their theorization, which has as its main purpose
not that of legitimating existing social reality but that of introducing
and justifying norms which are meant to transform it, can lead to
some serious misunderstanding. Because Plato, and to some extent
also Aristotle,reject pure aestheticism,it is supposed that no aesthetics
could be present in their times.There is a failure to keep sufficiently
distinct what Plato and Aristotle have to say in a descriptive way
about what were the prevailing attitudes towards aesthetic pleasure
among cultivated people in the society of their times and what Plato
and sometimes Aristotle have to say about the proper attitude that
one should have towards those pleasures.
Connected with this failure there is that due to an insufficient
awareness of the fact that Plato and Aristotle ascribe to the feelings
of pleasure and of displeasure characteristics such as being cognitive
and as involving some form of discrimination. This insufficient
awareness depends itself in part on the fact that the importance of
this account of pleasure from the point of view of the history of
aesthetics has not been appreciated because scholars have too easily
assumed that the topic of pleasure is of exclusive interest for ethical
psychology (it is typical of this attitude that Halliwell, while giving
attention to the treatment of pleasure in the Poetics, would not
discuss the relevant passages in the Ethics, evidently thinking that
nothing of use for aesthetics can be found in those works).
10. Poetry  regarded as  a  source  of  p leasure  
It is not at all surprising that Plato and Aristotle should have
mentioned the feelings of pleasure in this connection.The view that
poems sung (with the accompaniment of music, not just recited)
to an audience are a source of pleasure for the hearers is an old one,
that goes back to Homer. When Plato himself, in Republic X,
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introduces the figure of the honeyed Muse (hedusmene Mousa,
607a5), thinking of the poetry of Homer and of those poets whose
poems are a source of pleasure, he is in fact giving an imaginative
version of what was a common-place.And what pleasure can they
provoke if not an aesthetic one? And it is not a chance if Aristotle,
in the passage quoted above of the Eudemian Ethics, recalls the
spell exercised by the song of the Sirens, for it is sufficiently clear
from Homer’s description of the effect of their song that he regards
it as an intensification of the spell exercised and the pleasure
produced by the songs sung by a singer (aoidos) (cfr. Odyssey XII,
vv.37 ff.,where there is mention of the enchanting effect (thelgein)
and of the joy (terpsis) produced by their song, further vv. 183 ff.
on the honey-sweetness of their song;on the similar effects attributed
to the song sung by a singer see e.g. Odyssey I, vv. 337-38 and 346-
47;VIII,vv.43-45 and 62-64;XVII,vv.518-21).Similar assertions about
the effects of poetry or of singing are to be found in other poets as
well (e.g. in Hesiod, Theogony vv. 36-38, vv. 80-104;Alcman, fr. 1;
Pindarus, Paean VI, vv. 58-59; Nemean VII, v. 11; Isthm.V, vv. 53-54,
and VI, v. 9; Euripides, Medea vv. 190-203; Supplices vv. 180-183).
Gorgias went beyond what was claimed by the poets as an effect
of their songs, by admitting, apparently in connection with tragedy,
that the art-work is a source of deception (apate), but that for the
tragedian it is more ‘right’ (dikaios) to be successful in exercising
this deception, because he is fulfilling his promise (presumably
this implies that he does what is expected from him), and for the
members of the audience it is wise to accept this deception,because
each of them shows himself sensitive to the pleasure provided by
the words which exercise this deception (cfr. B 23 from Plutarch,
de gloria Ath. 5, 348C). On the effects of poetry in general, but
probably having mainly tragedy in mind, he says something in § 9
of his Encomium of Helena, where he suggests (as Aristotle will
do later) that it gives rise to emotions such as those of fear and
compassion. He does not here suggest that involvment in these
emotions can leave place to the feeling of pleasure,but this passage,
according to the statement in the § which immediately precedes
it, was meant to illustrate how the word (logos) eliminates pain
and produces joy (chara) and even, somewhat paradoxically, stops
fear.In the § 10 there is the further suggestion that the word exercises
a sort of magic, with the effect of leading to pleasure and bringing
away from pain. In this connection there is the mention of two arts
of magic,evidently by means of words,meaning presumably poetry
and rhetoric, which are ‘errings’ (hamartemata) of the soul and
deceptions of opinion (doxes apatemata),thus introducing the motif
of deception, which is developed (talking explicitly of falsity, but
probably without intending to distinguish it from fiction) in the next
§.Mention of deception in this connection serves to give an excuse
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to Helena,according to the declared purpose of the Encomium,but
clearly Gorgias has in mind the deception exercised by poetry. Of
discourses, presumably rhetorical ones, to be delivered in contests
(agonas), which are written in an artful way e not in conformity
with truth, it is said in § 13 that they are pleasing (produce terpsis)
and persuasive for a large mass of people. In § 14 Gorgias appears
to admit that the effect that discourses have of emotional
involvement, in giving sorrow or pleasure (terpsis) and in producing
sensations of fear or of boldness (or confidence: tharsos), is not
always positive, because there can be a malevolent persuasiveness
that poisons and bewitches the soul: discourses are like drugs
(pharmaka) that can bring away illness but also life.It is likely,finally,
that Gorgias assumes a parallel between poetry and painting, for in
§ 18 he comes to talk of painting and of sculpture and says about
the pictures that they give enjoyment to sight (terpousi ten opsin)
and about statues that they produce a sort of sweet illness (noson
hedeian) in the eyes.
It can be presumed that what Gorgias says in the Encomium at
§ 13, though applying to rhetoric, is to be extended to poetry, for
he seems to be admitting a parallel between the two in § 1026 and,
in general,does not seem to want to distinguish the effects of rhetoric
from those of poetry (a form of poetry is considered in B 23, and
in § 18 he probably assumes a parallel between painting and poetry).
This means that also in the case of poetry he admits an alternative
between giving pleasure and transmitting the truth. The same
alternative, we shall see, is formulated explicitly for poetry by the
author of the Dissoi logoi.Giving up the pursuit of truth leaves space
to deception,but this deception must be different from that obtained
by telling a lie, since presumably it is understood as not excluding
some consciousness of it, for there is wisdom in accepting it. (Notice
that, in the Hippocratic On Regimen, which is an eclectic work by
an author who must be familiar with Gorgia's views, the actor's art
is kept distinct from e.g. commercial activities because 'it deceives
those who know', cfr. I 24.) In short, it is not the deception of the
one who takes as real what takes place on the scene in a theatre or
what is painted. Everything is done in view of pleasure, which is
natural to regard as aesthetic pleasure. Gorgias assumes that this
pleasure is regarded as desirable even if he does not exclude that it
can be harmful, and this confirms that in itself this is an extramoral
pleasure. On the whole we cannot expect, from a writing such as
the Encomium of Helena and from a brief passage paraphrased by
Plutarch, the formulation of a well-developed aesthetic theory on
Gorgias’ part, but it is sufficiently clear that he gave a contribution
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my article Il potere della parola in Gor-
gia e in Platone, in Gorgia e la Sofis-
tica, «Siculorum Gymnasium» 38, 1985,
pp. 65-80.
27. Cfr. Aristotle’s Poetics, p. 64,
to aesthetics and that he regarded pleasure (hedoné or terpsis) as
the main effect of an art-work.
(Similar motives are also to be found in the sophistical writing,
of uncertain chronology, entitled Dissoi logoi. In III § 10 the author
says, with explicit reference to the arts and the works of the poets,
that in producing a tragedy or a painting,the one who deceives most
by making them similar to what is true, i.e. to the originals, is the
best poet or painter. (He does not explicitly talk of imitation, but
similarity to what is true must suggest this notion.) Elsewhere, in
III § 17 (and in II § 28) he makes an explicit reference to the arts
what is just and what is unjust are not to be found (i.e.moral criteria
are not operative) and says of the poets (evidently taken as possessor
of an art of this type) that they produce their works in view of
pleasure, not in view of the truth.The author thus seems to assume
the existence of a field constituted by arts like poetry and painting
which operate in an imitative way having pleasure in view, by
exclusion of any reference to the truth and to moral criteria) 
Leaving out Plato’s position for the moment, some consideration
must be given to Aristotle’s position in his Poetics. It is not often
remarked that in this work he tends to regard pleasure as the result
or accomplishment of each of the forms of art or of literary genres
which are discussed there. It is a result that, though external (thus
different from the internal end [telos] which, in the case of tragedy,
is its muthos, cfr. 6, 1450a22-23), is not extrinsic (just as producing
a catharsis is not extrinsic), but apparently is regarded as the work
(ergon) of the tragedy or other poetic work (cfr. ch. 13, beginning,
and ch. 26, 1462b12-15). In the introductory part of the Poetics he
treats all those genres as involving imitation (mimesis),but imitation
itself is regarded as being a source of pleasure (see the beginning
of ch. 4, where there are five occurrences of hedoné and cognate
words: 48b8, 11, 13, 15, 18).When he gives his famous definition of
tragedy at the beginning of ch. 6 he does not, admittedly, point out
that pleasure is its accomplishment,but at least he mentions the fact
that the language used must be ‘pleasurably garnished’ (cfr. 49b25-
31) and (at the end of ch.) the same is said with reference to some
parts of tragedy, namely singing and spectacle (of the latter it is
said that it exercises seduction, but this was regarded as a source
of pleasure by other authors, e.g. Gorgias); that music contributes
to the pleasure raised by tragedy is also pointed out in ch. 26,
1462a16f. However, when later on, at the beginning of ch. 14, he
comes back to the suggestion made in defining tragedy in ch. 6,
namely that it gives rise to a ‘purification’ of the passions (mainly
fear and compassion) which are put in movement by the tragedy,
Aristotle explicitly points out that this is a source of pleasure (cfr.
1453b11 and 12).Tragedy is kept distinct both from comedy and
from the epic poem because each of them gives rise to a pleasure
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that is proper to it (cfr. end of ch. 13, and 26, implicitly in 1462a10-
11, explicitly in 1462b1-3); this idea that each genre produces its
proper pleasure is reaffirmed in a general way towards the end of
ch. 26 (cfr. 1462b13f.). (The idea of producing the proper pleasure
is introduced, in the case of tragedy, also in the passage already
mentioned at the beginning of ch.14;from this passage one desumes
that bringing about this pleasure involves some restriction in the
means used.) The comparison between tragedy and epic poem from
this point of view is developed in ch. 24, 1460a11 ff. (cfr. 60a17). In
this connection he mentions the marvellous (or the surprising:
thaumastón) as what is realized by tragedy (he seems to have it in
mind also in 18, 1456a19 ff.), and this is regarded as being pleasant
also in the Rhetoric (cfr. I 11,1371a31-34 and III 2,1404b11-12).Also
in discussing the composition of a tragedy,with the parallel of painting
in ch. 6, 50a39-b3, and touching upon it for another reason in ch. 9,
51b19-26,there is the suggestion that it is a source of pleasure.Finally,
he says something on the way in which a tragedy, because it has a
form like a living being, gives raise to pleasure at the beginning of
ch. 23.The centrality of the notion of pleasure comes out clearly
from these passages.
Halliwell does not ignore the topic of pleasure in the Poetics,
while giving little attention to the contributions by Aristotle in other
works, but he is inclined to regard it as an obvious consequence of
the mimetic character of tragedies and other types of poetry and
of artwork. However it should be recalled that Aristotle, in Poetics
4, does admit that the contemplation of pictures, drawings and so
forth is a source of pleasure, thus produces a certain effect on its
viewer,but regards this, in some cases,where reference to the original
is involved, as a pleasure coming from the fact that one is learning
something,thus not as an aesthetic pleasure.And in his account there
are other cases in which this is not so but what happens is that,“if
by any chance the thing depicted has not been seen before, it will
not be in so far as it is an imitation that it produces the pleasure,
but in virtue of its execution or its colouring or some other such
cause”(1448b17-19). Here the pleasure talked about is clearly of an
aesthetic type, but is explicitly said not to depend on the mimetic
nature of the art-work, while pleasure which is not of an aesthetic
type is said to depend on such mimetic nature. Halliwell is not
unaware of the difficulty raised by this passage, but does not seem
to face it directly, for he only gives importance to the concession
that something can ‘give the pleasure’ as an imitation27. He shows a
similar attitude in discussing the pleasure of music,for he lies weight
on the fact that Aristotle admits that music is a source of pleasure
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under (b), and p. 72; see also his discus-
sion of the topic in his contribution,
entitled Aristotle’s Poetics, to The Cam-
bridge History of Literary Criticism,
[pp. 149-183] pp. 162-63.
28.The passage is as follows:«Let pity
also in its imitative dimension, rather than on the fact that for him
all music is pleasant (cfr. Aristotle’s Poetics, cit., p. 68, n. 29 and
Aristotle’s main treatment of the matter in Politics VIII 5: it is clear
that Aristotle agrees with Plato in regarding modes and rhythms as
imitative,but music has other aspects,such a form and chromaticism,
which cannot be regarded in this way; further,Aristotle associates
what he regards as the ‘natural pleasure’ or the ‘harmless pleasure’
of music to the appreciation of recreation and relaxation, and this
is independent of its imitative dimension).Further,he has to concede
that Plato, in Philebus 51d, talks of pleasures which follows musical
sounds that are said to be ‘beautiful in themselves’ (because of their
smoothness and clearness etc.), thus independently of the imitative
dimension of music. It can be added that Gorgias insists, as we have
seen,on the pleasures procured by poetry and so forth,but does not
suggest in any way that they particularly depend on their imitative
character, for this is not even mentioned by him (it is not a chance
that Gorgias’ contributions are not given any independent place in
Halliwell’s account of the ‘aesthetic of mimesis’).
A final point to be touched upon,but which also serves to introduce
a topic to be dealt with in what follows, is raised by the alternative
which,we have seen,is to be found both in Gorgias and in the author
of the Dissoi logoi concerning poetry, viz. the alternative between
giving pleasure and transmitting the truth. It would seem that, in
excluding the second horn of the alternative, they are also excluding
that poetry is to be taken as giving instruction, admitting instead
that it is to be judged on other criteria (such as the efficacy of the
deception to which it gives rise). On the negative point that poetry
does not give instruction there is an agreement by Plato, but he
supposes that it claims to give instruction, and thus is to be judged
on this basis. On examination this claim turns out to be ungrounded
it, precisely because poetry does not transmit the truth (it does not
transmit the truth about the gods and so forth). Hence poetry is to
be admitted as a positive influence in human life only in so far as it
exercises some other valuable function such as being edifying and as
contributing to the formation of an harmonic personality.Otherwise
poetry, in that it advances a claim that is ungrounded, it is to be
condemned as a source of deception.Aristotle,in his Poetics,disagrees
with Gorgias in that he admits that poetry gives instruction,and is not
only a source of pleasure, but he does not directly oppose Plato,
since the sort of instruction which poetry is supposed by him to
provide is not that which Plato has in mind and which has to do
with traditional paideia.Poetry addresses an audience of adult educated
people, and they are not in need of instruction because paideia is
behind them.What they learn from works of poetry is rather like what
they would learn from works of history,if they could learn something
from those other works, what is excluded by Aristotle.
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11. The place of  aesthetic  pleasures and their variety
The recognition that certain pleasures are of the aesthetic type
requires a differentiated treatment of pleasure. It can be doubted
that Plato, in the dialogues of the first period of his activity, was
willing to envisage such a treatment.An explanation that can be
given of the fact that in the Greater Hippias the definition of beauty
in terms of what is pleasant to the eye and to the ear is not developed,
but ends by being rejected, is that it cannot be admitted that this
be a type of pleasure that can be distinguished from other types,
since (it is argued) anything pleasant in so far as it is pleasant is not
different from anything else that is pleasant (cfr.299d).At some stage,
however, Plato recognized that one cannot treat all forms or types
of pleasure in the same way.
The clearest recognition of this fact is to be found in the Philebus,
where the assertion is made that pleasure is ‘variagated’ (poikilon),
for, in spite of being called with one name, it presents a variety of
forms (morphas) which are not all similar one to the other (cfr.12c).
In the Republic there is no general formulation like this one,but the
recognition of this fact is operative, for more than one typology of
forms of pleasure is introduced in the dialogue. One of these
typologies has to do with the distinction of necessary and non
necessary desires and anticipates the well-known Epicurean
threepartition of pleasures (cfr.VIII 558d ff. and IX 571a-b).The
typology which interests us most is the one we have already met,
and it is developed in the Philebus. He adopts a double distinction:
that between pleasures that are pure and pleasures that are not pure,
because they are associated with pain; and that between pleasures
that are true or genuine and pleasures that are not so.The first
distinction is not difficult to understand: a pleasure that arises from
the satisfaction of some need, e.g. of the appetite of hunger, cannot
be regarded as pure, because the condition of need is painful. But
this pleasure could also be regarded as illusory, since one feels as
pleasant the elimination of the pain,but this is in fact only a condition
of not feeling pain, not one of positively feeling pleasure (on this
point there is an obvious disagreement between Plato and Epicurus).
As one can see,a pleasure that is not pure may also be illusory,though
this coincidence is not necessary. Plato anyhow does not make
recourse to the distinction between genuine and illusory pleasure
in the case that is of interest for us, that of the impure or mixed
pleasures that are provoked by tragedy.As we shall see,he maintains
that the representation of a tragedy, if efficacious, gives rise in the
public to certain emotions, such as those of pity and fear, that are
painful in themselves, but which are accompanied by a feeling of
pleasure.This feeling of pleasure must be regarded as impure,in view
of its connection with those painful emotions, while it is not clear
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if it has to be regarded as illusory as well. It should be regarded as
illusory if it is the result of the relieving of a sort of need, that of
giving vent to the feelings of fear and pity. Plato is not sufficiently
explicit on this point.But in any case he seems to regard the impurity
of these pleasures as a sufficient reason for condemning them.
This approach to pleasure,as one can see, is ethical and, to some
extent, metaphysical (in the distinction between true and illusory
pleasures), but of a metaphysics which is not to be separated from
ethics. Plato’s question always remains what pleasure, in its various
forms, contributes to the good life of a person.When the request is
advanced, in the discussion of art in Republic X, that poetry shows
itself not only pleasant but also useful (cfr. 607e), it is sufficiently
clear that this usefulness lies in a positive contribution to the
goodness of the good life of a person. It is true that he admits, most
explicitly (as we shall see) in the Laws, that relaxation and play must
have a part in the life of a person, as a relief from its labours, so
that a positive contribution is not always required, and the request
may become de facto that the pleasure results in being harmless.
But he is not willing to treat the impure pleasures procured by
tragedy as harmless. (Further restrictions, discussed below, in
admitting the poets in the well-governed city, concern the contents
of their works.) In the Laws, as we have seen above (in ch. 9), he
admits that pleasure can operate as a discriminatory taste when
exercised by a virtuous and educated person, but education is
understood there as a training of the feelings of pleasure and of pain
so that one likes what is good (and not simply beautiful in an aesthetic
sense) and dislikes what is bad (see my discussion Part II, ch. 16).
Thus there is freedom in the exercise of taste only in so far as what
is beautiful coincides or is in accordance with what is good.Beyond
prospecting this situation Plato does not show any interest in
illustrating how this freedom is exercised.
Aristotle’s approach is to a large extent similar to that of Plato,
though he does not make recourse to the metaphysical distinction
between true and illusory pleasures.His main treatment of pleasure
(in fact, two distinct treatments) is to be found in the Nicomachean
Ethics and is conducted from the point of view of a discussion of
the question as to what pleasure, in its various forms, contributes
to the good life of a person. (There is a clear recognition of the fact
that pleasure presents various forms.There is also a discussion of
the related questions whether pleasure is itself to be regarded as the
good for man, or whether pleasure is to be regarded as intrinsically
bad,these two being extreme positions which are excluded by him.)
Aesthetic pleasures however are not considered from this point of
view in that work. But he freely admits (in IV [11] 14, 1127b34 ff.)
that relaxation is one part of life and that one form of relaxation
consists in amusement in a playful way,for instance in conversation.
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That the (evidently: harmless) pleasures coming from attending
the performance of certain comedies (with reservations however
towards the Aristophanic ones) belongs to this sphere is suggested
by an allusion contained in that chapter (cfr. 1128a20-25). One gets
the impression, from certain passages of the Politics which cannot
be discussed here, that he admits a higher form of relaxation,
consisting in entertainment that cannot be associated with play since
it involves learning, to which music can contribute in a significant
way.
Anyway, he has something to say on the place to be given to
aesthetic pleasures when discussing education in music in Politics
VIII ∑. He has something to say on this point when discussing
education in music in Politics VIII, for he there raises the question
what functions music has in human life, beyond the educative one
which is the main concern of his treatment in this book.His position
is (said very briefly) that music has a part in the leisure that is
indispensable for happiness, and that it has such a part as being a
source of pleasure (cfr. 3, 1338a1 ff. and 5, 1339b17 ff.).This point
can easily be extended to other arts, for he for instance recommends
drawing as being useful for a better judging of the products of
craftsmen, but this is a judgement that concerns their beauty (cfr.
3, 1338a17-19 and b1-2). However this point has not unrestricted
validity,because Aristotle expects that one aims at the best pleasures
and these are those which come from the finest things (cfr.1338a7-
9 [not just «noblest things»,as Kraut translates,but also not just «most
beautiful» in a purely aesthetic sense]).
Further pleasure,as we have seen,has some place in the Poetics,
especially a propos the admission that there is a proper pleasure for
each literary genus: for tragedy,for comedy,and so forth.Notoriously
in the case of tragedy this pleasure is to be put in relation to its
cathartic function.There is no attempt,on the other hand,to introduce
differentiations inside each literary genus, when these of course
would most directly concern pleasure as a discriminatory taste.
But it seems to be assumed that the works which are the best
examples of tragedy and so forth are also those which procure the
finest pleasures.
Plato sometimes adopts the view that either poetry in particular
or the mimetic arts in general can only be a source of pleasure, and
this becomes a reason to either condemn them (as happens in the
Gorgias) or to devalue them (as happens in the Politicus).Sometimes
however he admits that certain at least of these arts, and especially
music, though being a source of pleasure, have a positive value
(this happens in Republic III 398c ff. and in some passages of the
Laws), evidently because the pleasure they procure cannot be
regarded as harmful.Thus, in two passages of the Timaeus in which
he talks of the effect of music (i.e. 47c-e and 80b, to be quoted in
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part II, ch. 28), he makes a distinction between the pleasure which
is said to be irrational and to be experienced by silly people,and the
good cheer which is experience by intelligent people.People of the
first sort must be supposed to be most people, for the view that
this is the only benefit procured by music is said to be the prevailing
one. Further, of a tale (muthos) that is told by Socrates at the end
of the conversation he is represented to have had before his death,
and of a tale that is supposed to have been heard by the young Critias,
it is suggested that they are a source of pleasure for the hearers
(cfr.Phaedo 110b,and Timaeus 26b-c).Since these are tales that are
actually told in the Platonic dialogues (the first at the end of the
Phaedo, the second in the incomplete Critias) with a manifest
edifying purpose, there cannot be any doubt that the pleasure such
tales procure cannot be judged in a negative way.
What he constantly denounces is the finalization of the arts to
give pleasure to the moltitude (to ‘the many’, hoi polloi) or to the
mass (ochlos).This is evident for instance in the Gorgias (cfr.501e11-
502a1 and 502c9), in Republic X (cfr. 599a4, 604e4-6, 605a4, 608a4-
5, though these are not all passages in which the pleasure procured
to ‘the many’ is explicitly mentioned), and in the Laws. Here, in III
700a ff. (discussed below, ch. 17), there is an opposition between a
situation in which educated people, belonging to those who are
‘better’ (cfr. 700c5 and e3), imposed their judgement on the mass
[pleistos ochlos, 700c7] or moltitude of citizens [tôn politôn to
plethos, d1-2], and the situation in which it is this mass [in addition
to the just mentioned passages it is referred to in 700c3 and in e5]
which prevails with its judgement, with the consequence that it is
the pleasure it looks for that constitutes the aim of the poets (cfr.
700d6 and e2-4); rather similar is II 658e ff., also discussed below,
where pleasure is accepted as a criterion of judgement, if it is the
pleasure of a person who emerges in education and virtue; the
judgement of this person should prevail on that of the multitude,
who is deprived of education (cfr. 659a5-6), in leaving no place to
pleasure which ‘has been aroused improperly and not rightly’(659b3-
5). In what consists this bad pleasure (to which reference is made
also talking of non educated judges, in 959c1-2) is not explained,
but, in saying that with the opposite situation there is a corruption
in the pleasures felt by the spectators, he adds, to make it clear to
what this situation is opposed: «they ought to come to experience
more elevated pleasures (beltio ten hedonen) from listening to the
portrayal of characters invariably better (beltio) than their own»
(659c3-4).The negative situation was also presented, a little earlier,
as being that in which one pleases most (malista) most people
(pleistous) (658e5).
In Plato’s dialogues ‘the many’ or the mass are almost always
opposed to the educated or virtuous or expert person, as in these
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passages of the Laws, and declared to be uneducated or ignorant
(for that opposition cfr. e.g. Crito 46b-d; Greater Hippias 284d-e;
Gorgias 459a;for their ignorance cfr.e.g.Alcibiades I 111e;Republic
X 602b3; Gorgias 459a; Laws VIII 831b7). But there is also the
tendency to admit an equivalence between ‘the many’and the people
(demos) in the sense of the people who are the prevailing part in
an assembly under a democratic regime like that adopted in Athens.
(The equivalence of ochlos and demos is adopted in Gorgias 502c9
and in the context,where he starts with ochlos [in 502a1] and passes
to demos [in 502d5,d10];also in a prior part of the dialogue he starts
with ochlos [in 458e7 and 459a3-4], then passes to ‘the many’ [in
459e ff.], and at some point talks of demos [481d ff.], manifestly
alluding always to the same people.The same equivalence between
hoi polloi and demos is implied in Euthyphron 3b and in Laws
VIII 831b.) This tendency is noticeable also in other authors, like
Thucydides and Lisias, when one considers that democracy, as the
regime in which ‘the many’ are those who prevail, is opposed to
oligarchy,where it is ‘the few’who prevail. (In the Republic one also
notices a tendency to admit an affinity between ‘the many’ and the
inferior part of the soul, cfr. e.g. IV 431a8.) 
Now, of the multitude considered in this way it is said by Plato
that they are not able to pursue any other objective than pleasure,
sometimes with the added qualification that this objective consists
in the pleasures of the lowest or animal sort.Thus in the Protagoras,
where Socrates submits ‘the many’ to a fictitious interrogation, it is
maintained that they are not able to prospect any other aim than
getting pleasure and avoiding pain (cfr. 354b5-c2,d1-3,d7-e2,355a1-
5). In a more indirect way this same position is to be found in the
Gorgias as well,for there the hedonism which is defended by Callicles
and which consists in giving satisfaction to one’s desires without
limitation, is presented as the position which ‘the many’ approve in
their hearts and disapprove in their words only because they are
unable to realize it (cfr. 491e ff.). In Republic VI, when introducing
the Idea of good, it is asserted that ‘the many’ believe that the good
is nothing but pleasure (hoti tois men pollois hedonè dokei einai
to agathon, 505b5-6). In book IX there is talk of the condition of
those who,not being able to contemplate the superior reality of what
is bodiless,cannot do anything but pursue bodily pleasures,especially
those connected with feeding and sex, in a way similar to that of
animals, and the comment that is made (by the interlocutor of
Socrates) is that this is quite an appropriate description for the life
of ‘the many’(cfr.586a-c).Similarly,at the conclusion of the Philebus
it is asserted that ‘the many’give credit to animals like oxen and horses
in believing that the only end to be pursued is that of pleasure (cfr.
67b). Finally, in Phaedrus 256c the view is attributed to them that
the most happy life is that which contains sexual enjoyment.
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It can be added that Aristotle shares this low opinion of the
majority of people. For instance he claims, in Nicomachean Ethics
I 3 [5], 1095b14-17 and 19-22 that most men, being of the vulgar
type,identify the good with pleasure:their slavish tastes induce them
to prefer a life suitable to beasts.The same error of identifying the
good with pleasure is attributed to them in III 6,1113a33-b2.Further
in X 1, 1172a31-32 he says of ‘the many’ that they are slaves of their
pleasures. This looks then like a prejudice widespread among
philosophers.
Whatever one thinks of this prejudice,it gives rise to some trouble
in the case of aesthetic pleasures, for a number of these passages (in
both Plato and Aristotle) suggest that the pleasures which are pursued
by the mass of men are not those restricted to sight and hearing that
distinguish a man from a beast but precisely those of the other senses
that are common to men and animals.What then about the pleasures
restricted to sight and hearing which also should be pursued by
them,if the aim of poets (either in general or by a perversion) is that
of coming encounter the desire of pleasure held by the many? For
instance a tragedy, being destined to a representation that has its
immediate effect on sight and hearing, cannot directly satisfy the
appetites connected with the other senses.Perhaps it can be admitted
that there are ways in which a taste can be met that has been
corrupted by giving priority in one’s life to the pleasures of the
lowest type.Still, this corruption is something limited,for it concerns
the imagination. On this point, then, there is an inconsistency in
Plato’s and Aristotle’s attitude towards the multitude, for an
appreciation of tragedies and other artworks by ‘the many’,however
corrupted it may be, is different from pursuing animal pleasures and
thus requires a different characterization of their personality.
In fact it would seem that Plato does offer this other characteri-
zation of their personality when describing the typically democratic
attitude to life in Republic VIII.The suggestion there is that the
democratic constitution is not one constitution but a sort of bazaar
of constitutions in which each citizen chooses the one which suits
him in any given time.This means, from his own point of view, that
he will adopt the way of life that pleases him at that time
(constitution, politeia in Greek, being not just a certain political
regime but a way of life, both for the single person and for the
collectivity).For instance,he will live in peace when he wants to do
so, even if the rest of the city is at war, or, contrariwise, he will be
at war when the rest lives in peace, and he will avoid assuming
governing functions even if he has the capacity, if this is not his wish,
or assume them when he wishes, and he will equally avoid being
governed unless he wishes (cfr. 557b and d-558a).
Beyond the satirical excess in this description,which regards life
in the public dimension,there is the conviction that the democratic
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man has an attitude to life which is in neat contrast with the
requirement of specialization formulated for the well-governed city
of the Republic and which is that of the polymorphous dilettante
who pursues a certain activity till this gives him pleasure and,when
tired with it, passes to some other activity, without taking anything
very seriously.This is stated rather explicitly in a successive passage,
where a more plausible description is given of his private pursuits:
he lives from day to day indulging the appetite which prevails that
day, sometimes drinking wine and sometimes drinking water, trying
to get thin; sometimes he takes a turn at gymnastics,and sometimes
is idling and neglecting everything;sometimes he plays the flute and
sometimes gives himself to doing philosophy.It is a life where order
and necessity are absent but which he regards as free and pleasant
and blissful (cfr. 561c-d). Underlying this attitude is a psychological
condition, described in the intermediate passage, which consists in
giving satisfaction to non necessary desires and pleasures, that is
desires oriented to what is superfluous in life,without admitting the
existence of any hierarchy among them (cfr. 559d-e, 560d, 561a).
In this description of the psychology and of the way of life of the
democratic man and in this presentation of the democratic
constitution as the one which favours the whimsical choices of that
man one can view the intention to show not only that it is under
that regime that the most favourable conditions are to be found for
the pursuit of the activities which give rise to aesthetic pleasure but
also that the regime itself is characterized by some sort of
aestheticism.This is in fact suggested in indirect ways more than
by the frequent mention of those activities (only playing the flute
is actually mentioned). One indirect way in which it is suggested is
by the description given of the democratic constitution as being the
most beautiful one, for it is «like an embroidered robe which is
spangled with every sort of flower», thus being particularly
appreciated by ‘the many’, as variety of colours is particularly
appreciated by women and children (cfr. 557c).This description is
later extended to the life of the democratic man, which is said to
be manifold and varied like the fair and spangled constitution to
which he belongs (cfr. 561e).
It must be recognized that not everything that Plato says about
the democratic regime and the democratic man can be seen in this
light.There are parts, in this same part of Republic VIII, in which
democracy is seen for instance as a perversion of all values and
virtues, for in it sense of honour is called silliness, temperance
unmanliness, moderation vulgarity, or, on the contrary, insolence is
called breeding, anarchy liberty, and so forth (cfr. 560d-e, a passage
which recalls Thucydides,III 82.4 ff.),and also the process of leaving
free reins to the desires is described as leading to an excess that
cannot be stopped (cfr. 560a-d). In fact, there is, I think, a strong
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ambivalence in this treatment of democracy and of the democratic
man. Sometimes there is a prevalence of the intention to give an
account of them which makes it evident that all the conditions are
present in it for its conversion in the worse regime, that of tyranny,
for excess of liberty leads to the contrary excess, just as the excess
of heath in the summer season leads to the excess of cold in the
winter season (cfr. 563e-564a). Sometimes however he is willing to
admit that the democratic man can find, at least in favourable
circumstances, some sort of equilibrium in his life, by giving some
place to the virtues and by cultivating the pleasures in such a way
as keep them on an equal footing, thus avoiding (it is implied) the
risk of an excess that cannot be stopped (cfr. 561a-b).This account
can easily be extended to the democratic regime,and both this regime
and the democratic man can be seen as those who typically favour
the cultivation of those useless pleasures which come from the
activities connected with the fine arts.
12 . T he  i s sue  o f  the  ‘mixed ’ p l easures  produced  by
trag ic  representat ions  according to  Gorg ias  and to
Plato as  indicat ive of  their  at t i tudes  to  aes thet ics
Gorgias’ contribution to aesthetics is not without influence on
the reflection by Plato and by Aristotle. It is not only the issue of
deception that becomes burning but also that of the pleasure that
is produced by tragedy or, in general,by the representation of some
misfortune happening to somebody who does not (fully) deserve it.
This representation gives rise to feelings of pity (or compassion:
eleos) and fear (phobos), but experiencing these feelings is itself a
source of pleasure.This rather paradoxical fact is simply accepted
by Gorgias, for he shows no concern for the moral effect of the
condition in which the members of the audience find themselves.
The pleasure involved is however different from the ‘pure’pleasure
one feels in enjoying for instance an harmonious piece of music or
in seeing a beautiful statue.
That the pleasure involved is different is recognized by Plato,who
keeps the pleasure that is provoked by assisting to a tragedy or to
a comedy distinct from the ‘pure’ pleasures he talks about in the
above mentioned passage of Philebus 51b ff.This other pleasure
cannot be regarded as pure precisely because the person who feels
it experiences at the same time a painful feeling (that consisting in
pity and fear in the case of tragedy), thus finds himself in a condition
which is a mixture of pleasure and pain (this is stated in a previous
part of that dialogue: 48a ff.). It is sufficiently clear that also in the
Republic there is a difference, in his eyes, from the moral point of
view, because the ‘pure’ or harmless pleasures (such as those that
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one feels in enjoying for instance an harmonious piece of music)
and the ‘impure’pleasures that are produced by tragedy.The former
are to be approved and their creators to be admitted (as is sufficiently
clear from Republic IV 401b ff., with references to pleasure and
displeasure in 401e-402a and 402d ff.),the latter are to be condemned
and their creators are to be excluded (as is sufficiently clear from
Republic X).Aristotle comes back to this issue and provides a way
out to Plato’s condemnation of tragedy with his well-known
suggestion that the feelings of pity and fear have a cathartic effect
on the soul of the person who assists to its representation.Thus
the consequent pleasures cannot be harmful. (Aristotle does not
question the fact that these pleasures are different from the ‘pure’
ones that, as we have seen, are recognized by him.) 
To have a closer look at Plato’s position, the importance that
this issue has for him come out from the fact that in Republic X he
calls what he has to say on it «the gravest charge against poetry» (cfr.
605c). His point of departure is the admission (that results from
the previous account of imitation, clearly given having tragedy
primarily in mind, cfr. 603c ff.) that the effect that poetry obtains is
through the representation of the misfortunes of some person who
appears not to deserve them and thus is supposed to deserve pity
or compassion.(That the person appears not to deserve them is not
said explicitly, but is implicit in the admission that he is an object
of pity, cfr. the definition of eleos given by Aristotle that I quote
below.) The spectator, who is looking at sufferings that are not his
own, is thus induced to pity a person who (evidently on the scene)
claims to be good and immoderately laments (scil. his misfortune)
(cfr.606b1-3).Poetry gives satisfaction to our appetite for giving vent
to feelings of sorrow and of pitying,and in this way it is also a source
of pleasure.This pleasure is regarded as a gain by those who feel it,
so this (it is implied) is what makes poetry so appreciated. Plato
himself views this process in a negative way, because he believes
that these passions, when strengthened in this way, cannot be kept
under control,but pleasure and pain,together with the other passions,
will become the dominating forces in our soul (cfr.606d,also 607a6,
with extension to the whole community).
Now,concerning this passage, it can be noticed that Plato admits
that those who listen (including ‘the best of us’) to Homer or to
one of the tragedians who imitates a hero who gives expression
to his sorrows in a situation (evidently) of misfortune delight in
giving way to sympathy (sumpaschontes) (cfr. 605c10-d5). What
happens is that, contrary to what one would do in the case of one’s
own misfortune, one relaxes one’s control (phylaké) over the
‘lamentative’part (threnodes touto) of our soul and thus participates
‘sympathetically’ in the weeping and lamentation of the hero
imitated,and at the same time pities him (cfr.606a3-b3).That there
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is involvement in the representation of something pitiful is
reasserted in what follows (cfr. 606b7-8). Of the sentiments or
passions that were mentioned before Plato by Gorgias and that
will be mentioned by Aristotle fear (phobos) is missing (the
insistence on the couple pity and fear in Aristotle seems rather
conventional and should not be taken to exclude other passions,
referred to generically as toiauta pathemata in Poet. 6, 1449b27-
28).However this omission does not seem to be of any significance,
for in the Ion there is explicit reference to the fact that a rhapsode
like Ion will feel pity when telling something that is pitiful (eleinon
ti) and will prove fear when telling something that is fearful
(phoberon e deinon) (cfr. 535c), thus manifestly recalling the
conventional couple of pity and fear.And, according to the view
expounded in that dialogue (on which more Part II, ch. 25), also
the audience will find itself in the same emotional condition.
Similarly in Phaedrus, 268c5-d2, in remarking that composing a
tragedy requires more than making single discourses of a certain
kind, among the examples given of such discourses that are those
which are pitiful (reseis oiktrai) and those which,on the contrary,
are frightning (phoberai) or threatening.
Now, it is said that the sentiments or passions of pity, sorrow
and so forth that one proves arise from the contemplation of
extraneous sufferings (allotria pathe theoroun, 606b1). It is
sufficiently clear that an opposition is adopted in the passage between
these ‘extraneous’ sufferings and misfortune and the sufferings and
disgraces of one’s own (oikeion kedos, 605d6, oikeiai xumphorai,
606a3, apo tôn allotriôn eis ta oikeia, 606b6), for it is asserted
that in the case of the latter shame and other such considerations
induce us to keep in check the expression of the sentiments one
has. In this context it is not made clear whether the latter sufferings
and disgraces concern only one’s person.However in 603e reference
is made to such disgraces as the loss of one’s son (the same sort of
example is given in III 387e), and this certainly shows that the
suffering can concern what happens to another person, though
the closeness of one’s son to oneself makes the situation different
from the attitude one may have towards a person with whom one
has no close relationship.
The passage recalls Gorgias, Encomium of Helen § 9, but there
the point is that one has a proper feeling [idion ti pathema], i.e. a
feeling of one’s own, concerning persons and events that are
extraneous, thus there is a sort of reversal of that position.Yet it is
likely that Plato does not want to reject what had been asserted by
Gorgias, but believes that, in contemplating extraneous sufferings,
one has also feelings of one’s own, for this is precisely the point of
saying that one has ‘sympathy’ for the sufferings of the hero
represented on the stage.
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The question that arises at this point is whether, according to
Plato, only ‘sympathy’ or ‘com-passion’ is involved as a reaction on
the part of the public or something more, namely some sort of
identification with the personage represented. If only the sentiment
of pity were taken in consideration, it could seem that the first
reaction would be the only one to be expected. But the mention
of the feelings of sorrow and of fear appear to suggest that there
is the assumption that some identification with the personage is
accomplished, for these feelings are justified only if one imagines
oneself to be in his place. It is likely however that pity (eleos) is
not treated as substantially different from these other feelings, in
spite of the admission of some sort of opposition between this
and that of fear in the passage of the Phaedrus. Plato himself does
not say anything about how he conceived this feeling. Aristotle
however, in Rhetoric II 8, gives a definition of pity which shows
that he thinks that some identification is involved, because the
suffering that one proves for an undeserved evil that happens to
another person is said to be such that one can expect it to happen
to oneself or to a person that is close to oneself (this extension
coincides with the one admitted by Plato, with the example of
the loss of one’s son, so that the coincidence may touch also the
rest;Aristotle in any case is giving a definition which is generally
agreed upon, and Plato, on the issue that interests us, does not
seem to want to reject conventional wisdom)28.
Plato does not restrict this account to tragedy, for he thinks the
same effect is obtained by epic poems, tough certainly this is
intensified in the case of tragedy.The case of comedy cannot be
identical to that of tragedy, and Plato refers to it in talking of the
ridiculous (cfr. 606c). He suggests there is a parallel between the
two cases, in that one gives satisfaction to one’s propensity (due to
the inferior part of our soul) to ridiculing others and to buffoonery
through an interposed person (the one on the scene), without
realizing that, in this way, this negative propensity will get the
overhand in our soul.The parallel,one can see, is only partial.A more
developed account of what is involved in ridiculing others is given
by him in the Philebus, where the suggestion is that the malicious
feelings (due to envy, jealousy, etc.) that one experiences towards
one’s friends or neighbours are given satisfaction when ills befall
to them, this satisfaction being a source of pleasure (cfr. 48a-b, 49a-
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be {defined as} a certain pain {felt} at the
manifestation of destructive or painful
evil happening to one who does not
deserve it and which a person might
expect himself or one of his own to suf-
fer, and this when it manifestates itself
close at hand.» (1385b13-16) In what fol-
lows Aristotle remarks that people feel
pity if they think that certain persons are
among the good ones, for those who
think that none are such will think all
worthy of their suffering (cfr. 1385b34-
86a1).
29.‘Noble’ is manifestly ironical.
50b). On this account there is a mixture of pleasure and pain even
in the case of comedy, for the pain consists in experiencing those
malicious feelings, the pleasure in the reaction just described.
The consequence that is drawn in Republic X,on the basis of this
but also of other ‘charges against poetry’ (on these more below), is
that the poetry of Homer and of other great poets must be left out
from the well-governed city, in order to avoid that, instead of law
(nomos) and reason (logos), pleasure and pain be the rulers (cfr.
607a). In the treatment of the education of the guardians in books
II and III of this work the more moderate solution was proposed of
excluding from the poems the passages which for instance illustrated
the depreciable behaviour of some hero like Achilles. But of course
it would have been difficult to preserve a poem like the Ilias after
the big cuts to which it would have to be submitted. (It is true that
in the Laws, as we shall see, he contemplates the possibility of
revisions through rewriting of parts by another poet.) Anyhow,from
this other treatment, it is manifest that there are other, similar ways,
in which the poets are able to obtain an emotional involvement in
their audience. One example is that given at the beginning of book
III,where what is to be excluded is the depiction of the Hades done
in a fearful manner in a number of Homeric passages, for this would
encourage the fear of death in the guardians.A similar censure will
have to concern songs and music, for those melodies and rhythms
which express excessive lamentation and encourage sorrow (cfr.
III 398d-e, further Laws VII 800d-e) and those which are soft and
morbid (cfr. III 398e) must be excluded.
Plato does not deny that much of the fascination exercised by
poetry and by music depends precisely on the use of the techniques
he condemns.Thus, in Republic III,when propounding the exclusion
of the passages depicting Hades,he says that they are to be excluded
not because ‘not poetical and not sweet to the ears of the many’,
but because,‘the more poetical they are’, the less apt they are for
the ears of boys and men who are meant to be free and should fear
slavery more than death (cfr.387b).Later in this book he admits that
one of the styles to be avoided is not only pleasant, but by far the
most pleasant for children and their attendants and for ‘the many’
(cfr. 397d). In book X, when coming to «the gravest charge against
poetry», he remarks that even «the best of us» are induced to give
way to sympathy at the depiction of the suffering hero and to praise
as good the poet who most succeeds in stirring our feelings (cfr.
605c-d); that this praise is motivated by a feeling of pleasure is
suggested by what follows (esp. 605e6).Towards the conclusion of
the discussion it is conceded that poetry, especially that of Homer,
exercises a spell on the speakers themselves, so that they would be
happy if a defence could be found for her against the charges (cfr.
607c4-d1). But, it is added, if the defence fails, for it has not been
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shown that poetry is not just pleasant but also useful, we have to
give up our love for her, just as one has to give up a love for a person
when recognizing it is not beneficial.This is a childhood love (this
motif, introduced in 608a5, qualifies ‘the love from childhood’ of
595b9-10), prevalent in ‘the many’, which has been implanted in us
by the education that is imparted in cities with a noble constitution
(this allusion, in 607e6-608a1, is clearly ironical).Thus, in listening
what poetry has to say in her favour,‘we shall repeat to ourselves
like an incantation the argument we now put forward and be careful
not to fall’ into that love (608a2-5) - a suggestion that recalls what
had been said initially (in 595b6-7) of the need of an antidote
(pharmakon) against the effects of mimetic poetry through
knowledge of the truth (presumably the truth about mimesis) : ‘We
shall chant, therefore, that this sort of poetry (namely, imitative
poetry) is not to be taken seriously as if it had any contact with truth
and were a serious matter, but that the man who hears it must be
careful, fearing for his own constitution (politeia) [i.e. that of his
soul], and what we have said about poetry must be taken as
normative’ (608a6-b2).
These passages show an awareness on Plato’s part that aesthetic
values cannot be reduced to ethical values,only that he is not willing
to regard them as «values» at all, if they cannot be shown to be
completely in harmony with the ethical values.This possibility is
excluded,sometimes in a radical way,as in the treatment of Republic
X,when the effect of what is (admittedly) highly poetical, thus highly
satisfying from an aesthetic point of view, are pleasures that are
not pure. It is not excluded when the effect of what is beautiful
and/or harmonious consists in pleasures that are pure (on this point
see more below).The difference however between these two types
of artworks is not such that one can say that only one type of them
are genuine artworks,which are the only source of aesthetic values.
The recognition of this fact constitutes inevitably a serious problem
for Plato’s approach, and must have been one of the reasons why
his approach was abandoned by Aristotle.
Both in the case of Gorgias and in the case of Aristotle we can
say they contributed to aesthetics, even if their approaches are
different. But can one say that Plato contributed to aesthetics? One
way of giving a positive reply to this question is admitting that he
contributed unwittingly to it. In trying to convince his readers to
fight what for him is the devil, he is obliged to give a description of
it. In other words, in condemning a certain kind of aesthetic pleasure
as harmful,he has to explain how this harm works,and in this sense
he is contributing to aesthetics.(A reply of this type is given by Marc
Jemenez in his Qu’est-ce que l’esthétique, Paris 1997, pp. 228-29. I
quote: «Demandons-nous s’il n’est pas l’un des premiers à dire la
vérité de l’art.Il décrit dans le détail toutes les perversions auxquelles
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donne lieu l’activité artistique. Il recense le formes de séduction
qu’elle suscite et les vices qu’elle engendre, en montrant par quel
moyen elle agit sur l’âme. Pour condamner le mal, il faut en décrire
les symptômes et les effects. C’est bien ce que fait Platon. Il
diagnostique l’énergie érotique corrosive, subversive, dérangeante
contenue en puissance dans l’art, dans la poïesis, comme disent les
Grecs. Il croit nous mettre en garde; en fait, il attire notre attention
sur l’essentiel,à savoir sur la capacité de rupture de la création.Mieux
que quiconque, et déjà a son époque, il sait la où l’art fait mal et ce
que blesse: l’absence d’harmonie, les dissonances, les sons nouveaux,
les chorégraphies lascives, la poésie voluptueuse, la gymnastique
trop sensuelle ou trop acrobatique, la peinture virtuose, colorée et
chatoyante, les sculptures aux formes mouvantes… Non seulement
il dresse le catalogue des poètes et artistes interdits: Homère,
Aristophane,tous les musiciens disciples du satyre Marsyas,etc.,mais
il établit soigneusement la liste de plaisirs qu’on peut tirer de leur
fréquentation. Pour parler de façon anachronique, on pourrait dire
que Plato développe, parallèlement à une esthétique idéaliste, une
esthétique de la réception,de l’effet,e que sa réflexion sur l’art tient
à la fois de la sociologie et de la psychologie de l’art.») On the whole
I think this reply is correct,but in need of certain restrictions. In the
first place it is probable that we are induced to overrate the originality
of Plato’s contribution to aesthetics from this point of view, for the
little we know of Gorgias’ work makes one think that on various
points he developed what had already received a formulation by the
sophist. In the second place, Plato pursues this objective up to a
point, for it remains a secondary objective in his eyes, and his other
(primarily moral) preoccupations remain dominating. One could
add, on the other hand, that there are other ways in which Plato
shows concern with the fine arts.One of this ways is the postulation
of a sort of divine inspiration at the origin of their works. Even this
however is largely influenced by the negative objective of showing
that the poets do not possess genuine knowledge.Another way is
given by his thoughts about beauty, which are not negative in
purpose. Anyhow, it is one thing to say that Plato, in dealing with
the fine arts, gives contributions that are of interest for the history
of aesthetics, it is another thing to say that all or most of his
contributions are of such interest and were meant to enhance our
understanding of those arts from the aesthetician’s point of view.
We cannot ignore the context to which those contributions belong
and,as we shall see going on, in various cases it has little or nothing
to do with aesthetics.So there are reasons to question their traditional
collocation in the history of aesthetics.
Plato’s point of departure is the simple, basic question as to
how we should live, if in a just or an unjust way, as a good man or
not (cfr. Gorgias 487e-488a, 492d, 500b-d, Republic I 344d-e).The
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alternative between the just and the unjust life is at the centre of
whole treatment in the Republic.And this is recalled at the end of
the discussion of poetry in book X, where he expresses himself as
follows: «Great is the issue at stake (megas ho agon), greater than
appears, whether a man is to be good or bad.And what will any
one be profited if under the influence of honour or money or power,
aye,or under the excitement of poetry,he neglect justice and virtue?»
(608b4-8,Jowett’s transl.) The question about poetry is itself simple,
then: either it is not only pleasant but also useful (607d8), in the
sense of contributing to the goodness of the good life, or it just
should be excluded from one life.The same must be true of any other
art which has products which procure pleasure (notice that poetry
is associated to imitation in general in 607c5).
Less simple may however be the question of the way in which
either poetry or any other such art contribute, with their products,
to the goodness of the good life.This can in fact happen in an indirect
way. It would seem that Plato is willing to admit this in the passage
of the Laws (i.e. II 653c9-d5,quoted above, ch. 4) in which it is said
that the gods conceded to us men relief from labour or relaxation
ensured by the cultivation of the Muses in the occasion of events
such as religious festivals. Similarly, in another passage of the Laws
(i.e.VII 803d-e), it is said that the activities which have priority in
human life are those which take place in a condition of peace and
which have to do with play (or leisure:paidià) and with education
(paideia). Thus «a man should spend his whole life at ‘play’ -
sacrificing, singing, dancing - so that he can win the favour of the
gods and protect himself from his enemies and conquer them in
battle» (803e1-4, transl. Saunders).Welcoming, as a type of poetry
which is to be admitted, hymns to the gods is clearly in the spirit
of dedicating to the gods the time that is left free from labours
(including those of war).Still,the pleasure that comes from cultivating
certain forms of music on such occasions is not condemned, even
if it is not immediately a part of moral goodness.
Further,pursuing activities of this sort is not just a matter of making
a personal choice, for one is a member of a collectivity, of a city, and
must be concerned with what happens to the souls of the other
members of the collectivity.This itself is not without consequences
even for one’s own choices, for the education one receives and the
environment in which one lives can make a great difference. It is not
a chance if Plato, towards the end of the discussion in book X, in the
passage quoted above,refers polemically to the fact that love for poetry
is due to the education that is imparted in cities with a noble29
constitution (politeia) and, at the same time, invites us to be careful
about the constitution (politeia) of one’s own soul.
PLATO’S ATTITUDE TO POETRY 181
Études platoniciennes I
32. Cfr. Baldry, I greci a teatro [ital. transl.], Bari 1975, pp. 98-99, who later tou-
13 . Ar i s to t l e ’s  a t t i tude  to  ae s the t i c s  in  the  Poet ics
and in other  works
Before considering Plato’s attitude to aesthetics into some more
detail, I say something about Aristotle’s attitude, for this can offer a
useful term of comparison.On the whole Aristotle (following Gorgias
on this point) recognizes the peculiarity of the domain of the fine
arts and of aesthetic experience.What he says in Poetics ch. 25 and
elsewhere shows that he admits the existence of rules proper to any
given art and criteria of judgment concerning the products of that
art, and that he expects these to be respected by the persons
concerned.This is a situation that, in itself,should not lead to conflicts
with the requirements of morals.What is satisfactory or valuable
from an aesthetic point of view is also good for ethics, not because
(as Plato claimed) there is no value outside ethics but because what
has a genuine value from an aesthetic point of view cannot have
negative consequences from an ethical point of view. (It could
certainly be argued that the account that Aristotle gives of what is
in accordance to the rules of poetry and produces an aesthetic
pleasure is such as to require from the beginning some conformity
to what is ethically right;but it is important to point out that he sees
this conformity as required by those very rules of poetry, and not
as a consequence of the adoption of rules extraneous to the field.)
The practice of mimesis, as he points out at the beginning of his
Poetics, is proper to man’s nature just as his rationality, and one
cannot admit that a conflict arises between the two, for this would
imply that there are contrasting tendencies present in human nature.
Thus what belongs to this practice, i.e. the production of art-works
and their contemplation, cannot be morally harmful. Further, the
practice of mimesis, in its various forms, is a source of pleasure,
but pleasure, if harmless, is constitutive of happiness. Aesthetic
pleasure which is pure is harmless, as we have seen, for it is neutral
with respect to the virtue of temperance and, with greater reason
(it is implied),with respect to the other virtues.Even ‘impure’pleasure
is harmless if it has a cathartic effect, as in the case of tragedy. (On
this as on other points Aristotle is reacting to Plato’s position rather
than continuing Gorgias, without that this should mean that he
ignores the latter’s contribution.) 
Aristotle admits that the wish to come encounter the desires
of a non cultivated public can involve some perversion in the art.
This is to be noticed in his comment towards the end of Poetics
ch. 13, where he says that a certain type of composition is given
priority to another because of «the weakness of the audiences, for
the poets follow along, catering to their wishes» (1453a33-35). He
also remarks that even good poets may be induced to compose
tragedies in an unsatisfactory way,making them «episodic»,because
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they yield to the pressing requirements of their actors (cfr. 9,
1451b33 ff.), but clearly these actors themselves are motivated by
the wish to do what ensures their greatest success with the public.
(The evolution by which actors count more than the tragedians
or other poets is signaled in the passage of Rhetoric III 1
considered below.) Similarly in Politics VIII 6, 1341b8 ff., he
considers it as a danger of professionalism in the field of music
that one plays an instrument in view of a low end, which is the
pleasure of the audience and a pleasure which is vulgar. What
happens is that «the listener is a common person (phortikos)
and usually influences the music accordingly, so that it has an
effect both on the personality of the professionals themselves who
perform for him, and because of the motions which they make,
on their bodies too» (1341b15-18). That also rhetoric can be
perverted, for the same sort of reason, is suggested, with a parallel
with poetry, in Rhetoric III 1. Here Aristotle, in discussing the role
of delivery in rhetoric,points out that there had been an evolution
by which this part of rhetoric had acquired prevalence on the
others. Of the persons who are particularly able in the use of
the techniques of delivery he says that they are the ones who win
the contests, adding that “just as actors are more important now
than poets in the poetic contests, so it is in political contests
because of the sad state of governments” (1403b31-35). The
reference to “the sad state of governments” shows that the
prevalence of delivery is regarded as a perversion of rhetoric, so
that the same must be true of poetry, for here winning
competitions is seen as a sign of success with the general public,
but to do poetry with the purpose of winning them perverts it.
It is also clear, from Politics VIII 7, 1342a19-20, where he
introduces a distinction of two types of spectator, «the one a free
and educated man, the other vulgar …», and also from the
observations contained at the beginning of ch. 26 of the Poetics,
that he recognizes the existence of two types of audience, that
constituted by educated persons and that constituted by vulgar
ones. In what follows, in Politics VIII 7, he says rather dismissively
that «for the relaxation of this latter class also competitions and
spectacles must be provided». That also the anthropomorphic
representation of the gods contained in traditional myths, though
of course not true, is to be regarded as good for the moltitude, in
that belief in their reality may induce them to respect the laws, thus
as a useful expedient, is something that is explicitly said by Aristotle
in Metaphysics book XII 8, 1074b3-7.That he shares with Plato a
low opinion of the majority of people was already remarked above
(ch. 11). But the multitude is opposed to a minority of educated
people, of which the philosophers are a part, even if a particularly
significant part, and not just to the very few philosophers, as it
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happens with Plato. And these educated persons are those who
exercise the right appreciation towards the works of art.
This attitude by Aristotle is not indifferent for his actual treatment
of tragedies in his Poetics, for he tends to present Sophocles as
superior to Euripides not only for reasons connected with the
composition of tragedies (e.g. the role attributed to the choir, cfr.
ch.18,1456b25 ff.; recourse to the deus ex machina,cfr.15,1454b1
ff.; a more general but unspecified reproach against Euripides is to
be found in 13,1453a29) but also because the characters represented
in them are noble,not those of ordinary persons (cfr.ch.25,1460b32
ff., also ch. 4, 1448b24 ff., and ch. 15), because ‘irrational’ acts (such
as the killing of a person) are left out of the drama (cfr.ch.15,1454b6-
8), and for other similar reasons which, it can be presumed, are
noticed by an educated public.
Concerning his general approach in the Poetics, it can be said,
rather synthetically, that is to be associated to what sometimes has
been called genre criticism,with a concern with formal aspects like
composition and structure of the works he considers. It is indicative
of this perspective that he should talk of the function or work (ergon)
of tragedy (cfr. 6, 1459a30-31 and 13, 1452b29-30), evidently
supposing it to be different from other genres like comedy, just as
he talks,as we have seen above (ch.10),of the pleasure that is proper
to each genre. (He also talks more generally of the ergon of the art
of poetry, cfr. 26, 1426b12-15.) The idea is that each genre has its
own characteristics and its internal needs that must be respected
by the poet and which are taken into account in expressing
judgements about the value of each work.Also indicative of this
perspective is the subordination of the character to the plot and
also, implicitly, to the genre, for what matters is not so much how
it is to be valued from a moral point of view as how it fits in the
sort of story in which the personage which has it plays a part (thus
noble characters will be found typically in tragedies and ignoble
ones will be found typically in comedies).30 Similarly he thinks that
the various episodes in which a drama can be divided and the sort
of crucial events that can be identified in it (such as recognition and
reversal) must contribute to the work as a whole, which is to be
regarded as having a unitary plot.All these are aspects, in tragedies
and other poetic works,that can only be appreciated by connoisseurs.
From all this it can be inferred that the poetics Aristotle is
propounding (as part of an aesthetics) is addressed to the public of
educated people. His attitude to pleasure is connected with this
position, for he tends to admit that educated people will prove
pleasure at learning,so that the pleasure provided by a good tragedy
will not just be a purely aesthetic pleasure, but a combination of
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30. On this classificatory use of character cfr. also part II, ch. 19.
aesthetic pleasure and the pleasure of learning. (It is not a chance
that he insists on this sort of pleasure in Poetics ch.4. An intellectualist
attitude is evident in his Rhetoric as well, and has an application to
the pleasure procured by the imitative arts in I 11, 1371b4 ff.There
anyhow he seems to admit that the pleasure provoked by what is
admirable or surprising (thaumaston) is not reducible to that of
learning;that the plots of dramas have or ought to have this character
is suggested there and in Poetics 24,1460a12 ff., further 18,1456a19
ff.) Contrary to Plato,however,he believes that this sort of pleasure
can be obtained by the works of Homer and of the Attic tragedians,
with Sophocles mainly in mind,for Euripides,though called the ‘most
tragic’of them (cfr.13,1453a29-30),seems to be thought of as having
produced a work that reflected a corruption of taste.
Aristotle’s devaluation of scenery and even of music in the case
of tragedy as elements which have influence on the mass but should
not be much considered by connoisseurs,who are able to appreciate
a tragedy even if read, probably reflects this same attitude (cfr. ch.
6, end; 14, 1453b7 ff; 26, 1462a11 ff.).Yet there seems to be some
ambivalence on his part on this matter. One reason for devaluating
those elements seems to be that they can have a strong effect on
our emotions. But in the case of the story or plot he expects that
the main events represented be put by the poet «under our eyes»,
that is to say rendered particularly concrete and lifelike, so as to
obtain the maximum of involvement of our emotions (cfr. ch. 17,
beginning, and also ch. 14, beginning).
Finally, it is of importance to stress that Aristotle appears to
be convinced that poetry offers instruction and not only pleasure,
because he generally admits of imitation that it satisfies the need
to learn, adding that by acquiring knowledge it also becomes a
source of pleasure (cfr. Poet. 4, 1448b12 ff., also Rhet. I 11, 1371b4
ff. [see also above, ch. 6]). Further, he propounds (in Poetics 9) a
comparison between poetry and history which makes the former
‘more philosophical’ than the latter, and this must mean that it
offers more instruction than the latter, for philosophy is by him
normally associated with learning and teaching (didaké). It has
thus to be presumed that both tragedy and epos (given that the
latter is associated to the former) are genres of poetry which offer
instruction, i.e. are such that e.g. assisting to the representation
of a tragedy makes one learn something. Unfortunately Aristotle
never tries to explain where this instruction does lay. He certainly
has not in mind the instruction which is traditionally claimed for
poetry and which is rejected by Plato, that is to say, concerning
matters like religious ones, for he shows no interest for them. It
can however be conjectured that the instruction lays where history
would provide it, given the comparison between poetry and
history.
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One would expect history to be instructive (beyond the
information that is given by a work of history) in the sense in which
it is traditionally said to be magistra vitae. In the first place,it teaches
that the fortunes of men can change for the worse, or that there is
some alternation in the fortunes of men (this idea is expressed by
Herodotus I 5).This sort of teaching, concerning the fortunes of
other people, makes one both prepared to any turning of fortune
in one’s life and moderate in enjoying one’s good fortune when one
benefits from it (this point, implicit in Herodotus, is developed by
Polybius, I 1, 2). It also teaches what men are like in their nature,
for men of all sorts play a role in the scene of history. (It is this sort
of instruction that Thucydides appears to have in mind in I 22, 4,
where he suggests that the future will be like the past because
evidently he assumes an immutability of human nature.) Aristotle
himself seems to think of this second explanation in so far as he
insists on the causal or quasi-causal character of the concatenation
of events that is illustrated by a tragedy (on this point cfr. Part II,
ch. 29). In any case it is sufficiently clear that these claims can be
made in the case of tragedy.
What is surprising, on the other hand, is that Aristotle does not
take position in any direct way on these claims as made by historians
in favour of history. He appears to be of the conviction (expressed
in ch. 23), that in history no causal or other connections can be
established among events,but this is manifestly a very reductive way
of considering it. No word is dedicated to Thucydides’ claim to the
contrary,on the basis of an approach that is oriented in finding those
connections among events. Polybius on this point shows himself
polemical towards Aristotle when he declares that the aim (telos) of
tragedy and that of history are not the same but,rather, the contrary,
for tragedy with its persuasive discourses aims at startling and
seducing (psychagogein) the spectators by means of the deception
(hapate) it uses, while history is instructive and convincing for the
lovers of learning (cfr. II 56, 11-1231). Of course this is as reductive
a conception of tragedy as that held by Aristotle about history.A
more equilibrated position is adopted by Strabo, who, in his
Geography, admits that poetry’s capacity to exercise seduction
(psychagogia) does not exclude its offering instruction (didaskalia)
(cfr. I 2, 3-5), while also asserting the usefulness of history for its
formative character in ethics and in politics (cfr. I 1, 22-23).
In conclusion, from what Aristotle says in Poetics ch. 25 it can
be inferred that to express judgements about the value of those
works is not the competence of the politician (this tends to involve
the exclusion of ethics which is for him is subordinated to politics).
WALTER G. LESZL186
Études platoniciennes I
31.Quoted by Hartog and Casevitz,L’histoire d’Homère à Augustin,Paris 1999,
p. 121
On this point there clearly is a divergence between his position
and that adopted by Plato, for, even if it would be a simplification
to say that for the latter the only sort of judgement that can be given
of the works of a fine art is that by the politician, his decision has
precedence.Yet the very fact that, as we have seen above (ch. 3),
Aristotle himself attributes to the politician another sort of
competence,which is of particular importance for the organization
of the education in a well-ordered polis (it is not a chance that he
gives much attention to this topic in Politics book VIII), shows that
he is not unconcerned with the ethical consequences of our reactions
to the works of art.
14. An al ternative approach to Plato ’s  «phi losophy of
ar t»
An alternative to traditional interpretations lies in the suggestion
by some scholars (esp. by Nehamas, «Plato on the Mass Media»,
Monist 71,1988,pp.214-234,reprinted in his Virtues of Authenticity.
Essays on Plato and Socrates, Princeton 1999, ch. 13, from which
I quote) that Plato’s critique of imitative poetry should be taken as
substantially equivalent to the critique of the mass media, and in
particular of television, which is given by certain intellectuals
nowadays.It concerns the influence which these mass media exercise
on people,both in creating and/or propagating certain opinions and
in producing certain emotional attitudes. Nehamas thinks we are
prevented from having a right understanding of Plato’s position
because of the importance that such figures as Homer and Aeschylus
possess in our literary tradition and because «Plato’s argument with
poetry concerns a practice that is today paradigmatically a fine art»
(art.cit.,p.287).But in his times «poetry was popular entertainment»
and was considered as such by the philosopher. This applies
particularly to Plato’s main target, drama, for the audience could
amount to 17.000 people who were not well-behaved and were
representative of the great mass of the Athenian people.According
to Nehamas,«nothing in Plato’s time answered to our concept of the
fine arts, especially to the idea that the arts are a province of a
small and enlightened part of the population (which may or may
not be interested in attracting the rest of the people to them), and
Plato holds no views about them» (art. cit., p. 289). What the
philosopher is concerned with is a widespread attitude similar to
that which,nowadays, is held by people towards television.For them
«what is presented on television is a duplicate of what occurs in the
world. No interpretation seems to be needed in order to reveal and
to understand the complex relations that actually obtain between
them. By contrast, no one believes that the fine arts produce such
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duplications. (…) The fine arts, we believe, bear an indirect,
interpretative relationship to the world, and further interpretation
on the part of the audience and critics is necessary in order to
understand it. It is precisely for this sort of interpretation that the
popular arts do not seem to call.» (art. cit., p. 290).
The parallel thus propounded by Nehamas is to some extent
illuminating,but also, to some extent,misleading and unsatisfactory.
Tragedy and other forms of poetry or of art did constitute a kind of
popular entertainment in a city like Athens, but this fact does not
exclude their being appreciated by educated people with refined
judgement. As already remarked, a distinction of two types of
spectator, «the one a free and educated man, the other vulgar…», is
made in a general form, but with (likely) application to tragedy, by
Aristotle in Politics VIII 7,1342a19-20.From this point of view more
helpful than the parallel with television is that with the cinema, for
this undoubtedly is a popular art, but one which attracts a minority
of connoisseurs.The problems raised by drama and by epic must
have been discussed by these experts, for this practice of discussion
was giving rise to some forms of written literary criticism, as is
evident from Aristotle’s Poetics (e.g.ch.25 of this work is dedicated
to the problemata raised by epic, especially Homeric epic, and is
probably based on Aristotle’s lost work on Homeric problems.)
Nehamas argues that Plato was not concerned with art as such, as
is shown by the fact that he did not treat the artists in the same way,
banishing them all from his model city:«neither painting nor sculpture
is outlawed by Plato» (art. cit., p. 281).This all, I think, reflects some
misunderstanding of Plato’s position, for not all poetry is outlawed
and not all painting or other imitative art is admitted (see Part II,
esp.ch.16),but even if it were right it would not show that the point
of difference lies in the fact that these are not forms of «popular
entertainment». In asserting, in the passage quoted above, that
«nothing in Plato’s time answered to our concept of the fine arts»,
he is influenced by Kristeller’s approach, but this, we have seen, is
not adequate.
Further, to treat forms of poetry as «entertainment» is not
satisfactory,for they also constituted the basis of the education given
to young people. By the way in which they exploited traditional
myths, tragedies and other works had an important part in the
transmission of religious beliefs.Further, the enactment of tragedies
just as other forms of recitation or performance (playing music etc.)
belonged,at least to some extent, to the religious ceremonies which
had an important part in the life of the typical Athenian.This is
certainly not to say that his main attitude must always have been of
religious awe rather than of amusement, but it was not quite the
same attitude as a contemporary who watches television. Rather
than stressing that these arts were «popular» one should remark that
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their presence was pervasive, for, on the whole, there was no form
of culture that was not invested by their influence, nor part of the
population, however small, that was exempt from it.
Apart from all this, it is difficult to evaluate the capacity of the
Athenian public at large to appreciate dramas and other works from
an aesthetic point of view.However the suggestion by Nehamas that
there was involvement without distance and without any sufficient
consciousness that fiction was at issue seems to be extreme. He
maintains that «popular entertainment, in theory and practice, is
generally taken to be inherently realistic.To be inherently realistic
is to seem to represent reality without artifice, without mediation
and convention. Realistic art is, just in the sense in which Plato
thought of imitation, transparent.» (art. cit., p. 288). From the last
assertion it can be desumed that (as is stated by Nehamas more
explicitly in his companion article «Plato on imitation and poetry
in Republic X») Plato’s account of imitation is fitted to account for
this sort of realism. For the moment I limit myself to remarking
that the suggestion about realism is not so plausible in the case of
ancient Greek drama.The authors of tragedies were rielaborating
existing myth, so that the effect of surprise and of novelty was
reduced (see Aristotle’s observations in Poetics ch. 13, 1453a17 ff.,
and ch.14,1453b22 ff.),even if of course the variations with respect
to those myths were not insignificant. Realism on the scene was
rather limited, because of technical limitations (skenographia was
seen as a significant development), because the scene was in the
open air,and because the presence of the choir was an obstacle from
this point of view32. Further, drama was more told than acted (as
Beye notices there, pp. 128-129).
An approach partly similar to that of Nehamas is that adopted
by M.Burnyeat in his «Culture and Society in Plato’s Republic», Tanner
Lectures on Human Values 20, 1999, pp. 217-324. He is admittedly
close to Nehamas in pointing out that the role of poetry and drama
in the Greek world is different from that which they have in our
world, where they «have become minority, often élite pursuits»,
and that «the things Plato would focus on if he were asking his
questions today (…) would be recorded music (both popular and
classical) with which we are surrounded at home and in public
places; popular magazines; radio, film and TV; and the images in
advertisements», for «these are the universal media of cultural
transmission today» (art. cit., pp. 249-50). However, while he tends
too easily to assume that Plato has little interest in art and in aesthetic
experience as such, to some extent he avoids the narrowness of
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ches upon the former point; also C.R.
Beye, Ancient Greek Literature and
Society, Ithaca 1987, 2nd ed., p. 128 , 130-
31 and 150 on the former point.
33. Logos clearly is taken in this
sense,as confirmed by the opposition in
Nehamas’approach by talking,as we can see,of «cultural transmission»
rather than of «popular entertainment» (he does talk of «popular
forms of entertainment» at p.255).He insists, rightly in my view,that
Plato is much concerned with «gradual, unnoticed influence» (p.
252) that is exercised by the forms of music to which one gets
used from an early age, just as it is exercised by the material
environment (symbolically represented in the Republic by couches
and tables as furniture which is produced by arts like painting and
architecture).
One fruitful notion that is introduced by Burnyeat in his article
is that of the «total culture». He rightly remarks, at the beginning,
that «if you are designing an ideal society, as Plato does in the
Republic,and contrasting it with the corruptions of existing societies,
as he also does in the Republic, then you need to think about much
more than political institutions in a narrow sense.You need to think
about all the influences,all the ideas, images,and practices,that make
up the culture of a society» (art. cit., p. 217). In what follows he
specifies that he intends «culture» in the widest and anthropological
sense, as (following a dictionary’s definition) «the total of inherited
ideas, beliefs, values, and knowledge, which constitute the shared
basis of social action». Plato’s concern with the arts is a part of his
more inclusive concern with the culture of his ideal society.This is
illustrated by his concern with music, which is not understood in
the narrow sense of rhythm and attunement. «Those rhythms and
attunements convey verbal messages to the soul, and Plato is
concerned about their content as about their musical form. In an
ideal city, the whole culture must be as ideal as possible, because
all of it influences the character of the citizens.» (art. cit., p. 222)
Later on he remarks that the norms that are formulated for literature
in Republic II and III have the consequence that «very little of the
Greek literature we know would remain intact, and much of the
art would disappear», and that from them it is clear that «the whole
culture» will be reshaped in the ideal city (art. cit., pp. 259-60 and
261).
Burnyeat is less explicit on the issue whether what Plato is
criticizing and rejecting is itself considered by him as a «total culture»,
which would have to be considered as the culture proper to
democracy.This point is of importance, not only because one must
be clear about whether Plato is only rejecting some features of
existing societies,those that make them corrupt,or something more.
There is also the issue whether Plato, in conceiving the culture he
is rejecting as the total culture of democratic society, is operating
in such a way, by selection, by drawing certain connections, and so
forth, as to make it more consistent than it ever was.And there is
the further issue that he may be ignoring the fact that propounding
a radically reformed society is possible in a context of discussion
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and criticism which can be found only in democracies. In any case
Burnyeat shows awareness of the political implications of Plato’s
attitude to art.In talking about Plato’s «ban on dramaturgy» he remarks
that «contemporary readers would be sensitive to the political
dimension of Plato’s decision.Athenian tragedy and comedy were
intensely democratic institutions, both in the ways they were
organized and in their physical presence.» (art. cit., p. 274) Plato
himself, he adds, draws attention to «the link between theatre and
democracy» (p.275),making reference to some passages which will
be quoted by me later on. He also points out that «the Athenian
democracy, audience for much of the poetry Plato objected to,
accepted that it was their responsibility to ensure the quality of
the poetry funded by the state. In modern terms, they thought that
democracy should care about whether the mass media encourage
the right sorts of values.» (art.cit.,p.255) Some opportune references
to actuality serve him to make it evident that Plato’s questions are
not obsolete.
I quote two particularly significant passages and also quote the
final lines from his conclusion: «It is not surprising (…) that
advertisements, film, and TV provoke in us the very same concern
as Plato has in the Republic.Are their effects on the souls of the citizen
body,especially when young,harmful or beneficial? Plato’s question
«Shall we banish Homer, tragedy, and comedy? is an ancient version
of the question we would be asking if we stopped to wonder whether,
if we had known or suspected at the outset what we now know or
suspect about TV and its influence, we should have let it go ahead.
Would life without TV, or without advertising, be spiritually better?
But Plato’s focus is interestingly different from ours. First, sex and
violence are less important than moral and religious values more
generally.» (p. 250) «Most of us do not share Plato’s confidence that
objectively correct answers to these questions exist, and that, given
the right education, men and women of talent can come to know
what the answers are.Even if we did have that confidence,we would
not think it right to impose our answers on everybody else.
Democracy,both ancient and modern,puts a high value on individual
choice and autonomy.That complicates the task.A further complication
is that our culture values innovation and originality: after the initial
shock, we welcome the new ways of seeing and hearing brought to
us by Picasso or Stravinsky; we enjoy the sparkle of sophisticated
advertisements. But none of this relieves us of responsability for
thinking about what we can do to improve the world in which our
children grow up.» (p.286) «If we agree with Plato about the power
of mimesis (ancient or modern, epic and drama or advertising, film,
and TV),but reject his authoritarian solution,then democratic politics
has to take responsibility for the general ethos of society. Plato’s
problem is still with us. It needs a modern solution» (p. 324.)
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The adoption of this approach by Burnyeat makes it disappointing
that he should restrict his attention to the Republic,only exceptionally
referring to other dialogues.It is surprising for instance that he should
maintain that Plato in this dialogue is much concerned with the
conviviality of the symposium as a typically Greek institution, and
make no reference to the Laws, where this topic is discussed in a
much more explicit way.And there are various other points of contact
between these two dialogues which suggest that the later one
contains developments that throw light on various views expressed
in the Republic.There are other limitations of his approach, such
as that he does not give a survey of the whole range of critiques
which Plato addresses to the arts, and that he does not consider
tragedy as such. Inside the total culture art maintains its specificity,
which is not ignored by Plato himself but is not always sufficiently
stressed by Burnyeat in the account he gives of his position. Even
the title he adopts,“culture and society”,can give rise to misgivings,
for the arts do not exhaust the sphere of culture. But there are of
course quite a number of points on which his discussion is
illuminating, and I shall sometimes refer to these contributions as
completing certain I intend to give.
15. A survey of  P lato ’s contr ibut ions  in the  l ight  of
his  intent ions
The point of departure of an account of Plato’s contributions to
the treatment of the fine arts should precisely be that of clarifying
his intentions in dealing with them, instead of starting with the
preconception that, given his topic, his approach can only belong
to aesthetics.His intentions are particularly explicit in the treatment
he gives of the fine arts in Laws, book II, so it is convenient to have
a look at this first of all.The pretext of the discussion in that book is
that of the educative effect of the drinking parties or symposia, and
the topic that is actually introduced (at the beginning of the book)
is education (paideia), on the ground that, if one wants to give a
proper regulation to the parties, one has to reach clarity about the
correctness in music (mousikes orthotes), and this itself cannot be
obtained without consideration of education (paideia) as a whole
(cfr. 642a-b).A relatively restrictive definition of education is given
there, regarding it as «the initial acquisition of virtue by the child,
when the feelings of pleasure and affection,pain and hatred,that well
up in his soul are channeled in the right courses before he can
understand the reason why» (653b-c). In what follows however the
concern is not exclusively with education in this narrow sense,either
because the conception of education is enlarged or because a
continuity is admitted between education and the care of the soul
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which (at the very end of of book I) is presented as the task proper
of political art (techne politiké, 650b). In any case it is admitted
that the fine arts, either through direct performance or through
attendance to performances (adopting the role of the spectator is
said to be prevalent with old men, cfr. 657d), continue to have the
effects on adults which they had on young people. In this way the
attention is directed on the fine arts,which explicitly include music.
That it is the legislator or politician who has the task of overseeing
the pedagogical effects which are had by the arts is clear from a
number of passages. Egypt is taken as a model for the way in which
certain rhythms, styles and so forth are prescribed by law as the
only right or correct ones, saying that this prescription is the task of
the legislator or politician (cfr. 657a). In what follows it is suggested
more than once that the legislator or politician must tell (by persuasion
but, failing this,by compulsion) the authors or composers what sort
of works or compositions can be admitted as having an educative
value (cfr. 660a ff., 660e, 661c, further 671c in connection with the
drinking parties; this point is recalled later, in book IV 719b).
The topic of education is taken up again in book VII,giving attention
first to children’s games, then also to music.The insistence here (as
in some earlier parts,including that concerning what is done in Egypt)
is on the harmful effects of any change in what is being practised,
suggesting that the legislator or other authority should intervene to
prevent it (cfr. 798b, 799a ff., 800a-b). Further, this surveillance must
be extended to contents, and is one of the tasks of the legislator or
guardian of the laws (cfr. 801c-d, and what follows, also 810-11; it is
admitted, in the first passage and in 811d and 812e-813a, that there
are guardians of the laws or officials in charge of education). On the
high importance attributed to education cfr. also 803d (notice that
education is said not to be the responsibility of the fathers, for the
children «belong more to the polis than to their parents», 804d).
In books II and III of the Republic Plato’s concern is declaredly
with music (mousiké), but at the first stage he does not consider
music in our sense of the word, for he does not say anything about
tunes and rhythms, but his concern is with what we would call
literature, though not with it in all its forms. It is sufficiently clear
from the transition he makes at some point from consideration of
discourses (logoi) to consideration of diction (lexis), i.e.of the mode
of verbal expression (especially in recitation), that his concern up
to that point (i.e. 392c) is with contents. (A discussion of «diction»
will be given below, chs. 19 and 22) In fact Plato’s concern is, to a
large extent, with story-telling not only in poetry but also in prose
(he talks generally of story-makers in 377c,and,in that same context,
mentions stories or myths told by nurses and mothers [see also Laws
X 887d], further he talks of the first stories heard by young people,
but it is not likely these are all put in verse; he also mentions those
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who speak or tell stories in addition to the ‘poets’ in 380c, and he
talks of speech and of poetry in 383a, of prose33 and verse in 390a,
of poets and writers in prose [logopoioi] in 392b, of discourse in
general rather than of poems in 392c, of poet and story-teller in III,
392d,398b,while in 396e he talks generally of a rhetor; on the other
hand he talks of forms of poetry in 379a),though it is clear that poets
like Hesiod and Homer (explicitly mentioned in 377d and passim)
have a particularly important role in their composition and
transmission. In fact most of the passages that are quoted and
submitted to criticism come from Homer’s poems and from the
tragedians.The interest thus is in the sort of literature which consists
in story-telling or in telling myths, but poetry is put at the center in
view of the authority recognized to some poets (starting with Homer)
in the transmission of myths and of religious beliefs,mainly because
of the representation they offer of the gods and of the heroes (for
the importance of Homer and of Hesiod in this field see the well-
known assertion of Herodot II 53; their concern with the
representation of the gods is evident in the very discussion conducted
by Plato in this part, which is said to be aimed at a definition of the
typoi tes theologias, cfr. 379a - though it also concerns the
representation of the heroes -,and is asserted by him in book X 598e,
as an opinion generally held about them). In III 398b, the speaker
(Socrates) says they exhausted the part of mousiké which concerns
speeches (logoi) and tales (mythoi); the attention in what follows
is given to music in the strict sense, since the concern is with
harmonies and rhythms (from 398c onwards), with extension, at
some stage (from 400e onwards) to the other fine arts (apparently
always from the point of view of what can be called ethical mimesis
[on this cfr.below,ch.28]).As already remarked, this whole account
is said to belong to mousiké, for it is introduced in this way in 377e,
there is mention of mousiké concerning tales in the passage already
mentioned, and in 403c it is said that the discourse about mousiké
has come to an end.But mousiké is presented as the part of education
(paideia) which, in contradistinction with gymnastics, is directed
to the soul (cfr. 376e).The starting point is in fact the question as
to what education is to be given to the guardians (cfr. 376e), and in
various passages it is made clear that he is answering this question
(cfr. II 378c; 383c, III 394e; 398b, 401c; 402c).
Thus also in this part of the Republic, as in the parts of the Laws
considered above, Plato’s treatment of poetry and of the fine arts is
given in the context of a discussion of education,and not for its own
sake. But it has to be admitted, to complete this survey, that not all
his main treatments of poetry and of the fine arts arts are given in




the account given in Republic book X, that he is concerned with
education (paideia). On the other hand, one cannot regard this
treatment as wholly independent from that given in books II and III.
At its beginning he takes up the question that was raised in III
394d and 398a-b, whether certain poets should be admitted in the
city,and there the concern was clearly with education (this is explicit
in the second passage).And this is the question to which he gives
a negative reply at the end of the discussion (cfr.607a).That he keeps
the issue of education in his mind is shown by the fact that,
immediately before that negative conclusion,he recalls the reputation
which Homer had as the educator of Hellas (cfr.606e), implying that
there no good justification for it.This point had been developed
earlier,where some grounds had been offered to exclude that Homer
had been able to educate men and make them better (cfr. 600a-c,
where there is an unfavourable comparison not only with Pythagoras
but also with sophists like Protagoras, which certainly cannot be
taken wholly seriously). No doubt it is not only his inability as an
educator but also that in other things (e.g. in administrating cities)
which is pointed out,but it is the former to which more importance
is given. Further, if we take education in the largest sense of the
word,as the provision of that care of the soul that makes men better,
this is at issue in the whole discussion, for poetry is criticized in
the main for the fact that it has the effect of introducing in the
souls of the public a bad order or constitution (a kakè politeia) (cfr.
605b,and cfr.608a,where this motif is recalled).The question which
is explicitly raised is whether poetry is not only a source of pleasure
but also is beneficial to orderly government and all the life of man
(ophelime pros tas politeias kai ton bion ton anthropinon) (cfr.
607d).
On the whole it would seem that the treatment of poetry and
of painting in book X cannot be regarded as wholly independent
with respect to the treatment of books II and III. Now, what he
says of Homer and other poets in Resp. II-III has rather disastrous
consequences for their poetry,since Plato cannot have been unaware
that the works of these poets present some unity,so that one cannot
leave out much of what is said about the gods and the heroes and
still claim that what remains after all this censure is e.g. a tragedy
that can be played in a theatre.(The issue of the unity of these works
is well present in his mind, as shown by his insistence on the unity
of any well done work in the Phaedrus and in the Politicus) Certainly
the conclusion that is drawn in Resp. III 401b, that the poets should
either ‘embody in their poems the semblance of the good character
or else not write poetry among us’, has negative implications for
Homer and the other poets.And this explains why at the beginning
of book X he can regard as something already established that it
should be refused ‘to admit at all as much of it (poetry) as is imitative’.




In book X Plato offers a justification of the censures to which he
had submitted the works of poets like Homer by showing, in the
main,that (a) their authors do not possess genuine knowledge about
the objects they are reproducing, (b) the works themselves have a
negative effect on the condition (or constitution) of the soul of their
hearers or viewers. On point (a) there is an opposition between
the poet’s lack of sophia and its possession by the philosopher (this
goes back to the Apology).On point (b) his concern seems to extend
to adult hearers and viewers, but the point of view of education
(paideia) declaredly adopted in book II and III is not in fact
abandoned.No doubt the treatment of imitation (mimesis) on which
these conclusions are based goes somewhat beyond these limits and
has some interest in itself, as we shall see.
The view expressed by various scholars that the first half of book
X (if not the whole book) is extraneous to the rest of the work, or,
using Julia Annas’ outspoken assertion, «an excrescence» (cfr. her
Introduction to Plato’s Republic, Oxford 1981, p. 335) does not
seem to be right, without denying that this treatment of poetry
presents some puzzling aspects and that its connection with the
treatment given in books II and III is not unproblematic. Points (a)
and (b) just touched upon constitute some of the reasons for coming
back to this topic. In the case of (b) the treatment given in book X
draws benefit not only (as is declared at the very beginning of the
book) from the treatment of the soul, with its internal divisions, in
book IV, but also from the treatment of pleasure given in some
passages of books VIII and IX and from other developments to be
found in these books (concerning both soul and city).There is also
a point which, according to Plato’s express declaration, was not
discussed in books II and III, namely the rules that should be laid
down about how to treat men. After having laid down the rules
about how to treat gods and demons and heroes, there are these
other rules that are to be laid down,but this cannot be done before
having discovered what justice is and how advantageous it is to
the possessor (cfr. 392a-c). Indeed, it cannot be said that what Plato
does in book X is to lay down those rules in the way in which he
laid down those other rules. But the question that is touched upon
in this part,namely that «about men poets and story-tellers are guilty
of making the gravest misstataments when they tell us that wicked
men are often happy and the good miserable…», receives some
treatment in book X, as we shall see.
A peculiar position in Plato’s production is taken by the short
dialogue Ion, in which Socrates conduces a discussion with the
rhapsode Ion,with the purpose of ascertaining what kind of capacity
is involved in both his rhapsodic skill and in that of the poets whose
works he recites and interprets.The concern is with performance
in the case of the rhapsode, but also with the source of the poets’
capacity to invent and compose,and with the reaction of the public
to performance by the rhapsode of inspired poetry. The conclusion
reached is the negative one that both the rhapsode and the poet
do not possess a genuine art (techne), for they work under a divine
inspiration, in a manner comparable to that of diviners or of other
«possessed» people.There is a convergence in this negative result
between what we find in this dialogue and what we find in Republic
X, for there too it is excluded that the poet possesses a genuine art
(techne) or that he can be a wise person, only that this result is
obtained in a different way,by pointing out the limitations involved
in imitation (mimesis). It would have to be clarified how far these
treatments are complementary to one another.
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